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Welfare impacts of alternative pest management strategies of False Codling Moth 
(FCM) threatening California’s oranges are examined. Different economic agents along 
the supply chain of fresh oranges and orange products in the United States are 
considered, including consumers, retailers, wholesalers, and growers. A partial 
equilibrium dynamic framework that accounts for supply response from the other US 
orange producing states is developed. Data for supply shocks (orange yield losses and 
control costs) are obtained from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the 
United States Department of Agriculture (APHIS). 
FCM is not presently in the United States. If introduced to California and no action 
is taken for its control, FCM can spread in all of California’s orange acreage within 10-12 
years resulting in an annual crop loss of 11.25%. In addition to a No Mitigation Scenario, 
three pest management scenarios are considered for control/eradication of the pest where 
growers in infested areas are assumed to pay all the costs: The Pesticide Treatment and 
Area-Wide Pest Management scenarios slow down the pest spread to reach 9.3% and 
1.89% of California’s orange bearing acreage in 30 years respectively. The annual per 
acre cost is $380.9 for the former scenario and $2310.5 for the later scenario. The 
xiv 
Eradication Scenario eradicates the pest in seven years (the pest almost disappears in the 
second year) at an annual cost of $3508.5 per acre besides stripping off the entire yield of 
the infested orchard. 
The results show that California orange growers’ ranking of the alternative 
scenarios in terms of their total welfare impacts in 30 years is opposite to that of 
consumers and retailers in all the US regions, California wholesalers and the US as a 
whole. The No Mitigation Scenario which leads to the highest welfare losses for the US 
as a whole (-$1240 million) is associated with the highest gains for California orange 
growers ($1063 million). The Eradication Scenario which results in the lowest welfare 
losses for the US as whole (-4 million) is associated with the lowest welfare gains for 
California orange growers in non-infested areas and the highest individual grower 
welfare losses for California orange growers in infested areas (a total loss of -$0.93 
million for all California orange growers).   
1 
 
CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Problem Statement 
The introduction of a plant pest outbreak to an environment can have significant 
economic and ecological impacts. For example, the citrus canker infestation in Florida 
consumed over $1.4 billion of federal and state expenditures in efforts to combat the 
disease (Lowe 2009). Also, the total acreage of orange in Florida was reduced by 32% in 
2008 from its level in 1996. Although it is not clear whether all such losses in acreage can 
be attributed to citrus canker, 87,000 acres of orange trees representing 10% of the total 
orange acreage in Florida were lost in eradication efforts (Lowe 2009). This is besides 
yield losses, higher production costs, loss of some markets, and the environmental 
impacts of pesticide use.  
Management of plant pests and other invasive species may trigger government 
regulation. The individual or company who introduces or spreads a potentially invasive 
plant pest may not bear the full costs associated with their action so that private and 
social costs diverge. Even if the source of incursion of the pest incurs some costs, the cost 
to other agents and non-market costs may not be internalized in private decisions. In 
addition, prevention and control of plant pest outbreaks can require extensive monitoring 
and surveillance both by the regulatory authority and market agents. Although there may 
be market incentives to control plant pests, market failures at the prevention, eradication 
2 
and control stages may entail a role for government at one or more of such stages (Alam 
and Rofle 2006).  
Identification of the appropriate management policy is a critical decision facing 
regulators. Management policies may require huge government funds and may have 
impacts on several stakeholders, including consumers, retailers, wholesalers, growers, as 
well as export and import markets. Therefore, the choice of the pest risk management 
regulation should be based on pest risk assessment that considers the relevant economic 
welfare effects on the different agents. The welfare effects should be decomposed to 
consider the disproportionate impacts the regulation might have on certain sub-groups 
that are traditionally treated as homogeneous, like producers (Paarlberg, Lee, and 
Seitzinger 2003). Also, the welfare analysis should consider the trade impacts, even if the 
object of the regulation is not international trade. For example, applying an eradication 
policy that entails tree removals and quarantines implies reduction in the product supply. 
The extent to which the product price increases in the domestic market and the 
subsequent impacts on producer and consumer surplus is affected by the possibility that 
imports fill the gaps in demand. If the product is also exported, the export market 
regulations following the pest outbreak are important to consider. A ban on exports may 
imply more of the domestic production available to domestic consumers; thus offsetting 
or more than offsetting the impact of the reduction in supply due to the pest.  
In addition, depending on the pathway of the pest introduction and spread, the pest 
management regulation should consider the country’s obligations under the relevant 
international agreements. For example, the World Trade Organization Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) requires that such 
3 
regulations be based on risk assessment, applied to the extent necessary to protect plant 
life or health, and “should not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between countries 
where identical or similar conditions prevail” (WTO 1994). Thus, even a domestic 
regulation may affect the country’s compliance with its commitments under the SPS 
Agreement. For instance, the United States had to review its restrictions on imports of 
Unshu oranges from South Korea to be consistent with the regulations imposed on 
Florida orange producers (USDA-APHIS 2010).  
Moreover, the economic pest risk assessment studies should consider the dynamic 
nature of pest spread and the lagged response of agricultural crops to changes in price, 
especially perennial crops. Tree crops are characterized by (1) a long time lag between 
initial input and first output, (2) output flows from the investment decision are extended 
over a long period of time, and (3) a gradual reduction of the productive capacity of the 
plants (French and Mathews 1971). In addition to the lagged response of tree crops to 
price changes and high adjustment costs, the loss from a plant pest, if it results in tree 
death or removal, is more perpetuated than for annual crops as it takes a long time for 
new trees to enter into the production stage. Moreover, there is high uncertainty 
associated with the growers’ decision with respect to price expectations, as well as the 
pest risk. Therefore, it is important to note the uncertainty in probability of pest 
introduction and assessment of economic consequences in the selection of a pest 
management option (FAO 2004).  
One of the pest risk assessment issues currently examined by US regulators is False 
Codling Moth threatening California’s oranges. Fresh oranges constitute 22% of the US 
per capita consumption of fresh fruit (USDA-ERS 2012). California’s orange production 
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represents 25% of the US total orange production. However, it represents 74.3% of the 
US orange production directed to the fresh market (USDA-ERS 2012). California directs 
82% of its production of oranges to the fresh market (USDA-NASS 2012). The rest of its 
production is directed to orange-based processed products (mainly juice) where 
California constitutes less than 8% of the US orange production. Florida dominates the 
United States market of orange-based processed products with a market share exceeding 
90%. It directs more than 95% of its production to the orange for processing market. 
California and Florida together represent 97% of the United States total orange 
production. Arizona and Texas constituted the remaining share of the market in the last 
30 years. However, no commercial production has been recorded for Arizona since 
2008/2009 (USDA-ERS 2012). 
False Codling Moth is not currently present in the United States. There have been 
2622 border interceptions at 34 US ports between 1984 and 2013, and one domestic 
interception of an adult male in Ventura County, California, in 2008. No adult females 
have been detected yet. There is a risk that False Codling Moth becomes established in 
California, given the similarity of weather conditions between California and the foreign 
regions where the pest is established.  If no action is taken to control the False Codling 
Moth, it can spread in all California’s orange growing areas within 10 to 12 years, 
causing an average loss of 11.25% of California’s orange production per year 
(PERAL/NCSU 2013).  
Therefore, several mitigation options are considered to control/eradicate the pest. 
Growers in infested areas will incur all the control/eradication costs. In the first scenario, 
growers in infested areas are required to apply pesticides which implies an annual 
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additional cultural cost of $380.88 per acre. This scenario slows down the pest spread 
such that 9% of California’s orange acreage is projected to be infested by the pest in 30 
years. The expected crop loss reaches 1.05% of California’s orange production in the 30th 
year of the projection period. The second scenario is an Area-Wide Pest Management 
program, where growers in infested areas are required to apply pesticides in addition to 
requirements of stripping off the infested fruits and perform some sanitization. This costs 
them an additional $2310.5 per acre. The pest spreads gradually to cover 1.89% of 
California’s orange acreage in the 30th year of the projection period, resulting in the loss 
of 0.21% of California’s orange crop in that year. The third scenario is an eradication 
scenario where growers in infested areas are required to destroy the entire orchard yield, 
in addition to application of Sterile Insect and Mating Disruption Techniques. The total 
cost incurred by growers in infested areas is $3508.8 per year. Under this scenario, the 
pest spreads in the first year in 0.4% of California’s orange acreage until it is totally 
eliminated in seven years. The alternative mitigation strategies can have varying impacts 
on the different stakeholders to California’s orange industry. Those stakeholders include 
orange growers, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers in California as well as the other 
United States regions.  
Thus, the problem is that in order for regulators to make an informed decision 
about which pest management policy of False Codling Moth to select, they need to 
understand the economic welfare trade-offs among the different stakeholders to 
California’s orange industry. The objective of the current research is to identify the trade-
offs in economic welfare among the different agents in the United States orange market 
under the alternative pest management strategies of False Codling Moth in California. 
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In order to achieve that objective, the study develops a partial equilibrium model 
for the analysis of economic impacts of pest management strategies of False Codling 
Moth on California’s orange industry. The analysis contributes to the pest management 
literature through examining the welfare impacts on consumers, retailers, wholesalers and 
growers of fresh oranges and orange-based processed products in the different United 
Stated regions. It also decomposes the welfare impacts of the different pest mitigation 
programs on growers in infested and non-infested areas within California. This fills a gap 
in the previous research on pest management which limited the analysis to the welfare 
impacts on farmers and consumers, and did not consider the impacts on wholesalers and 
retailers. Also, most of the previous research presented the aggregate welfare impacts of 
alternate pest management policies on farmers in the affected region without distinction 
between the impacts on growers in infested and non-infested areas. 
 Another contribution of the current research is that it accounts for the dynamic 
nature of oranges as a tree crop while considering the supply response and welfare 
impacts on the other United States orange producing regions. Also, the current study 
integrates input from the output of a pest spread model developed by the United States 
Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and North 
Carolina State University (PERAL/NCSU 2013). 
The economic model developed in the current study accounts for a wider scope of 
supply and demand shocks than those relating to the specific case of False Codling Moth. 
Therefore, it can be readily applied to a wide variety of pest management problems in any 
of the three orange US producing regions. In addition, the framework of analysis can be 
applied to similar pest management problems of other trees and perennial crops. 
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1.2 Data and Methodology  
In order to meet the objective of the research, a partial equilibrium model that 
projects the economic impacts of phytosanitary measures for 30 years on the different 
stakeholders (consumers, retailers, wholesalers, and orange growers) along the US supply 
chain of fresh oranges and orange-based processed products in a dynamic framework is 
developed. Consumer demand for oranges is determined using partial budgeting. Supply 
and derived demand relationships between retailers-wholesalers, and wholesalers-orange 
growers in the fresh orange and orange-based processed products are represented in a 
Ricardo-Viner framework where labor is a mobile input, capital is an industry-specific 
input, and orange is an intermediate input. Supply of oranges by growers is an investment 
decision where growers respond to changes in expected relative returns to costs.  
The model comprises five regions: (1) California, the region under risk and is the 
US main producer of oranges directed to the fresh market; (2) Florida , the US main 
producer of oranges directed to the processing market; (3) Arizona and Texas which 
represent the other regions producing oranges in the US, and constitute a minor share of 
the US orange production; (4) Rest of the US, domestic regions that do not produce 
oranges; (5) Rest of the World, which is a net importer of fresh oranges from the United 
States, and a net exporter of orange-based processed products to the United States. 
International trade of the United States is modeled in an excess supply-excess demand 
framework.  
The inputs and outputs of the partial equilibrium model outlined above are 
illustrated in Figure 1-1. The model equations are expressed in total logarithmic 
differential form. Therefore, numerical solution of the model requires baseline data and 
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elasticities which comprise the first two categories of inputs to the model. Baseline data 
include US orange supply and use, orange prices at the different market levels, orange 
grower costs and returns, and orange yield and acreage grouped by age in each state. 
Since the economic impacts of the alternative pest management scenarios are projected 
for a future thirty-year period, the values of the different baseline data variables are 
forecast for the period (2014/15-2043/44). The forecasts are conducted through the 
application of Vector Autoregression Model (VAR) and Ordinary Least Squares. 
Elasticities are econometrically estimated in the current study, drawn from the literature, 
or assumed based on judgment and model validation. Historical data for the period 
(1980/81 to 2011/12) are employed for the data projection and econometric estimation of 
elasticities. Such data are obtained from multiple internet sources including the US 
Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, National Agriculture Statistics 
and Foreign Agriculture Service, as well as Florida Department of Citrus, California 
Department of Agriculture, University of Florida and University of California, Davis.  
The third category of model inputs is supply shocks which comprise orange yield 
losses and changes in grower costs. Projected per acre orange yield losses in each year of 
the thirty-year study period, expressed as projected percentage reduction in orange yield, 
under the alternative pest management scenarios are obtained from the US Department of 
Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and North Carolina State 
University (PERAL/NCSU 2013).  PEARL/NCSU(2013) projects the crop damages 
under the alternative pest management scenarios using a pest/disease spread model, 
Exotic Pest Analysis Tool (EXPAT). Changes in grower costs, which include additional 
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pest mitigation costs and  savings of  costs dependent on yield per acre like harvest cost 











Figure 1-1: Model Input and Output 
 
 
1.3 Organization of Chapters 
The dissertation consists of seven chapters. First, the current chapter provides an 
introduction to the research topic, research problem and objectives, hypotheses, and 
methodology. The second chapter presents a review of the literature on economic 
assessment of pest management policies, as well as the literature on supply response of 
perennial crops. The third chapter provides an overview of the United States orange 
industry.  The fourth chapter presents the conceptual framework of the analysis of orange 
pest management alternative policies. It starts with presentation of the model structure 
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along the fresh orange and orange-based processed products supply chains in each of the 
US regions in light of the industry structure overviewed in the third chapter. Then, the 
global market clearing conditions are presented. The fifth chapter presents the estimation 
of the model parameters, data employed in the model, data projections for 30 years, and 
model validation. The sixth chapter is an application of the model in the analysis of the 
economic impacts of the alternative mitigation strategies of the False Codling Moth 
threatening California’s oranges on consumers, producers, wholesalers, and retailers in 
California as well as other regions. The seventh chapter highlights the conclusions and 
suggestions for future research. 




CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides a review of the literature covering two areas. The first section 
provides an overview of literature applying the main tools for economic pest risk 
analysis, including budget sharing, partial equilibrium models, general equilibrium 
models, and optimal control. The second section presents the literature on modeling 
supply response of perennial crops. 
 
2.1 Economic Pest Risk Analysis 
The scope of research on pests and other invasive species is wide and it combines 
several components into an inter-disciplinary framework (Cororaton et. al. 2009). This 
framework can be outlined through the three stages of pest risk analysis in the 
International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures-11 (FAO 2004) : Stage 1 (initiating 
the process) is purely based on risk science as it focuses on identification of the pests 
representing potential risk that should be subject to risk assessment ; Stage 2 (risk 
assessment) starts with determining whether the pest in question satisfies the criteria  for 
being a quarantine pest,  then evaluates the probability of pest entry, establishment, and 
spread, and the associated economic impacts;  Stage 3 (risk management) involves two 
steps: The first is identifying pest management alternatives for alleviation of the risks 
associated with the pest as identified in the risk management stage . The second is 
12 
evaluating the management options for “efficacy, feasibility and impact in order to select 
those that are appropriate”. 
The thesis of this research relates to the second step of the risk management stage 
which focuses on evaluating the economic impacts of already identified options for risk 
management. In this regard, three techniques of economic pest risk analysis are 
mentioned by the International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures on pest risk analysis 
(FAO 2004): partial budgeting, partial equilibrium modeling, and general equilibrium 
modeling. Those techniques are covered by the current literature review. Also, the 
optimal control approach is briefly reviewed. 
 
2.1.1 Partial Budgeting Models 
Partial Budgeting is mainly suitable when the economic impacts associated with the 
pest are limited to producers and are relatively small (FAO 2004). It employs fixed 
budgets and fixed coefficients such that variables like prices and production are 
exogenously defined. However, a pest infestation problem may have long term impacts 
on prices and market dynamics which implies that partial budgeting is not adequate for a 
comprehensive pest risk assessment study but it can be used for a preliminary assessment 
(Soliman et. al. 2010).  
For example, Cook et. al.(2011) used partial equilibrium analysis and partial 
budgeting to analyze the consequences for Australia of allowing quarantine restricted 
imports of apples from New Zealand, given that Australia banned apple imports from all 
countries to prevent the risk of fire blight disease. A partial equilibrium model was used 
to estimate the welfare gains of moving from an autarkic situation to the restricted trade 
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situation. Variability of the parameters (elasticties of demand and supply, and prices) was 
incorporated in the analysis assuming Pert Distribution. The net present value of the gains 
from trade was calculated for 30 years.  
Partial budgeting combined with a stratified dispersal model was used to simulate 
the arrival, spread and impact of the disease in order to estimate the losses in production 
under two scenarios: (1) pest eradication, and (2) pest control. The annualized welfare 
gains due to moving from an autarkic situation to the restricted trade are added to the 
losses from disease spread to estimate the net gains/losses from the quarantine-restricted 
trade. The analysis showed that the gains from trade did not outweigh the production 
losses.  
The above analysis considered the evolution of the disease spread over time, as 
well as the time it takes for the removal and replacement of apple trees. However, it did 
not account for the response of producers and consumers to price changes resulting from 
the possible decrease in production due to disease infestation in the case the disease is not 
naturalized, or resulting from control costs incurred by the producers in the case the 
disease is naturalized.  
 
2.1.2 Partial Equilibrium Models 
Partial equilibrium models rely on “microeconomic representations of supply and 
demand and are used to assess the effects of a policy intervention or other shocks on 
equilibrium, i.e. on the changes in price, quantity and welfare” (Beghin and Bureau 
2001). This represents an advantage for partial equilibrium models over partial budgeting 
models which do not consider price changes and welfare impacts, and gravity models 
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which only account for the impacts of regulations on trade flows (Beghin and Bureau 
2001). However, unlike general equilibrium models, partial equilibrium models do not 
include linkages to all other sectors in the economy and treats national income and 
expenditure as exogenous.  Thus, partial equilibrium models are more suitable when the 
sector under study is relatively small compared to the total economy, and when there are 
specific complexities in the sector under study that need to be reflected in the analysis. 
Roberts et. al. (1999) outlined the basic framework for the analysis of trade and 
welfare effects of alternative technical regulations in agricultural markets using a partial 
equilibrium model. The framework comprised three different components that can be 
used separately or combined depending on the nature of the regulation. The first 
component is the regulatory protection effect which reflects the fact that domestic 
producers may gain some rents due to the regulation. In some cases, countries might 
adopt a technical regulation for protecting production as its main goal without a real risk 
associated with imports. Meanwhile, the second component is a supply shift element that 
addresses the impacts of imports on domestic supply and the costs of imposing 
phytosanitary measures on imports that will eliminate the threat of infestation. Finally, 
the third is a demand shift element where the regulation impact on imports involves costs 
to the consumer, but it may include information that can affect the consumers’ demand 
for the product. 
Several studies can be categorized under the framework outlined by Roberts et. al 
(1999).  For example, Peterson and Orden (2008) used a partial equilibrium model to 
compare three scenarios for regulations of US imports of Hass avocados from Mexico 
considering compliance costs in Mexico, subsequent pest risks, and US producers’ 
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control costs and production losses. The scenarios were: (a) the 2004 rule which provided 
unlimited seasonal and geographical access with compliance measures (the baseline 
scenario), (b) unlimited access without fruit fly compliance measures, and (c) unlimited 
access without all compliance measures.  
In all cases, there was a net welfare gain for the United States compared to the 
restrictions preceding the 2004 rule, as the gains in consumers’ surplus due to lower 
prices offset producers’ welfare losses. The results were robust to changes in the 
compliance costs and the various estimates of US supply and demand elasticities. The 
more risky scenarios (b and c) provided modest welfare improvements over the current 
regulation.  Therefore, the authors recommended that the current regulation is 
maintained, given the limitations of the available information about the magnitudes of 
pest risk probabilities that did not encourage taking risk decisions for modest gains. 
However, the model did not consider the dynamics of supply response of avocado 
producers as well as the spread of pest infestation.  
Few studies considered the dynamics of supply response and the dynamic aspects 
of infestation spread in the analysis of the impacts of phytosanitary measures. Those 
aspects were considered by Acquaye et.al. (2008) when examining the economic impacts 
of citrus canker on oranges in Florida, and evaluating the implications of a future 
hurricane on the benefits from an eradication program. A simulation model for supply 
and demand of Florida oranges was applied. On the supply side, annual production in 
each county of Florida depended on age-specific yields and acreage. The age distribution 
of trees was determined by previous years’ plantings and tree removals. Tree removals 
were set exogenous to the model, while new plantings were determined based on profit-
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maximizing behavior with a rational expectations formulation. Meanwhile, the demand 
side included demand equations for fresh oranges directed to consumption in the 
domestic and export markets, as well as the demand for oranges for production of juice. 
Supply of orange juice from other states was exogenously determined. Due to the large 
number of equations, the model was solved numerically. 
In the case of an initial outbreak affecting Florida’s central region without an 
eradication policy in the absence of hurricanes, producers achieve a gain as lower 
production combined with inelastic demand by domestic consumers (who lose) lead to 
higher prices and higher domestic revenue which offsets the loss of export revenue, and 
the result is an annual net loss for the United States of $2.7 million.  The introduction of 
an eradication program exacerbates the consumers’ losses due to further reduction in 
supply caused by the eradication program as well as the restoration of foreign exports. 
Meanwhile, producers achieve further gains due to higher revenue and compensation. 
The result is an annual net national loss of $25 million. A hurricane is assumed to re-
establish the disease in the central region in 2016 either (a) to two other regions in Florida 
in the case of the introduction of an eradication program in 2011, or (b) to all six regions 
in Florida in the case of no introduction of an eradication program in 2011. Comparing 
the impacts of an eradication program in 2016 under scenarios (a) and (b), it is found that 
scenario (b) results in higher producer surplus due to higher reduction in production and 
higher prices leading to higher revenue. Meanwhile, consumers and tax payers incur 
higher losses under scenario (a) due to the same reason, and the result is a net national 
loss in both scenarios but there is a higher loss under scenario (a).  
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However, the above results are derived from the assumption that the demand of 
consumers for fresh oranges is inelastic. Sensitivity analysis for a range of demand and 
supply elasticities is important to analyze the robustness of the results. Also, the analysis 
did not identify the separate welfare impacts on growers who lose their trees are and 
those who do not. In addition, the supply from producers in the other US states, and the 
welfare impacts on them were not considered.   
Meanwhile, in their analysis of the effects of the introduction and establishment of 
citrus canker into California, Jetter et. al. (2003) decomposed the welfare impacts for 
producers who lose trees under the eradication program and those who do not. They also 
considered the impacts on orange producers in the other US states, but they did not show 
the import impacts. Two scenarios were compared: eradication, and allowing the disease 
to be established.  
The study relied on an equilibrium displacement model to estimate the changes in 
producer and consumer welfare from changes in market quantities and prices for fresh 
orange. Also, the government outlays for the eradication program including 
compensation to homeowners were estimated. Short run and long run impacts were 
estimated. An elasticity of supply of 0.5 was used in the short run. In the eradication 
scenario, the elasticity of supply was allowed to increase gradually to 20 after 8 years as 
trees are replanted and re-enter production. Meanwhile, for the disease establishment 
scenario, two values for long run elasticity of supply were compared: 1 and 4. After year 
8, the costs and benefits from the eradication program are zero; yet, for the disease 
establishment scenarios, the equilibrium reached in year 8 continues until perpetuity.  
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Elasticities of demand of -0.85, -0.5, and -0.45 were used for oranges, lemons, and 
grapefruit respectively for both the short and long run in both scenarios.  
Under the eradication scenario, the losses to growers who lose trees offset the gains 
that other producers achieve due to higher prices. Consumers also incur losses due to 
higher prices. However, those losses decrease over time as growers replant, market 
supply increases and prices fall. On the other hand, under the disease establishment 
scenario, producer costs increase due to the need to apply pesticides four times a year. In 
addition, new groves need special treatment to avoid the disease in the first four years, 
the costs of which are added to investment costs and amortized for the life time of the 
grove. Higher prices induce more production from the other states and lower demand 
from consumers, which imposes a downward pressure on prices. The net price change, 
which is still an increase, is not sufficiently high to offset the impact of higher costs 
incurred by California producers. Thus, California growers will decrease production in 
the long run, and other producers increase production.   
Due to the large share of California in the US fresh orange market, the increase in 
the other states’ production could not offset the reduction in California’s production, and 
the net impact on the US market is a decrease in fresh orange supply. The losses to 
producers are higher with a supply elasticity of 1 compared to 4. Consumer welfare runs 
in an opposite direction to producer welfare.  Comparing the net present value of costs of 
the eradication program with those of losses due to the establishment of the disease, the 
conclusion was that an eradication program should be adopted as the avoided losses are 
high.  
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However, the above analysis did not consider the impacts of imports and the 
possibility of tree losses and quarantines under the disease establishment scenarios. Also, 
it did not consider the welfare impacts on retailers and wholesalers. Although the study 
used different short-run and long-run elasticities of supply by orange growers, it did not 
represent the supply response of orange growers in a dynamic framework that considers 
the age distribution of orange trees. 
Alston et. al. (2012) applied a similar approach to Acquaye et. al.(2008) when 
evaluating the aggregate impact on California’s wine grape producers of the current 
control program of Pierce’s Disease which aims at preventing the spread of the insect 
transmitting the disease from South California to the North where it is not yet established. 
It was found that the current program leads to net benefits. Those results were maintained 
with the different sensitivity analysis scenarios for disease incidence rate and prevalence. 
Under the severe state-wide outbreak scenario, there is a loss in producer surplus of $161 
million per year or 7.2% of the wine grape cash income per year. However, growers in 
some regions achieve gains as the disease costs are relatively minor and are offset by the 
benefits of higher prices resulting from the heavier losses in the primary production areas. 
Similar results were obtained for the regional outbreak scenario. 
Other studies pointed out the importance of taking into account pre-existing 
commodity policies in the analysis of the impact of invasive species. Acquaye et. al. 
(2005) presented a case study of the impact of citrus canker on orange production while 
considering the specific tariff on imports of frozen orange juice concentrates, and federal 
crop insurance. The analysis revealed that ignoring the tariff and insurance policy, there 
was an underestimation of producer gains, overestimation of consumer loss, and 
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underestimation of taxpayer benefit. However, the model was static, and did not consider 
US producing areas outside Florida, as well as the impacts on fresh orange markets.  
Also, Tu et. al. (2005) examined the implications of tariff escalation between 
agricultural and processed food markets on invasive species risks. They apply a multi-
market partial equilibrium model that connects the agricultural input and processed food 
markets in a small open economy that applies a tariff escalation policy and introduce an 
externality of invasive species to the agricultural input market. The results showed that 
the tariff escalation through imposing higher tariffs on processed food than the 
agricultural input results in increasing the risk of invasive species. This is due to the fact 
that tariff escalation shifts trade away from the processed food market towards the 
agricultural input which is the pathway for invasive species transmission. 
 
2.1.3 General Equilibrium 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are more suitable for addressing 
large-scale problems that potentially have macroeconomic impacts, or that have vertical 
inter-linkages with other sectors. However, such models are usually characterized by high 
complexity, difficulty to interpret results, and higher development costs (Soliman et. al. 
2010). One of their main applications in pest risk assessment is in the case of forest pests.  
For example, McDermott and Finnoff (2010) employed static CGE to analyze the 
welfare impacts of the Emerald Ash Borer (EAB) invasion in Ohio and Michigan. 
Besides being widely used as landscaping trees around houses and in parks, ash trees are 
used in several sectors like logging, furniture and paper. General Equilibrium modeling 
allowed the analysis of the vertical relationships among the affected sectors, household’s 
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removal impacts, and state removal impacts.  Also, prices were allowed to adjust, and the 
welfare estimates from the study were half of the projected losses from previous fixed 
price models.  
Welfare calculations depended on each industry’s elasticity in the production of ash 
products. The later was represented through a coefficient ε which stands for the decrease 
in productivity resulting from a 1% decrease in ash production where ε = 0 implies no 
impact. The model is simplified by assuming ε = 1 for the logging sector, which is 
directly affected by the loss, and a range of values from 0 to 1 were calculated for the 
other sectors. The annual equivalent variation reduction was $1.8 million in Ohio under 
the minimal impact scenario of ε=1 for the logging sector and 0 for others, and $3.9 
million under the maximum scenario impact of ε = 1 for all sectors. “Back of the 
envelope calculations” were made to estimate the total dynamic consequences of the 
invasion using the annual estimates resulting from the model. However, dynamic CGE 
modeling may lead to different results. In addition, the study did not consider any 
mitigation scenarios which might reduce the total welfare loss, and may result in different 
impacts for some sectors.  
 On the other hand, Chang et. al. (2012) examined the potential economic impacts 
of future spruce budworm outbreaks on 2.8 million hectares of Crown Forest Land in 
New Brunswick, Canada, over a 30-year horizon. The analysis combined (1) an advanced 
spruce budworm decision support system model that integrates pest population and stand 
dynamics to examine tree/yield and potential timber harvest volume changes over time, 
and (2) a dynamic CGE model that tracks primary inputs, industry transactions, and 
prices while accounting for economic growth over time.  
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The model compared 16 alternative scenarios including two pest management 
strategies, under two pest outbreak severity levels, and four pest control levels. The 
results indicated that a moderate or severe pest outbreak results in losses ranging from 
$3.3-4.7 billion in present value output terms. The losses centered on natural resource-
related sectors (forestry and logging, support activities for agriculture and forestry, crop 
and animal production, fishing, hunting and trapping, and mining & oil sectors), 
manufacturing (due to lumber and wood products and pulp and paper sectors), utilities, 
and transportation, and warehousing sectors. The flow of factors of production from the 
affected sectors led to limited expansion in the other sectors that could not offset the 
negatively impacted ones. The pest control program reduced the negative impacts on 
output by 66%. If the program is combined with re-planning harvest scheduling and 
salvage, the negative impacts will be further reduced by 1% to 18%.  
 
2.2 Optimal Control 
Optimal control models aim at identifying the optimal treatment path through 
defining the management control as a minimization problem of the expected costs and 
damages from the presence of control activities of the invasive species in question 
(Cororaton et. al. 2009). An example is Brunett et. al. (2007) which employed optimal 
control to find the optimal path for treatment of Miconia calvescens, a flowering plant 
damaging the ecosystem in Hawaii through preventing other plants from growing. The 
study results revealed that the optimal population of the invasive species ranged from 1 to 
18% cover. The optimal path involves high expenditure in the first year of management 
to slow the spread, but after that the expenditure will be lower than the present value of 
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the net cost of management, and there will be increasing present value of the difference 
between damages and costs over time. So, the optimal control policy did not entail 
eradication of the invasive species or elimination of its damages. However, such studies 
rely on an approach similar to partial budget sharing for the estimation of costs and 
benefits of the invasive species eradication so they do not reflect the impact on prices and 
quantities.  
 
2.3 Modeling Supply Response 
Modeling supply response of perennial crops like oranges should consider their 
characteristics: (1) a long time between initial input and first output, (2) output flows 
from the investment decision continue over a long period of time, and (3) a gradual 
reduction of the productive capacity of the plants (French and Mathews 1971). Therefore, 
models of perennial crops should account for the lags between initial input and output, 
the age distribution of acreage of the perennial crop in question, and removals of 
perennial crops (Askari and Cummings 1976). 
French and Mathews (1971) provided the basic framework for analysis of perennial 
crops. The framework comprises five components: (1) functions for desired production 
and bearing acreage, (2) an equation representing new plantings, (3) an equation 
representing removal of acreage (4) an equation depicting the relationship between 
unobserved expectation variables and observable variables, and (5) an equation 
explaining variations in yield as a function of age, trend variable representing technology, 
and disturbances to account for weather and other biological factors. Total production is 
represented by the product of acreage and yield.  
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They applied the model to asparagus production in the United States through 
estimating a single reduced form equation of the model due to data constraints.  Acreage 
was specified as a function of lagged prices and average harvested area in different 
periods. The use of the reduced form did not allow the separate estimation of structural 
parameters of the new planting, removal, and harvest decisions as intended by their basic 
framework. 
Another attempt to separately quantify harvest and investment decisions was made 
by Wickens and Greenfield (1973) which is considered by Coleman (1983) as a 
comprehensive investment approach. They suggested a three-equation model comprising 
an investment function, a vintage production function, and a harvesting equation. 
Investment was represented in terms of the expected difference between prices and 
harvesting costs over the productive time of the tree, average yield, and the discount rate. 
The vintage production function represented potential production in terms of average 
yield, past plantings, and tree removals. Meanwhile, the harvesting equation related 
actual production to maximum potential production and a weighted average of recent 
prices. The yield cycle of the crop is also considered in the harvesting equation.  
The model was used to estimate coffee supply response in Brazil. However, it was 
criticized by Akiama and Trivedi (1987) because it was not possible to derive structural 
parameters from the reduced form, and due to the use of a polynomial form to express 
yield curve which does not necessarily apply.  In addition, tree removals were 
represented as error terms.  
As explained in subsection (2.3.1.1), most of the subsequent studies followed 
French and Mathews’ basic framework (Alston et. al.  1995;  French, King, and Minami 
25 
(1985); Kinney et. al. (1987); Lajimi et. al. 2008). Other studies extended the framework 
by Wickens and Greenfield (1973) like Trivedi (1986), Akiama and Trivedi (1987), 
Devadoss and Luckstead (2010); Alston et. al (1995) and Gray et. al. (2005).  
Production is represented by the production identity below. In the following, an 
overview of the literature on the two components of the production identity, yield and 
bearing acreage, is presented. 
 𝑄𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 × 𝐵𝑡        (2.1) 
where 𝑄𝑡, 𝑌𝑡, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵𝑡, refer to output, yield, and bearing acreage at time t, 
respectively. 
 
2.3.1 Bearing Acreage 
Bearing acreage changes over time through plantings and removals, as follows: 
𝐵𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝑁𝑡−𝑘 − 𝑅𝑡−1, (2.2) 
where B represents bearing acreage, the subscript t denotes the year, k is a lag of k 
years required for a tree to reach bearing age, N represents new plantings, and R refers to 
tree removals. Therefore, changes in bearing acreage depend on new planting and tree 
removal behavior (Kinney et. al. 1987). The following discusses the literature on new 
plantings and tree removals. 
 
2.3.1.1 New Plantings 
Modeling new plantings followed two approaches: the traditional approach and the 
investment approach (Alston,1990). The traditional approach represented new plantings 
26 
as a linear function of expected annual profitability, previous year’s acreage, current tree 
removals, and other variables relevant to the crop under study. Examples of that approach 
included French and Mathews (1971), French, King, and Mianmi (1985), French and 
King (1988), Kinney (1987), and Lajimi et. al.(2008). Meanwhile, the investment 
approach is based on the assumption that investment in new plantings is derived from the 
maximization of net profit of an investment, assuming that cost of investment is a 
quadratic function of new planting in most cases (e.g. Alston et. al. 1995 and 2012, 
Acquaye et. al. (2008), Devadoss and Luckstead (2010), Gray et. al. (2005), Wickens and 
Greenfield (1973):  
Max 𝐸𝑁𝑃𝑉 = 𝑁𝑡(𝐸𝑃𝑉𝑡 − 𝐴𝐶𝑡) (2.3) 
The first order condition: 
𝐸𝑃𝑉𝑡 = 𝑀𝐶𝑡 (2.4) 
 where AC𝑡=c1+c2 𝑁𝑡 based on a quadratic cost function, ENPV : expected net 
present value of an investment, 𝑁𝑡 : new planting, EPV𝑡: expected present value of net 
returns, AC𝑡: average costs. 
The first order condition implies that profit maximizing growers increase plantings 
to the point where expected net present value of the marginal orchard equals the change 
in total investment costs, which is with quadratic costs a linear function of new plantings. 
Re-arrangement of the profit-maximization condition results in the following new 
plantings equation: 
𝑁𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑡−1 (2.5) 
Alston (1995) modified equation (2.5) to allow for partial adjustment: 
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𝑁𝑡 =  (𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑡−1) + (1 − )𝑁𝑡−1 , (2.6) 
where  is the adjustment parameter. The partial adjustment function considers the 
time required for investment decisions in the crop development, adjustment costs, and 
possible short run constraints. It was suggested in the model structure of French and 
Mathews (1971) and  Nerlove (1958), but French and Mathews (1971) assumed that  =1 
in the econometric estimation of asparagus supply response equation.  
In applying the investment approach, some studies based the profitability 
expectation on a rational expectation approach which assumes that growers “utilize all 
past information to form expectations of the relevant variables for their production 
decisions” Devadoss and Luckstead (2010). For example, Devadoss and Luckstead 
(2010) used an autoregressive model for prediction of the expected price of apples              
(E(P) =  ∑ 𝜃𝑖
6
𝑖=1 𝑃𝑡−𝑖 +∈𝑖 ). Several combinations of lags from 1 to 6 were compared 
using AIC. The estimated expected price resulting from the autoregressive model is then 
used as the expected price in the regression equation. They considered the approach 
rational expectations because they utilized the past information in estimation of a model 
for forecasting price, and costs. However, since the purpose is to model how farmers 
have actually responded to changes in prices and farming costs, finding the number of 
lagged annual profitability indicators that affect farmer’s planting decision through the 
regression equation of new plantings is more appropriate.  
 The concept of rational expectations may be appealing in the sense that it assumes 
that economic agents are optimizers and that they make use of all information available 
about the economic conditions in their industry to predict the profitability of their 
investment (Nerlove and Bessler, 2001). However, from an empirical point of view, it is 
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hard to believe that farmers can utilize all information to predict the future supply-
demand structure in the industry (French and King 1988). Other approaches for modeling 
farmers’ expectations about future profitability of the crops include: (a) naïve 
expectation, where the expected price equals the previous year’s price; (b) extrapolative 
expectation, where the expected price is a weighted combination of the prices in several 
previous years; and (c) adaptive expectation, where the current price differs from the past 
year’s price by an amount proportional to the previous forecast error (Labys, 1973). 
 
2.3.1.2 Tree Removals 
Some studies modeled tree removals as functions of expected short-run profits 
based on the fact that old trees may be retained a bit longer if high profits are expected in 
the next year, and the existence of a government incentive program to remove trees. e.g. 
French and King (1988).  Other studies modeled removals in a similar way as the new 
plantings decision (e.g. Alston et. al., 1995). However, they noted that the quality of data 
about tree removals might be an obstacle to reliable estimation of tree removal equations. 
Also, due to lack of data about new plantings and tree removals, many studies formulated 
their model such that the dependent variable is the change in acreage or net investment 
(new plantings minus tree removals) instead of separate equations for each. e.g. French 
and Mathews (1971) and Kinney et. al. (1987). Several other studies modeled tree 
removals as a constant proportion of acreage .e.g.  Acquaye et. al. (2008), Alston et. al. 




The yield of a perennial crop varies with the age of the bearing plants, technology, 
weather and biological factors. Keeney and Hertel (2008) reviewed studies analyzing 
yield response to price for annual crops. However, most studies do not assume yield 
response to profit expectations and the response is limited to acreage. This is attributed to 
the fact that yield is affected by many factors that are out of farmers’ control (Nerlove 
1958). In addition, cultural practices tend to be standardized and exclude the possibility 
of much variation in yield in response to price variations (French and Mathews 1971, 
Alston 1980). In modeling lemon production in California, Kinney et. al. (1987) argued 
that there is limited opportunity for lemon production to adjust input usage to either input 
or product prices. Also, more recent studies like Acquaye et. al. (2008), Gray et. al.(2005) 
and Alston et. al. (2012) did not assume yield response to price movements. 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
There are several approaches to the assessment of the economic impacts of 
alternative pest management strategies. Partial equilibrium analysis is more suitable for 
the purpose of the current research. A fruit tree crop is relatively too small to result in 
significant macroeconomic effects, and its main interlinkage is with the fruit processing 
sector which can be reflected in a partial equilibrium model. In addition, partial 
equilibrium allows for more detailed examination of the sector under study.  
The above literature review shows that only few studies considered the dynamics of 
supply response of perennial crops and trees in economic analysis of the impacts of pest 
spread e.g. Acquaye et. al. (2008) and Alston et. al. (2012). While Acquaye et. al.(2008) 
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examined the economic impacts of  a pest eradication policy on the fresh orange and 
orange juice market in Florida in a dynamic framework, and presented the overall welfare 
impact of the pest management policies on the US consumers, they treated supply from 
the other US regions as exogenous. In addition, they did not consider the welfare impacts 
at the different levels of the supply chain.   
Also, Alston et. al. (2012), who examined the impacts of Pierce Disease 
management policy in different production regions in California’s wine grape industry, 
only showed the welfare impacts on wine grape growers and wine processers. They 
treated wine grape processors as consumers, measuring the changes in their welfare as 
changes in Marshallian consumer surplus. The impact of the change in the price of 
input(wine grape) on the price and quantity of output was not considered. Moreover, they 
did not consider international trade. In addition, both of the above studies showed the 
aggregate impact on producers with no clarification of the losses for producers with 
infested crops.  
Jetter et. al.(2003) differentiated between the welfare effects on producers in 
infested areas and non-infested areas in the analysis of the impacts of a citrus canker 
eradication policy on California’s fresh citrus, but they did not show the welfare impacts 
along the supply chain of the citrus industry or consider the impacts on the citrus juice 
industry. Also, while they distinguished between the short-run and long-run impacts of a 
pest eradication policy through different supply response parameters, they did not 
develop a dynamic supply response framework that accounts for the age distribution of 
orange acreage.  
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The current study contributes to the literature through developing a framework for 
the analysis of economic impacts of pest management strategies on California’s orange 
industry that (1) accounts for the dynamic nature of supply response of oranges as a tree 
crop, (2) considers the supply response and welfare impacts on the different stakeholders 
in the other US orange-producing regions and accounts for net flows of international 
trade, (3) decomposes the welfare impacts on the different stakeholders (orange growers, 
wholesalers, retailers, and consumers) along the supply chain of fresh oranges and 
orange-based processed products in the different US regions, (4) decomposes the welfare 
impacts of the alternate pest management strategies to reflect the impacts on growers in 
infested and non-infested areas, and (5) integrates input from the output of a pest spread 
model developed by APHIS .The model can be readily applied to a wide variety of pest 
management problems in any of the three orange US producing regions. In addition, the 





CHAPTER 3.  INDUSTRY OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides an overview of the orange industry in the United States. The 
first section reviews the evolution of the United States orange production, consumption, 
and utilization since 1980. This is in addition to providing a brief discussion of the United 
States orange trade. Meanwhile, the second section outlines the market structure of the 
orange industry in the United States. 
 
3.1 US Orange Production, Consumption, and Trade 
The United States is the second largest world producer of oranges (USDA-FAS 
2013) with its 8 million metric ton production valued at around $2 billion per year during 
the period 2006-2012 (USDA-ERS 2012). Florida contributed to around 70.1% of the US 
total bearing acreage of oranges during the same period, followed by California which 
represented around 28.4%, then Arizona and Texas (1.5%). However, no commercial 
acreage has been recorded for Arizona in the USDA statistics since 2009/10.  
California is the largest producer of fresh oranges in the United States representing 
about 85% of the US total fresh orange production, followed by Florida which comprises 
about 13%. California directs 82% of its production of oranges to the fresh market. 
Meanwhile, Florida directs around 95% of its production to the processing channel 
(USDA-ERS 2012). The difference between California and Florida in utilization of 
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production is mainly attributed to weather.  Florida’s warm and humid weather is 
associated with oranges that have thinner skin and more yield of juice than that of 
California. On the other hand, owing to California’s drier climate and cooler nights 
during the winter, its oranges are characterized by thicker skin and more pulp. Thus, 
California’s oranges are more qualified to meet the standards of the fresh market due to 
lower incidence of blemishes and less susceptibility to damages during transportation 
(Boland et. al.2008).  
US production of oranges fluctuated between 1980 and 2012, with more variation 
witnessed in Florida (Figure 3-1). Florida experienced a succession of freezes between 
1977 and 1989 that resulted in severe damages to trees and yield. Total production and 
bearing acreage in 1989/90 were 36% and 30% less than their levels in 1980 respectively. 
With higher orange prices, new plantings increased and orange production reached a 
historically high level in 1997/1998 (Morris 2009). The new plantings of oranges 
migrated to south Florida to reduce the risk of vulnerability to freezes. However, the 
more tropical climate of south Florida has been associated with increased plant disease 
threats such as citrus canker and greening along with greater risk of hurricane damage 
(Morris 2009) .  
Between 1998 and 2008, the Florida orange crop was negatively affected by 
hurricanes, citrus canker, and the emergence of citrus greening. Thus, during the period 
(1997/8-2007/08), Florida’s orange production declined by 47%, from 9.96 million tons 
to 5.1 million tons (USDA-ERS 2012). In addition, the number of orange trees decreased 
by 23% during the same period (Morris 2009).  
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While California’s orange acreage followed a similar trend to that of Florida, the 
range of fluctuation was much lower. Total acreage in 1989/90 was 4% lower than its 
182,000 acre level in 1980 (Figure 3-2). Similar to Florida, higher orange prices were 
associated with higher plantings resulting in an increase in acreage in the 1990s. Yet, 
acreage in 1999/2000, which is the highest acreage recorded for California (203, 000 
acres) during the period 1980-2012, was only 11% higher than the 1980 level. While the 
1998 freeze resulted in a reduction to California’s production by about half of its previous 
year level, it did not result in damages to trees (Cook 2000).  
On the other hand, the Texas orange industry has been severely affected by 
successive freezes (Sauls 2008).  The 1983 freeze resulted in loss of 70% of the orange 
crop of that year and reduction of orange acreage by 60% from its 1980 level (calculated 
from USDA 2012). No orange fruit was produced during the 1984-85 season and only a 
modest amount was grown in the 1985-86 season.  While the industry was recovering and 
growers were in the process of replacing the damaged trees, another major freeze in 1989 
reduced the acreage to around 3500 acres compared to 24,000 acres in 1980. Acreage 
increased afterwards, but it remained at a flat level of 8800 acres since 2002/03. 
Arizona’s acreage decreased gradually from 13,000 acres in 1980 to reach 10,000 acres 
in 1989/90. Acreage maintained a level of 10,000 acres in the 1990s, then it decreased 
gradually until it reached the point that no commercial acreage was recorded since 
2009/10 (Figure 3-2). 
While US per capita consumption of fresh oranges fluctuated during the period 
(1980-2000), it witnessed a decreasing trend since 2000/2001. The per capita 
consumption in 2010/11 was 24% less than its level in 1980. Total consumption 
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fluctuated around an average of 1.4 million metric tons (MT) (USDA-ERS 2012).  The 
decrease in consumption is attributed to consumers’ increasing preference of easy peel 
fruits like mandarin oranges and the increasing variety of fresh produce in the US market 
(Baldwin and Jones 2012).  
 
 























































































































































































 Per capita consumption of orange juice followed a similar trend of fluctuation 
during the period (1980-2000). Yet, it experienced a higher decrease since 2000/2001, as 
2011/12 level is 40% less than that of 2000/01. That decrease in consumption can be 
attributed to a change in consumer diet towards lower calorie drinks including bottled 
water (USITC 2006-a). Also, Morris (2010) and USITC (2012-a) believe that higher 
retail prices have contributed to that decrease in consumption. In addition, USITC (2012-
a) cited the overall economic conditions and the pricing of alternative products as factors 
contributing to the decrease in the US per capita orange juice consumption. 
As for trade, the United States is a net exporter of fresh oranges, and a net importer 
of orange products. California exported 32% and 42 % of its orange production to foreign 
markets in 2009 and 2010 respectively (CDFA 2012), and Florida exported more than 
40% of its fresh oranges in 2009 (Morris 2009). The main markets include Canada, 
Japan, China/Hong Kong, South Korea and the European Union (USDA-FAS 2013). 
While data about domestic shipments are not available, California is estimated to only 
consume around 11 % of its fresh orange production1.  Imports of fresh oranges 
constitute 7.4% of total consumption to fill seasonal gaps in supply (USDA-ERS 2012 
and Baldwin and Jones 2012). Most of the fresh orange imports enter the US duty-free 
under free-trade agreements and non-reciprocal preferential arrangements for developing 
countries (USITC 2012-b). 
On the other hand, the United States imported 18% of its total orange juice supply 
(production + imports +beginning stock) and exported 7 % of its orange juice supply in 
                                                 
1 Average per capita consumption of fresh oranges in California is assumed to be equal to that of the US 
average. 
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2011/12(USDA-ERS 2012). Most of orange juice imports are from Brazil and Mexico 
mainly in frozen concentrated orange juice form (USITC 2012-a). Florida is estimated to 
consume around 6% of its orange juice supply. Meanwhile, California’s orange juice 
demand exceeds its supply. The US orange juice imports from Brazil are subject to 
import tariffs of 4.5 cents per liter (USITC 2012-a). Anti-dumping duties imposed on 
three Brazilian firms since 2006 were revoked in 2012 after a World Trade Organization 
(WTO) ruling that the method of calculation of duties were not consistent with WTO 
provisions (USITC-2013).  
 
3.2 Market Structure 
The structure of the market in the US orange industry is presented in Figure 3-3. 
Consumers decide on their level of consumption of fresh oranges and orange juice. Then, 
consumers’ demand for oranges is met through two supply chains: fresh and processed. 
In each chain, there are three market levels: retail, wholesale, and farm. The following 
presents a briefing about each of the economic agents in the US orange industry. 
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Figure 3-3: Structure of the US Orange Industry 
 
3.2.1 Consumers and Retailers 
Consumers purchase fresh oranges and orange juice from retailers. Retailers 
purchase fresh oranges directly from packinghouses or through some other marketing 
agent. Meanwhile, they purchase orange juice from orange juice processors or branded 
juice marketers. The US retail industry is witnessing increasing consolidation as the 
market share of the top five US retailers increased from 34.7 in 1998 to 50.4% in 2008 
(Morris 2010). However, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for the degree of 
industry concentration of the orange industry is low since it is less than 1000 (US 
Economic Census 2007). The HHI Index is calculated by “summing the squares of the 
individual market shares of all participants” (US Department of Justice 2010).There are 
views that the increasing consolidation of retailers in the recent years enhanced their 
pricing power. e.g. Boland et. al.(2006). Those views are based on the increasing margin 
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between retail price and both of farm prices and bulk orange juice prices, and on the 
decreasing correlation between farm prices and retail prices (Morris 2010). However, 
Morris (2010) argued that recently retail prices are following farm prices and bulk orange 
juice prices but with a time lag.  
 
3.2.1.1.1 Fresh Market Packinghouses 
Packinghouses receive oranges in large 900-pound pallet boxes (Morris 2010). 
They sort, grade, and pack fruit of similar quality and size into cartons or other 
specialized containers (USITC 2006-b).  Fruit that does not meet the standards of the 
fresh market is sent to processing plants. Most packinghouses have sales staff that sells 
its fruits directly to retailers or export markets. Most of the fresh sales are free on board 
prices from the packinghouse (Morris 2010).  
About one-half of all California and Arizona packinghouses (39) marketed their 
fresh citrus production through Sunkist Growers, which is a non-profit marketing 
cooperative owned by 6000 California and Arizona growers in 2005(USITC 2006-b). 
Around 47% of California’s oranges were marketed through Sunkist in 2005. Another 
25% of California’s oranges were marketed through California Citrus Orange Growers 
Cooperative in the same year. However, California’s orange market is not vertically 
integrated in a way that cooperatives can control the production of oranges or exercise 
market power (Boland et. al. 2008). Before the suspension of the Arizona-California 
citrus marketing order in 1994 (USDA-AMR 1994), cooperatives were able to influence 
the fresh orange prices through controlling the quantity of oranges directed to the fresh 
market (Jacobs 1994). Currently, cooperatives’ role is mainly marketing. The influence 
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they have on growers’ production decision is educational through informing them about 
the citrus varieties and cultural practices leading to profitable production. Membership is 
voluntary and on an annual basis. Also, there is no requirement for members to market all 
their production through the cooperative (Sunkist 2013). 
Florida’s fresh citrus packing sector is more fragmented than that of California. 
There are 40 certified fresh citrus packinghouses in Florida, which are either cooperatives 
or large growers. However, it is trending towards more consolidation as the top 10 
packinghouses account for 50% of the fresh citrus packing sector in Florida compared to 
35% in 1996 (Morris 2010). 
 
3.2.1.2 Orange Processors 
Orange juice processors receive oranges from orange growers and process it into 
single strength bulk orange juice with an average Brix value of 11.8 degrees, where the 
Brix value is an indicator for the degree of concentration of orange juice measured as the 
percentage by weight of sugar content in a solution at a particular temperature (USITC 
2006 a). Afterwards, juice intended for the frozen orange juice concentrate market is 
further processed to obtain a base concentrate of 65 degrees (the ratio of concentration 
between single strength 11.8- degree brix value and 65-degree brix value is one to seven). 
It is then reconstituted and packaged for retail sale near the point of retail sale for 
transportation cost saving. Meanwhile, the Not from Concentrate Orange Juice is usually 
packaged into single strength retail-size containers at the processing plant. However, 
packaging for retail sale may also take place near distribution points in major markets. 
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Many of the orange juice processors blend domestic orange juice with imported 
concentrated bulk juice to ensure compatibility with product standards, and customer 
preferences (USITC 2012). 
There are about 25 orange juice extractor/processor firms in the United States. 
Ninety percent of orange juice extraction is handled by 12 firms (USITC 2012).  While 
most of the Florida orange groves were relocated from the North and Central regions to 
the Southern region with the 1970s and 1980s freezes in Florida, orange processing plants 
remained in the Central region as hauling oranges is considered less expensive than 
rebuilding the plants(Morris 2009). Branded juice marketers are gaining increasing 
importance in the US market. They either own the orange processing facilities or 
purchase orange juice form bulk processors. The market share of the three top brands 
increased from 53% in 1997/98 to 65.7% in 2007/08 (Morris 2010).  The top three orange 
juice processors represented 55% of the US market share in 2010. The Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) for the degree of industry concentration of 1499 calculated by 




There are 6,000-7,000 orange growers in the United States.  The number of growers 
has declined in the past few decades through continued consolidation and the development 
of orchard lands for other uses (USITC 2006-b). California growers usually grow oranges 
for the fresh market, and orange for processing is a residual market. The next chapter 
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The fresh orange industry is mainly concentrated in California, while the orange 
processing industry is concentrated in Florida. The United States is a net exporter of fresh 
oranges, and a net importer of orange products. There are three main levels of orange 
marketing in the fresh orange and orange products channel: retail, wholesale, and farm. 
The next chapter presents the economic model of the orange industry in the United States 
















CHAPTER 4.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter starts with presentation of how the model reflects the orange industry 
market structure in a representative United States region. The supply-demand 
relationships between the different agents in the US market outlined in the previous 
chapter are represented. The basic framework is modified according to whether the 
region is a net import, exporter, or non-producer of oranges/orange products.  Meanwhile, 
the second section presents the global market clearing conditions.  
 
4.1 Market Structure in a Representative US Region 
The model is structured to reflect the welfare impacts of phytosanitary measures 
on the different stakeholders along the supply chain of oranges (consumers, retailers, 
wholesalers, and orange growers) which was explained in the previous chapter. In the 
first sub-section, consumers decide on their level of consumption of an aggregate of fresh 
oranges and orange products. Then, they allocate their consumption between fresh 
oranges and orange products based on relative prices, and elasticity of substitution 
between fresh oranges and orange products. Thus, consumers’ demand for oranges is met 
through two supply chains: fresh and processed. In each chain, there are three market 
levels: retail, wholesale, and farm. The second sub-section outlines the supply-derived 
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demand relationships at the retail and wholesale levels. The third sub-section presents the 
supply decision by farmers. 
 
4.1.1 Consumer Demand 
Consumers are assumed to be price-taking agents who decide on the quantity 
consumed of each product through maximization of their utility given their budget 
constraint. The utility function satisfies the axioms of consumer choice: completeness, 
transitivity, reflexivity, continuity, non-satiation and convexity. Completeness ensures 
that a consumer can order their preferences for the full set of choices. Failure to meet this 
axiom results in undefined preferences. Transitivity warrants consistency of consumer 
choices. Given consumption bundles A, B, and C, a consumer who prefers A to B, and B 
to C must  prefer A to C. Reflexivity means that for a consumer each bundle is as good as 
itself. This axiom is trivial for a properly defined choice set, but is necessary for 
mathematical representation of utility. Continuity is important for obtaining differentiable 
utility functions and well-behaved demand curves. It means that if A is preferred to B, 
and C lies within ε of B, then A is preferred to C.  The first four axioms allow 
representation of consumer preferences by a utility function (Deaton and Mauellbauer 
1980).  
The axiom of non-satiation means that for a given consumption bundle X, a 
consumer prefers another one, Y, that has more of one good, and at least the same 
amount of the other goods in X. This axiom ensures that the budget constraint is binding, 
assuming strictly positive prices. The axiom of convexity implies that if bundle X is 
preferred to bundle Y, then any combination of the two bundles is preferred to bundle Y. 
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The above axioms allow mathematical representation of the consumer choice problem 
through the standard utility maximization problem given a budget constraint (Deaton and 
Mauellbauer 1980). 
The model relies on the utility function of a representative consumer assuming 
that the response of aggregate demand to aggregate income and prices is the same as that 
of individuals. This assumption is supported by adopting a homothetic and linearly 
homogeneous utility function for all consumers where the indifference curves are rays 
from the origin. This ensures path independence and uniqueness of consumer surplus 
(Just, Hueth, and Schmitz 1982). 
Consumer preferences are assumed to be weakly separable such that commodities 
are partitioned into two groups (fresh oranges and orange products oC , and other 
products othC  ) allowing preferences within a group to be described independently of 
other groups; that is, the marginal rates of substitution between goods in a group are 
independent of the quantities of products in another group (Armington 1969). Changes of 
prices of goods outside the group only affect the group in question in a manner similar to 
a change in income (Strotz 1957). 
The assumption of weakly separable preferences allows the representation of 
consumer’s decision for the quantities consumed of each of fresh oranges and orange-
based processed products through two stages. In the first stage, a consumer maximizes a 
weakly separable utility function U( oC , othC )  subject to the expenditure constraint         
E = o oP C + oth othP C . The utility function is assumed to generate demand for oranges and 
orange products of the form: 
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oC = C( o,P , oth,P  , E)   (4.1) 
where P refers to price, E refers to expenditure, U represents utility, C  represents 
per capita consumption, and subscripts  o and oth represent oranges and other products 
respectively. 
Then, in the second stage, a consumer selects fresh oranges and orange products to 
minimize expenditure that meets his total orange demand, oC . oC  is represented by 
 ,  of opC C which is assumed to follow a constant elasticity of substitution specification 
(thus, meets the assumption of being homothetic and linearly homogeneous referred to 
above).  This stage gives per capita demand of fresh oranges, denoted by subscript of, and 
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of ofw  + P
RC
op opw ,   b   is a constant, c  is the elasticity of substitution 
between fresh oranges and orange-based processed products, and  ofw  and opw  refer to 
the shares of consumption of fresh and orange-based processed products in total 
consumption of oranges respectively for a representative consumer (based on 
homogeneity and linearity of the Constant Elasticity of Substitution function and using 
Euler’s Theorem –Armington 1969). 
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Given the above assumption of homothetic, linearly homogeneous utility function, 
aggregate United States demand is represented by the product of per capita demand of the 
respective good, population, and the percentage of consumers that do not have health risk 
concerns about the product in question (Paarlberg et. al. 2008). As mentioned in the 
introductory chapter, there is a limited chance that consumers have health risk concerns 
relating to plant pests except for fears relating to pesticide use, and it is difficult to 
estimate the number of those consumers. However, the model structure accounts for this 
possibility in case health risks arise with other perennial crops to which the model is 
applied. Therefore, total US consumption of all oranges, oAC   fresh oranges, ofAC , and 
orange products, opAC , are represented as follows, given that pop refers to population, 
and 0≤π≤1 refers to the proportion of the population who do not have health risk fears 
about the product in question: 
o oAC C o pop   , (4.4) 
of ofAC C of pop   , and (4.5) 
op opAC C op pop   . (4.6) 
  
4.1.2 Distribution of Fresh Oranges and Orange Products 
This section focuses on the problem of retailers and wholesalers involved in the 
distribution of fresh oranges and orange-based processed products. There are two 
separate supply chains for fresh oranges and orange products but they have a similar 
model structure. Retailers supply fresh oranges/orange-based processed products to 
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consumers, and use fresh oranges/ orange-based processed products provided by 
wholesalers as inputs to their production. Wholesalers supply fresh oranges/ orange 
products to retailers and export markets, and demand fresh oranges/oranges for 
processing from farmers and import markets.  
 The problem of producers in each of the four industries (retail fresh oranges, retail 
orange products, wholesale fresh orange, wholesale orange products) is to maximize the 
value of production under resource constraints. A Ricardo-Viner framework is applied 
where each industry uses a composite mobile factor (termed labor), a factor specific to 
the industry (capital which is fixed in supply), and an intermediate good (oranges). Labor 
wage is exogenously set since this factor is shared with the rest of the economy and the 
share of the orange industry in the economy is small. Producers operate under perfect 
competition, so all returns accrue to factors of production such that the zero-profit 
condition holds. Production in each industry is represented by a constant returns to scale 
production (CRS) function which is linearly homogeneous of degree one in all inputs. 
As a consequence of CRS, the cost function has the form    ,    C w q q c w  , 
where  c w  is the unit cost of production, w is the input price vector, and q is the 
quantity of production. CRS also implies that  c w is both the average and marginal cost 
of production, which is independent of output level (Woodland 1982).  
The duality theory allows representation of the revenue maximization problem in 
the form of a minimum factor payments problem such that the derived factor demand is 
expressed as a function of input costs. Dixit and Norman (1980) proves the duality of the 
revenue maximization and minimum factor payments problems. Based on Woodland 
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(1982) and Dixit and Norman (1980), the minimum factor payments problem is 
expressed as minimization of the objective function wv , where v is the vector of 
production inputs including factors of production and the intermediate input, subject to 
the constraint that the unit cost, ( )jc w , is at least equal to output price , ( )jc w p . The 
Lagrange of the problem is represented as follows (Woodland 1982): 
   
1




L w q wv q c w p

      (4.7) 
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  (4.9) 
where 1 2( , ,... )mq q q q  is the vector of Lagrange multipliers, m is the number of 
output products, and i=1,…,n given that n is the number of factors of production and 
intermediate inputs. Labeling the vector of Lagrange multipliers as q implies its 
interpretation as the vector of outputs (since q is the vector of choice variables in the 
revenue maximization problem, the dual of the minimum factor payments problem). 
Meanwhile,  ijc w is the demand for input i per unit of output of product j according to 
Shephards’ Lemma (Woodland 1982). Thus, the unit cost of producing good j is the total 
of demand for inputs i to n multiplied by their prices: 







c w c w w

 . (4.10) 
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The complementary slackness conditions imply that because factors of production 
and intermediate inputs  that have positive shadow prices are fully employed and because 
goods should break even to be produced, equations (4.8) and (4.9)  hold with 
equality(Dixit and Norman 1980). Therefore, the zero profit condition (equation (4.11)), 
and the market equilibrium condition (equation (4.12)) for each of the factors of 







w c w p
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q c w v

 . (4.12) 
It is more conventional in models that employ a similar structure to denote ijc as 
ija , like Jones (1965) and Sanyal and Jones (1982 ). Therefore, this notation will be 



















Using the above structure, the zero-profit conditions and factor market clearing 
conditions are shown below for retailers and wholesalers in the fresh orange and orange 
products markets. Those conditions are similar for both orange markets. Therefore, for 
subscript oj = of and op, where of refers to the fresh market, and op refers to the orange 
products market, the factor market clearing conditions for retailers in each of the fresh 
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orange and orange products markets (which have a similar structure) are represented as 
follows: 




oj L oj ojw PS rQ a L  (4.13) 




oj k ojQS r Pa Kw   (4.14) 




oj o oj ojQS a DDw r P   (4.15) 
where 
R
ojQS  represents retail supply of oranges in market oj (which refers to either 
the fresh orange or the orange products markets),  
RW
ojDD refers to derived demand for 
oranges, O, by retailers from wholesalers in market oj, ,R ojL  is the demand for labor by 
retailers in market oj, and ,R ojK  is the demand for capital by retailers in market oj. 
Required quantity of each input i = L, K, and O to produce a unit of oranges (fresh or 
processed) by retailers is represented by , ( , , )
R R WR
oj oj ji o w r Pa  which is a function of the three 
input prices: w (wage which is exogenously set), 
R
ojr , returns to capital for retailers in 
market oj, and 
WR
ojP , wholesale price of oranges at retailer’s door.   
Similarly, the factor market clearing conditions for fresh oranges and orange 
products at the wholesale level are: 




oj L oj ojw PS rQ a L  (4.16) 




oj k ojQS r Pa Kw   (4.17) 









ojQS  represents wholesale supply of oranges in market oj (which refers to 
either the fresh orange or the orange products markets),  
WG
ojDD refers to derived demand 
for oranges, O, by wholesalers from growers oj, ,W ojL  is the demand for labor by w in 
market oj, and ,W ojK  is the demand for capital by wholesalers in market oj. Required 
quantity of each input i = L, K, and O to produce a unit of oranges (fresh or processed) by 
wholesalers is represented by , ( , , )
W W GW
oj oj ji o w r Pa  which is a function of the three input 
prices: w (wage which is exogenously set), 
W
ojr , capital returns for wholesalers in market 
oj, and 
GW
ojP , packinghouse door price of oranges in market oj. 
The zero-profit condition for retailers is: 
, , , 
RC WR






jP a w a r a P  ,  (4.19) 
where   1   WR W WR WR WRoj oj oj oj ojP P AV TR T    , (4.20) 
W
ojP is the wholesale price of oranges of market oj (fresh or processed), AV refers to 
ad valorem charges imposed on the wholesale prices of oranges, 
WR
ojTR  is the transportation 
costs from the wholesaler’s to retailer’s door, and 
WR
ojT  represents other specific charges 
which may include phytosanitary costs. 
The zero-profit condition for wholesalers is: 
, , ,   
W GW
oj L oj K oj O oj of
W W W WP a w a r a P   (4.21) 




ojP is the equivalent on-tree price of oranges of market oj (fresh or processed), AV 
is the ad valorem charges imposed on the equivalent on-tree price of oranges, 
GW
ojTR  is the 
transportation costs from farm to packinghouse door, and 
GW
ojT  represents other per unit 
non-ad valorem charges which may include phytosanitary costs. 
On the other hand, the consumer-retailer market clearing conditions are represented 
as follows: 
R
oof fQS AC    (4.23) 
R
oop pQS AC    (4.24) 
As for the retailer-wholesaler market clearing conditions, the derived demand for 
fresh oranges and orange products by retailers is fulfilled by domestic wholesalers in 
orange producing regions. Interregional trade is handled by wholesalers rather than 
retailers in those regions. Thus, the wholesale supply of fresh oranges and orange 
products are represented according to the equations below in the orange producing 
regions: 
 W RWof of ofQS DD ES   (4.25) 
     
W RW
op op op op opQS DD ES BI IE    (4.26) 
where 
W
ofQS  and  
W
opQS are the wholesale supply of fresh oranges and orange 
products respectively, 
RW
ofDD  and 
RW
opDD  refer to derived demand  for fresh oranges and 
54 
 
orange products by retailers from wholesalers,  opBI  represents beginning inventory of 
orange products and  opEI  is the ending inventory of orange products. 
Meanwhile, in the Rest of the US region, which is not an orange producer, retailers 
handle imports. This is supported by the fact that packinghouses and orange processing 
facilities are generally located near orange growing areas. While reconstitution of frozen 
orange juice and packing for retail sale might take place in consumption regions for 
transportation cost savings, there are no data available about the locations of such 
activities or interregional trade patterns. Therefore, processing of bulk orange juice, and 
packing for retail sale is assumed to be an integrated activity taking place in the 
production regions.  
Therefore, for regions not producing oranges, the derived demand by retailers is 
met by imports or excess demand, ojED , as follows: 
 RWof ofDD ED  (4.27) 
RW
opDD =   opED +   opBI -   opEI  (4.28) 
 
4.1.3  Supply by Orange Growers 
   In the United States orange producing regions, derived demand for oranges by 
wholesalers, 
WG
ojDD  , is met by orange growers’ supply 
G
ojQS  as follows:   
 WG Gof ofDD QS  
 WG Gop opDD QS  
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Due to the nature of oranges as a tree crop, the orange grower’s response to 
changes in prices and other market conditions is mainly reflected in the long run through 
changes in the decision of investment in new plantings of orange trees. In the short run, 
orange growers’ response to changes in prices can be in the form of yield per acre 
response and the allocation of  production between the fresh orange  and orange for 
processing markets. As discussed in the literature review, the possibility of changing 
yield per acre in response to changes in input and output prices is limited since cultural 
practices tend to be standardized. Therefore, yield is treated as exogenous to the model. 
Meanwhile, farmers’ decision to allocate production between the fresh and processed 
markets differs among the production regions is explained below. 
 
4.1.3.1 Total Orange Supply at the Farm Level 
   Orange supply at the farm level in each US orange-producing region is 
determined by the product of yield and bearing acreage. Because orange yield varies by 
age, the orange production identity takes account of age distribution of orange trees in 
each region. The production identity also considers exogenous shocks to orange yield and 
acreage due to pest infestation, pest management programs, or other events as follows: 
1
QS Y  α B
n
G




  (4.29) 
where QS
G
t  represents orange supply at the farm level in each region in year t, 
subscript i  refers to age category of orange trees, Yit is yield of orange trees per acre at 
age i in year t, Bit is bearing acreage of oranges of age i in year t,  it  denotes shock to 
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yield of orange trees of age i in year t , and αit represents shock to bearing acreage of 
orange trees of age i in year t. 
 
4.1.3.1.1 Yield 
Yield of orange trees varies with age. Trees start bearing fruits at the age of 3, and 
yield increases gradually to reach maturity at the age of 13.  On average, orange trees in 
California live until the age of 40 ( O’Connel 2009); meanwhile, Florida orange trees live 
until the age of 30 (Spreen 2006). Arizona and Texas trees are assumed to live until the 
age of 30.  As mentioned above, yield is set exogenous to the model.  Exogenous shocks 
may occur to yield due to pest infestation, weather, technology, and other factors.  
 
4.1.3.1.2 Bearing Acreage: 
According to equation (2.2) in the literature review, bearing acreage is represented 
as: 
1 3 1t t t tB B N R       
 where B represents bearing acreage, R refers to tree removals, subscript t 
designates the year, and subscript t-3 reflects the fact that orange trees start bearing fruits 
at the age of  three. However, similar to Acquaye et. al. (2008), since orange trees are 
grouped by age: 
it 3 1, 1B   t i tN R                      for tree ages =3. (4.30) 
it 1 1, 1B it i tB R                    for tree ages >3. (4.31) 
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The new plantings decision is represented as a function of expected ratio of returns 
to costs, 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑡, and new plantings of the previous year. A partial adjustment equation is 
used to reflect the fact that a grower’s decision to invest in new plantings is not fulfilled 
in the same year due to administrative delays and other constraints where   is the 
adjustment coefficient reflecting the portion of the new plantings decision implemented 
in year t as explained in chapter 2. Equation (4.32) below is estimated, with some 
variation, for the three US orange producing regions in the next chapter. 
𝑁𝑡 =  (𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑡) + (1 − )𝑁𝑡−1       (4.32) 
On the other hand, orange tree removals are set exogenous to the model. 
Exogenous shocks due to pest infestation or eradication policy are represented by the 
parameter αi  in equation 4.29. 
4.1.3.2 Allocation of Oranges between Fresh and Processing 
 California orange growers mainly target the fresh market, with few growers 
producing for the processed market. Thus, the orange for processing market in California 
is a residual market. Before 1994, the allocation of oranges between the fresh and 
processed markets was determined by the Arizona-California Citrus Marketing Order 
(Jacobs 1994, USDA-AMR 1994); though, the marketing order was partially suspended 
after exceeding a certain threshold each season (Timothy et. al. 1996). Starting in 1994, 
the allocation of oranges between fresh and processed utilization is determined by 
demand and weather events. The percentage of California orange production directed to 
the fresh market averaged 76%, during the period 1994-2011, and 74% during the period 
1980-2011. The years witnessing major drops in the level of utilization of oranges as 
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fresh were the years of freeze and low rainfall (Figure 4-1). Low rainfall levels are 
associated with smaller oranges that do not meet the standards of fresh orange packing 
houses (Fruit and Tree Nut Outlook 1999). 
 California oranges directed to processing are so low priced that negative equivalent 
on tree-returns are recorded for oranges in many years during the period 1980-2011 (Fruit 
and Tree Nut Yearbook 2012). Therefore, the relative price of fresh and processed 
oranges in a given year may not be the main factor affecting the allocation of orange 
production between fresh and processed.  This was also confirmed by Ordinary Least 
Squares estimation for an equation with the utilization rate of oranges as a dependent 
variable, and the following as independent variables: relative price of fresh oranges and 
orange for processing (current price and several lags), a dummy variable representing 
years of severe weather events, and a dummy variable representing years when the 
marketing order was applied. The estimated equation showed a very inelastic response of 
the orange utilization rate to the current relative price (a coefficient of 0.01); meanwhile, 
the lagged price variables were not statistically significant. The severe weather events 
and marketing order dummy variables were statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Therefore, the allocation decision of California oranges between the fresh market 
and orange for processing market is set exogenous in the model. Exogenous changes to 
the utilization rate of oranges, for example due to a higher percentage of  fruits not 
meeting the standards of fresh oranges and being  allocated to processing, are denoted by 
the shift parameter Ω in the following equation representing grower supply of fresh 
oranges in California: 
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, ,  , .   
G G
of CA of CA o CAQS U QS Ω  (4.33) 
where , :
G
of CAQS  Grower supply of fresh oranges,  , :
G
o CAQS  total supply of oranges, and 
ofU  : percentage of total orange production utilized fresh. 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Percentage of California Oranges Utilized Fresh and Weather Events 
Source: Severe weather events data from NOAA (2012), and Orange Utilization data 
from (USDA-ERS 2012). 
 
 
On the other hand, in Florida, the relative equivalent on tree prices of fresh 
oranges to oranges for processing fluctuated from 1:1 to 1:1.5 during the period 1980-
2012 (Fruit and Tree Nut Yearbook 2012). According to Murraro (1997), Murraro et. al. 
(1991), and Niles and Childfield (1976), Florida growers have two basic decision times 
for allocation of oranges between the fresh and processed markets (Figure 4-2).  The first 
is prior to the production season, when the grower determines the cultural practices to 
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The grower’s decision depends on expectations relating to the following factors: expected 
cultural costs, chances of harvesting fruits that meet the characteristics of the fresh orange 
market, expected price differential, and expected yield of pounds solids per orange which 
determines the price of oranges directed to the processing market.   
The second decision time is at harvest when the grower decides whether to pursue 
the fresh or processed marketing channels. The outcome of this decision is mainly 
determined by the cultural practices followed and the environment during production that 
influences fruit characteristics.  The growers make their decision based on the realized 
fruit characteristics, prices, yield and costs which become less uncertain at this stage.  
 
 
Figure 4-2: Florida growers’ decision of allocation of oranges between fresh and 
processing 




Thus, in Florida, the percentage of orange production routed to the fresh market,
, of FLU , becomes a function of the current year price, and the expected price. The expected 
price is based on the lagged prices of the previous two years according to results of the 
estimation of the regression equation of fresh orange utilization in Florida on the current 
price, and the prices of the previous two years: 
          , , ,(
W
of FL of tU f P  , 1,
W
of tP   , 2 )
W
of tP   (4.34) 
, ,  , .  
G G
of FL of FL o FL FLQS U QS Ω  (4.35) 
Finally, in each of the three orange producing regions, the quantity of oranges 
routed into the processing channel is 
G
opQS  :  
G
opQS  = 
G
oQS   - 
G
ofQS  (4.36) 
 
4.2 Model Closure and Global Price Linkages 
The model allows regional trade within the United States as well as international 
trade. In the fresh orange market, there are two exporting regions: California, and Florida; 
and three importing regions: Arizona-Texas, Rest of the US, and Rest of the World. 
Meanwhile, in the orange products market, there are two exporting regions: Florida and 
Rest of the World; and three importing regions: Arizona-Texas, California, and Rest of 
the US. Regional and international trade is represented in an excess supply-excess 
demand framework where trade is an implicit function of price for US regions, and US 
imports and exports.  
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  In order to provide a graphic illustration of the model (based on Alston, Norman 
and Pardey 1995), we start by a two-region model where California is a net orange 
exporter, and the other regions are net importers. In Figure 4-3, panel (a) represents 
supply and demand in California, and panel (c) represents supply and demand in the Rest 
of the Regions. The excess supply, ESo, is given by the horizontal difference between 
California’s demand and supply curves. The excess demand, EDo, is given by the 
horizontal difference between the Rest of the Regions’ demand and supply curves. 
Market equilibrium between all regions occurs at the intersection of the excess supply 
and demand curves at price Po. 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Excess Supply-Excess Demand Framework – Two Region Model 




An upward shift in California’s supply curve due to a pest infestation results in an 
increase in the equilibrium price Po to P1, as the excess supply curve shifts upwards. 
There is a decrease in orange consumption in California, and a reduction in the quantity 
traded of oranges. In the Rest of the Regions, the price increase induces an increase in 
supply and a decrease in consumption. 
Applying the above framework to the five-region case: 
In the fresh orange market, given that California and Florida are net exporters, and 










ofED ,  (4.37) 
      where ofES  refers to excess supply, and ofED represents excess demand as defined 
before. CA is California, FL is Florida, AZTX is Arizona-Texas region, ROUS is the rest 
of the US region, and ROW is the rest of the world region. Excess demand of the Rest 
World is a function of the wholesale price of fresh oranges at the retailer’s door in the 
Rest of the World (ROW).  
   
ROW





ofP )    (4.38) 
On the other hand, in the orange products market, Florida and Rest of the World 
are net exporters, and the other regions are net importers: 








op opED ED  , (4.39) 
where  
, ( )ROW ROW WR ROWop op opES ES P   (4.40) 
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such that excess supply of world exporters is a function of wholesale price of 
orange products at the retailer’s door.  
As explained above, wholesalers handle inter-regional trade in the US orange 
producing regions. Meanwhile, retailers handle imports in the Rest of the US region. 
Therefore, the wholesale price of oranges at the retailers’ door was selected as the price 
connecting all regions. The Rest of the US region price was selected as the price linking 
all regions. 
In the fresh orange market, the price linkages are as follows: 
,WR ROUS
ofP =  , 1  wR CA CA ROUS CA ROUS CA ROUSof of of ofP AV T TR       (4.41) 
,WR ROUS
ofP =  , 1  wR FL CA ROUS FL ROUS FL ROUSof of of ofP AV T TR      (4.42) 
,WR ROUS
ofP =  , 1wR AZTX AZTX ROUS AZTX ROUS AZTX ROUSof of of ofP AV T TR      (4.43) 
,WR ROUS
ofP =  , 1wR ROW ROW ROUS ROW ROUS ROW ROUSof of of ofP AV T TR      (4.44) 
Similarly, in the orange products market, the price linkages are as follows: 
,WR ROUS
opP =  , 1  wR CA CA ROUS CA ROUS CA ROUSop op op opP AV T TR      (4.45) 
,WR ROUS
opP =
 , 1  wR FL CA ROUS FL ROUS FL ROUSop op op opP AV T TR      (4.46) 
,WR ROUS
opP =
 , 1wR AZTX AZTX ROUS AZTX ROUS AZTX ROUSop op op opP AV T TR      (4.47) 
,WR ROUS
opP =




4.3 Differential Transformation of the Model 
All the model equations are transformed into logarithmic differential form. The 
logarithmic differential form has the advantage of being driven by elasticities which are 
easier to estimate or obtain from literature.  In addition, it allows the flexibility of either 
using historical observed data or projected data (Paarlberg et. al. 2008). The differential 
form of the model is presented in the Appendix. 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
The model structure reflects the relationships among the different stakeholders 
(consumers, retailers, wholesalers, and orange growers) along the US supply chain of 
fresh oranges and orange products in a dynamic framework. Consumer demand for 
oranges is determined using partial budgeting. Supply and derived demand relationships 
between retailers-wholesalers, and wholesalers-orange growers in the fresh orange and 
orange products are represented in a Ricardo-Viner framework where labor is a mobile 
input, capital is an industry-specific input, and orange is an intermediate input. Supply of 
oranges by growers is an investment decision where growers respond to changes in 
expected relative returns to costs. The differential form of the model is adopted, so the 
model is driven by elasticities. The next chapter presents the econometric estimation of 





CHAPTER 5.  PARAMETER ESTIMATION, DATA AND PROJECTIONS 
This chapter presents the different sources of data used in the model. Because the 
study employs a simulation model, it uses data and parameters from several sources. The 
parameters are econometrically estimated in the current study, drawn from the literature, 
or assumed based on judgment and model validation. Also, the model projects the 
economic impacts of alternative pest management scenarios for the next 30 years, so 
projections of the data that set the baseline for the model are required. Thus, the first 
section presents the data employed for econometric estimation of the parameters and 
projection of the baseline data. The second section provides econometric estimation of 
supply response parameters of orange growers in the different United States regions, and 
econometric estimation of orange consumer demand elasticities. It also presents the 
values and sources of the other parameters. The third section focuses on the data 
projections. Meanwhile, the fourth section discusses model validation. The fifth section 
concludes the chapter. 
  
5.1 Data Employed in the Model 
5.1.1 Supply, Use, and Price Data 
Data about US orange production and utilization at the national and state levels are 
obtained from the US Fruit and Tree Nut Database (USDA-ERS 2012). Meanwhile, US 
total fresh orange consumption, trade, and production are available from the USDA 
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production, supply and distribution database (USDA-FAS 2012). There are some minor 
discrepancies between the two databases with respect to fresh orange production. 
Therefore, the total production data from the supply, and use database is employed, and 
the production of each state is calculated based on shares of each state in fresh orange 
production obtained from the Fruit, Tree Nut datasets. Orange juice production, 
consumption, stocks, and imports data from 1980 to 2010 are obtained from USDA-ERS 
(2013), while 2010 and 2011 data are obtained from the USDA production, supply and 
distribution database (USDA-ERS 2012). Since time series data about other orange 
products consumption, production, prices, and inventory are not available, all the 
production of oranges directed to processing is assumed to go to orange juice production. 
The estimated loss rate of fresh oranges at the retail level (by supermarkets) is obtained 
from Buzby et. al.(2009). 
Data about the consumption of fresh oranges and orange juice is not available at the 
state level; therefore, the share of each state in total consumption is calculated based on 
the state’s share in population. This assumes that orange consumption patterns are similar 
among the US states which is not necessarily true.  As for orange juice inventory, data is 
available at the national level for the whole study period, and it is available for Florida 
only starting 1985. The share of Florida in the total US orange juice inventory during the 
period (1980-1984) is assumed to be equal to its average share during the period (1985-
2011). Meanwhile, the rest of the inventory is prorated among the other states based on 
their consumption shares.  
Equivalent on-tree prices of oranges directed to fresh production and to processing 
is available from the Fruit, Tree, and Nut dataset (USDA-ERS 2012) at the state level. 
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Also, packinghouse door prices for both utilization forms are compiled from the USDA 
Citrus Fruit Summary Reports (USDA-NASS various issues). Only aggregate price of 
California’s oranges are published starting 2009/2010 for confidentiality reasons. The 
fresh orange price was estimated based on regression of the fresh orange prices on 
aggregate price of fresh oranges using available data from 1980/1981 to 2008/2009. 
USDA Citrus Fruit Summary Reports provide FOB (Free on Board) prices of fresh 
oranges for each state from 2000/2001 to 2011/2012. The data of the rest of the period is 
estimated based on the average packing costs obtained from the available time period.  
Data about prices of Florida’s bulk orange juice is available from 1990 to 2010 
while data about prices of Brazil’s bulk orange juice is available from 1980 to 2011 
(Florida Department of Citrus, Various Issues). Florida’s bulk orange juice data for the 
period (1980-1990) and the year 2011 are estimated based on regression of Florida’s 
prices on Brazil’s prices. The other states’ bulk orange juice prices are assumed to be 
equal to those of Florida plus transportation. Data about the US Most Favored Nation 
tariff on oranges since 1980 is obtained from the Citrus Reference report of 2012 issued 
by Florida Department of Citrus. Average ad valorem equivalent of tariffs and quotas 
imposed on the US fresh orange exports is extracted from the International Trade Center 
Market Access Map website -MACMAP (International Trade Center 2013).  
Retail prices of orange juice are obtained from Citrus Reference Reports issued by 
Florida Department of Citrus (various issues). Retail prices of fresh Navel and Valencia 
oranges are available on the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics website. Weighted 
average orange retail price was calculated based on the share of each of the orange 
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varieties in the total US production. All prices and costs data were converted to real 
values using Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website.  
Data about temperature and rainfall are obtained from the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration weather database (NOAA 2013). Severe weather events data 
are available from NOAA (2012), as well as the 2012 Citrus Reference Report (Florida 
Department of Citrus 2012). Data about orange acreage and yield at the state level are 
obtained from Fruit and Tree Nut Report (USDA-ERS 2012).  
 
5.1.2 New Plantings, Tree Removal, and Age Distribution of Orange Acreage Data 
Data about total annual bearing acreage of oranges in all states during the period 
(1980/1981-2011/2012) is obtained from the Fruit and Tree Nut Datasets (USDA-ERS 
2012). However, that data is an aggregate of bearing acreage for all tree ages. For 
California, data showing acreage of oranges by year planted is available from Florida 
Department of Agriculture Citrus Summary Reports during the period (1980-1993) and 
from California Citrus Acreage Reports for the years 1998, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 
2010, 2012 (California Department of Agriculture various issues) . However, there is 
inconsistency between data in the various reports since acreage planted in a year might 
appear higher in a subsequent report while it should be lower due to removals. Also, data 
showing non-bearing acreage/trees of oranges are available from the USDA Census of 
Agriculture Reports (1974-2007) which are released every five years. So, data about new 
plantings  and age distribution of orange bearing acreage are calculated based on 
reconciling data from California Citrus Acreage Reports, and Census of Agriculture 
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Reports, as well as an assumption of 2.8% orange acreage removal rate for the period 
(1972-1997) using the average acreage removal rate of the period (1998-2012).  
As for Florida, the Florida Orange Census is conducted biannually. Data about 
Florida’s orange acreage by year set is available from Florida’s Commercial Citrus 
Inventory reports (USDA-NASS various issues from 1970-2009). Florida Agricultural 
Statistics Reports (Florida Agricultural Statistics Service, Various Issues) provide data 
about orange non-bearing acreage from (2008/09-2011/12). Meanwhile, data about 
orange acreage by age category is available for even years from 1970-2010 in Florida 
Department of Citrus (2011). Total bearing acreage is available from the above 
mentioned reports as well as Fruit and Tree Nut Dataset (USDA- ERS 2012). Similar to 
the problem encountered with California’s data, there are some inconsistencies in the data 
between the different years. Therefore, data about new plantings and distribution of 
orange acreage by tree age in Florida are estimated based on reconciling data from the 
above mentioned sources, as well as data about tree removals for even years during the 
period 1994-2011 from Florida Department of Citrus (2011), and a guideline of average 
tree removal rate of 2.8% for orange trees of age less than 24 years of age, and 5% for 
oranges of 24 years of age or older from Acquaye et. al.(2008). 
Concerning Arizona and Texas, data about orange acreage by age category is 
available for Texas from 1969-1995 (Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer 
Services, Various Issues). Meanwhile, data of non-bearing acreage for both Arizona and 
Texas is available through the USDA Census of Agriculture Reports (1974-2007). Due to 
lack of data about age distribution for the two states for many years, and given that their 
contribution to the total US production does not exceed 3% during the study period, the 
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supply response model for the Arizona-Texas  region does not consider the age 
distribution of orange acreage. New plantings data is estimated based on an assumption 
of orange acreage removal rate of 5%. However, this rate is adjusted in many years based 
on the available data about age distribution mentioned above, bearing acreage data, and 
weather events.  
 
5.1.3 Yield 
Florida Department of Citrus (2011) provides average orange yield per tree by age 
category from 1992/1993 to 2009/10. Also, Abrigo and Buani-Arouca (2010) estimate 
the average ratio of yield of trees of each age to the yield of a mature tree using data from 
37 years. The above data is used to define ranges for the ratio of yield of each age 
category to the weighted average yield of oranges. Such ranges along with weighed 
average yield of oranges (from USDA-ERS 2012), and acreage for each age are used to 
solve for the yield of oranges per age category for each year using Excel Solver (Non-
linear Optimization). It is assumed that the ranges of ratio of yield of each age category to 
average yield in California are similar to those of Florida. 
 
5.1.4 Costs and Returns 
The University of California Cooperative Extension Department issues costs and 
returns studies for several agricultural products including oranges (University of 
California, Various Issues). Studies for San Joaquin Valley, the region in which about 
87% of the value of California’s orange production is located (California Citrus Quality 
Council 2009), are available for the years 1980, 1985, 2002, 2005, 2007, and 2009. 
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Comparing the elements of cultural practices in the different studies, it is found out that 
they are similar (except for Gypsum soluble use).While there are studies for other regions 
in California in the years 1981/1982, 1988/89, and 1997, the data relating to the cultural 
practices and costs are inconsistent with the data for San Joaquin valley. Thus, studies 
about the other regions are excluded to avoid data inconsistencies. Therefore, using data 
from the available studies about costs and returns of the San Joaquin Valley Region, cost 
data for the period 1980-2011 are estimated as shown in Table 5-1.  
 
 
Table 5-1: Cultural Costs and Cash Overhead Costs of California-Method of Estimation 
and Data Sources 
Item Source 
Fertilizers Nitrogen-based fertilizers represent the majority of the total fertilizer 
cost (96% of the total cost in 2007). Thus, fertilizer cost for the 
whole data series is estimated using fertilizer cost from the 2007 cost 
and return study and the Nitrogen Price Index at the national level 






Insecticide costs for the period (1980-2011) were estimated through 
applying the Insecticide Price Index to insecticide, herbicide, and 
fungicide costs from the 2007 cost and return study. The Insecticide 
Price Index (at the national level) is obtained from the Agricultural 
Price Summary Survey (various issues) and the NASS Quick Stat 
Database (from 1997-2011). 
Irrigation 
(water costs) 
The quantity of irrigation water (30 acre-inches for mature trees) 
reported in the 1980 cost and return study is the same as that reported 
in the subsequent years. However, the water prices are not available. 
Thus, considering that the consumer price index for utility water 
follow a linear trend during the period 1980-2011, a linear increase is 








Frost protection variable costs comprise water costs, and wind 
machine operation (propane costs). Water costs are estimated as 
explained above. Meanwhile, propane costs are estimated based on 
propane prices from the Agriculture Price Summary Survey (various 
issues), and the USDA Quick Statistics database. 
Labor costs It is assumed that labor use for all years is the same as that reported 
in the 2007 costs and returns study. The costs are changed based on 
the change in labor wage. Wage data for California’s agricultural 
labor (paid by the hour) are obtained from various issues of the 
Farm Labor Survey and Quick Statistics database. 
Pruning costs A linear change in pruning costs is assumed. It is estimated based on 
the available data from the California Cost and Return Studies. 
Fuel, lube, and 
repairs costs  
Fuel, lube and repairs costs are assumed to change based on the 
change in the historical yearly average gasoline prices of California 
obtained from the California Energy Commission (2013) . 
Cash Overhead 
costs 
A linear change in cash overhead costs is assumed using the 
available data from O’Connell (various issues) and University of 
California (various issues). 
Land Value The land rent data are available in the Quick Stat Database and 
Agricultural Land Values and Cash Rents-Final Estimates only from 
1994-2012.  So, average land farm real estate values for California 
from USDA-ERS: US and State Farm Income and Wealth Statistics 
datasets (US and State-level data 1980-2011) is used. The land cost 
is annualized following the methodology of capital recovery 
employed in the Cost and Return studies.  
Machinery Machinery costs for the period (1980-2011) are estimated through 
applying the machinery price index to machinery costs from the 
2007 cost and return study. The index of prices paid for “other 
machinery” from the Quick Stat Database, and Agricultural Prices 
Reports is used. 
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On the other hand, data representing costs of production of Florida oranges are 
obtained from Florida orange costs and returns studies issued by the University of Florida 
Institute of Agricultural Sciences (UF/IFAS various issues). The reports provide data for 
cultural costs and debt payments. Debt payments include principal plus interest on grove 
establishment and capital investment, management costs, and taxes and regulatory costs 
for Central Ridge and Southwest Florida regions. The average of the two regions is used. 
Meanwhile, data is not available about Texas orange production cost and returns. 
However, according to Sauls (2008), Texas citrus production costs are close to those of 
Florida or higher.  The main difference is that Texas orange industry relies on irrigation 
more than Florida. On the other hand, the few production cost studies that are available 
for Arizona are mainly for a combined California-Arizona orange industry. Therefore, it 
is assumed that Arizona’s production costs are similar to those of California, and that 
Texas’ costs are similar to those of Florida. Accordingly, costs of production of oranges 
for the Arizona-Texas industry are calculated as a weighted average of California and 
Florida production costs based on the weights of acreage of Arizona and Texas 
respectively. Returns are calculated based on a weighted average of the product of yield 
and acreage of the Arizona and Texas region. 
 
5.1.5 Revenue Shares 
Unit revenue share of labor in the orange processing sector in Florida is obtained 
from the United States International Trade Commission Anti-Dumping Investigation 
Report of Certain Orange Juice from Brazil (USITC 2006-a). The labor share in 
California and Arizona-Texas region is assumed to be the same as that of Florida. 
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Revenue share of labor in the packinghouses is assumed to be similar to the revenue 
share in the food sector available in the US Economic Census (United States Department 
of Commerce 2007). For orange products, orange revenue share is calculated by dividing 
the delivered-in price by the bulk orange juice in each state. Similarly, for fresh oranges, 
orange revenue share is calculated by dividing the packinghouse door price by the FOB 
price. Revenue share of capital and management is calculated as the difference between 
the orange output price and the total of labor and packinghouse door price of oranges (or 
delivered-in price of oranges in the case of orange products).  
 
5.2 Model Parameters 
5.2.1 Supply Response 
As discussed in the literature review and model structure chapters, the orange 
growers’ response to changes in prices of inputs and output is mainly reflected in changes 
in their decision of investment in new plantings of oranges. The literature review 
highlighted two approaches for modeling new plantings: the traditional approach and the 
investment approach. Both approaches are applied. 
In applying the traditional approach, features from Alston (1995), French, King, 
and Minami (1985), Alston et. al. (1980), French and King (1988), and Kinney (1987) are 
incorporated, as well as some other variables that relate to the orange industry as follows: 
 (5.1) 
Several lags of annual returns to annual costs are tested. Annual returns are 
calculated as yield times weighted average equivalent on-tree returns of fresh oranges and 
𝑁𝑡 =  (𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝑡−2+𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑡−3 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑡−4 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝐹𝑡−1
+ 𝛽8𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑊𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑀𝑂) + (1 − )𝑁𝑡−1 
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oranges for processing. Annual costs are calculated as cultural costs plus operating costs 
plus annualized costs of orange grove establishment and capital. The annualized costs are 
calculated using a capital recovery method. This method of calculation of annual returns 
and costs is based on the annual returns and costs study and template provided by the 
University of California Extension Department to orange growers (O’Connell et. al. 
2005, 2007, and 2009).  Therefore, it is likely that orange growers might calculate returns 
and costs in a similar way.  The model is estimated in a double-log form since the main 
purpose is to estimate the elasticity of supply response. In order to avoid negative values 
that result in undefined logarithmic values, the ratio of annual returns to annual costs is 
used rather than net returns.  
 In the investment approach, equation (2.6) from the literature review section is 
used but the ENPV (expected net present value) is replaced by expected benefit-cost 
ratio: 
𝑁𝑡 =  (𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐵𝐶𝑡−1) + (1 − )𝑁𝑡−1 (5.2) 
where  is a fraction of the desired change in investment that is accomplished in 
year t, EBC is expected benefit- cost ratio in year t which is calculated as the ratio of 
present value of benefits to present value of costs. 
The present value of costs included costs of establishment of orange orchards, land 
and capital costs, operating costs (including cultural costs), and cash overhead costs. 












  (5.3) 
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where EP: expected price, EY: expected yield, and ES: Expected survival rate of 
trees. 
 
5.2.1.1 Estimation of Supply Response Parameters for California Growers 
New plantings, benefit cost ratio, annual relative returns, rainfall, acreage, and 
removals time series data are tested for the existence of unit roots using Dickey Fuller 
test. The hypotheses are rejected at the conventional levels of significance (ranging from 
1% to 10%). 
Because the above time series are found to be stationary based on the Dickey 
Fuller test results, the Ordinary Least Squares Method (OLS) is applied.  A common 
problem with the use of time series data is autocorrelation. While the OLS estimators in 
the case of autocorrelation are still unbiased, consistent and asymptotically normally 
distributed, they are no longer efficient such that the minimum variance property is no 
longer satisfied. Consequently, a regression coefficient may be incorrectly declared 
statistically insignificant (Gujarati 2003) .According to Keele and Kelly (2006), using the 
lag of the dependent variable as an explanatory variable can in many cases address that 
problem; however, it might lead to biased but consistent estimators if there is no residual 
autocorrelation in the data-generating process or true underlying relationship. It might 
also suppress the explanatory power of the other variables if it is added for the sole 
purpose of addressing autocorrelation (Achen 2001). In the current case, the inclusion of 
a lagged dependent variable is justified on the grounds that new plantings are an 
investment decision that is partially fulfilled in a given year due to short-run constraints 
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and adjustment costs. The issue of the influence on the explanatory power is addressed 
through testing whether the significance of the other variables improves when one 
removes the lagged dependent variable.  
   Although residual plots do not show signs of autocorrelation, the hypothesis of 
no autocorrelation is rejected at the 5% level by the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange 
Multiplier likelihood ratio test for the estimation of equations (5.1) and equation (5.2) 
above. This test is more accurate than the Durbin-Watson test in the case of having the 
lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable (Greene 2003).  
  One way of solving the problem of autocorrelation is the application of Prais-
Winsten regression, a Feasible Generalized Least Squares method, which yields more 
efficient estimators than OLS in the case of autocorrelation (Wooldridge 2009). A 
generalized least squares method transforms the variables through including the 
autocorrelation parameter ρ in the formula for estimating the regression coefficient: 
𝛽𝐺𝐿?̂?  
1
1 1X’ X ' YX 

   (5.4)      




  (5.5) 
where 𝛽𝐺𝐿?̂? is the estimated regression coefficient,   is the matrix containing the 
autocorrelation parameter, X is matrix of independent variables, and Y is the vector of 
dependent variable. Because the autocorrelation coefficient is usually unknown, a 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) method where the autocorrelation coefficient 
method is estimated is more commonly used. Prais-Winsten is a Feasible Generalized 
Least Squares Method which estimates ρ using an iterative method (Greene 2003).  
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New plantings based on equations (5.1) and (5.2) above are estimated using both 
Prais-Winsten and OLS. Several combinations of the variables in equation (5.1) are 
examined. Such combinations include omitting the lagged dependent variable to account 
for the concern raised by Achen (2001) that it might suppress the explanatory power of 
the other independent variables. It is found that the only statistically significant variables 
are the first-order lagged ratio of annual return to costs, and the first-order lagged new 
planting variable (variables with a p-value higher than 10% are considered statistically 
insignificant. Rainfall has a p-value of 11% but the coefficient has a negative sign while 
it is expected to be positive). Table 5-2 compares the results of the estimation of equation 
(5.2) and the re-estimation of equation (5.1) after omitting the variables that are not 
statistically significant. 
The estimated coefficients of regression resulting from applying OLS and Prais-
Winsten are similar in value. Also, the estimated ρ in all the equations that are examined 
are between 0.4 and 0.47. According to Gujarati (2003), Griliches and Rao (1969) found 
through a Monte Carlo study that OLS is at least as good as FGLS in terms of small 
sample properties when ρ is less than 0.3. In our case, this may imply that the 
autocorrelation associated with the OLS is low which matches with the findings from 
residual plots which do not show signs of autocorrelation. The coefficient of the ratio of 
annual returns to costs represents the short-run elasticity of supply. Meanwhile, the long-
run elasticity of supply is obtained by dividing the short-run elasticity of supply by the 
coefficient of adjustment (Labys 1973). Therefore, using the Prais-Winsten estimation 
results for equation (5.1), the short-run elasticity of supply is 0.6 and long-run elasticity 
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of supply is 3. Meanwhile, for equation (5.2), the short-run elasticity of supply is 0.54, 
while the long-run elasticity of supply is 6.5.  
 
Table 5-2: Comparison of the Results of Estimation of the New Plantings Equation of 
California Oranges using the Annual Returns- Cost Ratio and the Benefit-Cost ratio 
 Equation (5.1) 
Relative Returns  
Equation (5.2) 
Benefit Cost Ratio 







 Relative Returns 0.59 *** 
 








Ratio of the previous year 





 Lagged New 
Plantings 
0.79 *** 0.74*** 0.92 *** 0.88*** 
Constant -1.5 -1.4 0.22 0.27 
R-squared 82.77% 61.2% 83.99% 63.51% 
F (p-value) 0 0 0 0 
N 31 31 31 31 
***: siginifcant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, and *: significant at 10%. 
 
In conclusion, equations (5.1) and (5.2) converge to similar results except for the 
difference in the higher long run elasticity. The ratio of annual returns to annual cost is 
selected as a measure of profitability in the new plantings equation of California. The 
templates for orange production cost and returns issued by the University of California 
Extension and Cooperation for use by orange growers apply the annual returns to costs 
ratio. Also, the annual cost includes the annualized costs of orchard establishment and 
capital, so it includes the investment costs. Growers are likely to fund the initial 
81 
 
investments through loans, so they pay the annualized cost in each year. This is in 
contrast to paying the whole investment costs in the first year which might imply bigger 
differences between the two measures of profitability. In addition, as explained below, 
the estimated new plantings equation of Florida which uses annual returns to costs ratio is 
better in terms of statistical properties than the equation using the benefit cost ratio. 
Applying the same measures of profitability in the two regions ensures consistency. 
Figure (5-1) plots the data of observed new plantings of California oranges versus the 
predicted data based on equation (5.1).  
 
 
Figure 5-1: Plot of Observed Versus Predicted New Plantings of California Oranges 
(1980-2011) 
 
5.2.1.2 Estimation of Supply Response Parameters for Florida Growers 
New plantings, benefit cost ratio, annual relative return, rainfall, acreage, and tree 









































Observed New Plantings of California (1000 Acres)




test. The hypotheses are rejected at the conventional levels of significance (ranging from 
0% to 10%). 
OLS is used to estimate equation (5.1). However, first-order autocorrelation is 
detected through the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier likelihood ratio. Also, 
residual plots indicate some signs of autocorrelation. The equation is re-estimated using 
the Prais-Winsten regression. The four lagged variables of the annual profitability ratio 
and the lagged new plantings variable are found to be significant at the conventional 
levels ranging from 1% to 10%. Figure 5-2 plots the data of observed new plantings of 
Florida oranges versus the predicted data based on equation (5.1). Meanwhile, estimation 
of equation (5.2) shows low R-squared (20%), and the benefit-cost ratio is not significant 
at any of the conventional levels of significance (p-value 0.45). However, the whole 
model is significant at the 1% level (Table 5-3). 
Traboulsi (2013) estimates the supply response of Florida’s orange growers using 
total acreage as the dependent variable, and temperature, one-year lagged price of 
oranges, rainfall, time trend and lagged acreage as explanatory variables. The estimated 
elasticity of supply with respect to the one year lagged price is 0.17. The estimated 
lagged dependent variable coefficient is 0.988. Also, temperature is found to be 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The difference in the results with respect to 
temperature may be attributed to the fact that the current model uses annual returns to 
cost ratio rather than price. Annual returns include yield which may already incorporate 
the effect of temperature. This is besides that the current model uses new plantings rather 





Figure 5-2: Observed Versus Predicted New Plantings of Oranges in Florida 
 
Table 5-3: Comparison of the Results of  Estimation of the New Plantings Equation of 
Florida Oranges using the Annual Returns/Cost Ratio and the Benefit/Cost ratio (Prais-
Winsten Regression) 
 Equation (5.1) 
Relative Returns 
Equation (5.2)  
Benefit/Cost Ratio 
Ln  t 1EBC  , Lagged Benefit Cost Ratio - 0.157 
Ln  t 1RR   , Lagged Relative Returns  0.162* - 
Ln ( t 2RR  ), Lagged Relative Returns 
0.215* - 
Ln ( t 3RR  ), Lagged Relative Returns 
0.212* - 
Ln ( t 4RR  ), Lagged Relative Returns 
0.299** - 
Ln  t 1NP  ,  Lagged New Plantings 0.732*** 0.88*** 
Constant 0.68 0.36 
R-Squared 90.3% 20.3% 
F(p-value) 0 0 
N 28 31 


































Observed New Plantings (1000 Acres)
Observed Versus Predicted New Plantings of Orange Trees in Florida
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5.2.1.3 Estimation of Supply Response Parameters for Arizona-Texas Growers 
As mentioned earlier, orange acreage in Arizona has been declining such that no 
acreage is recorded for Arizona in the USDA statistical reports since 2009. Meanwhile, 
Texas orange acreage has highly fluctuated during the period (1980-2012) due to severe 
weather.  In addition, Texas orange cultivation relies on irrigation more than Florida, 
since Texas rainfall levels are  less than half those of Florida (Sauls 2008). Therefore, 
rainfall, which is not a significant variable in the estimation of either Florida’s or 
California’s supply response equations, is not considered as an independent variable. 
Also, equation (5.2) is not tested since it is decided that it will not be used for either 
California or Florida.  
Marketing order and weather dummy variables, tree removals of the previous year, 
and a time variable representing structural changes are included as independent variables 
in the supply response equation besides four lags of annual return to cost ratio, and a 
lagged new planting variable (based on equation 5.1). Several combinations of the 
variables are tried. The equations are estimated using OLS regression. The two 
combinations of variables shown in table 5-4 exhibit the best performance among all 
combinations in terms of the significance of variables and higher R-square. In both cases, 
the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for no first order autocorrelation is not rejected at any of 
the conventional levels of significance (p-values are 0.8 and 0.82). Re-estimation using 





Table 5-4: Results of Estimation of New Plantings Equation for Arizona-Texas Region 
 OLS Regression Prais-Winsten Regression 
Ln ( t 2RR  ), Lagged Relative Returns 0.68** 0.49** 
Ln  t 1NP  , Lagged New Plantings 0.43*** 0.65*** 
Weather -.52 *  
Constant 0.17 -.12 
R-squared 61.2% 71.1% 
F (p-value) 0 0 
N 31 31 
***: siginifcant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, and *: significant at 10%. 
 
5.2.2 Orange Consumption 
5.2.2.1 Elasticity of Substitution between Fresh Oranges and Orange Juice 
Elasticity of substitution is estimated from the logarithmic transformation of the 
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Since (1 − 𝜎𝑐)= -0.5, then 𝜎𝑐= 1.5. 
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5.2.2.2 Own Price Elasticity of Demand for Oranges 
To estimate the own price elasticity of oranges, the real index of nitrogen fertilizer 
is used as an instrument for retail price of oranges. This is in order to avoid the possible 
problem of endogeneity due to the correlation between retail price of oranges and the 
error terms of the regression equation of orange consumption on orange prices. The two 
main conditions that a variable should meet to be used as an instrumental variable are 
being (1) correlated with the independent variable it is used as an instrument for; and (2) 
uncorrelated with the error terms (Wooldridge 2009).  Regression of real price of oranges 
on the nitrogen index shows that nitrogen index is a statistically significant variable at the 
5% level. The overall model is significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the nitrogen index 
satisfies the first condition of an instrumental variable.  While the second condition 
cannot be tested, one can argue that nitrogen index does not result in shifts in demand for 
oranges.  A two-stage least squares method is applied. The estimated equation is: 
ln o(AC )  = -10.5 -0.76 ln ( P
RC
o ) (5.7) 
where ACo is aggregate orange consumption, and P
RC
o is value share weighted 
average price of fresh orange and orange juice. 
Based on the estimated own price elasticity of oranges (aggregate of fresh oranges 
and orange products), the estimated elasticity of substitution between fresh oranges and 
orange products, and average consumption shares of fresh oranges and orange products, 
the resulting partial price elasticity of fresh oranges and orange products are -1.3 and        
-0.9 respectively. Comparing those numbers with the estimated own price elasticity for 
fresh oranges and orange juice from the literature, it is found that the estimated own price 
87 
 
of elasticity of fresh oranges ranged between -0.27 to -1.14 with an average of -0.79 from 
10 papers published between 1992 to 2002 reviewed in Durham and Eales (2010). 
Durham and Eales (2010) estimated the own-price of elasticity of fresh oranges to be         
-1.37, but they used data from retail stores rather than aggregate national level data. 
Weatherspoon et. al. (2012) estimated the Cournot price elasticity and Slutsky price 
elasticity to be -0.72 and -0.542 using data from a retail store in Detroit, which is a low 
income area. As for orange juice, Brown et. al. (1994) estimated the own price elasticity 
to range from -0.82 to -0.89 using several methods of estimation. USITC (2012) expert 
opinion estimates the own price elasticity of orange juice to range from -0.4 to -0.8.  
 
5.2.3 Other Parameters 
Data for the price elasticity of total demand of world imports for fresh oranges 
from the US is obtained from the literature. Sparks (1991) estimates the Cournot price 
elasticity of demand for the US fresh oranges in four of the top US markets. The 
estimated elasticities were -1.16, -3.3, -1.28, and -1.07 for Canada, European Union, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore respectively. The estimated elasticities are close in the four 
markets except for the European Union. Given that Canada is the largest fresh orange 
market for the US, the estimated elasticity for Canada (-1.16) was initially selected to 
represent the elasticity of demand of importers of US fresh oranges. Yet, model 
validation led to the choice of -1.5. Elasticity of supply response of orange products 
exporters to the United States is defined as 1.5 based on Spreen (1996) estimation of the 
supply response of Mexico orange juice exporters. No studies for the supply response by 
Brazil, the major orange juice exporter to the US, is available for the author. As for the 
88 
 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, and between capital and orange input 
at the retail and wholesale levels, they are assumed to be 0.2.  Table 5-5 shows all the 
elasticities employed in the model. 
 
Table 5-5: Elasticities Used in the Model 
Item Elasticity 
Elasticity of Supply Response of California 
Orange Growers 
Lagged Relative Returns (RRt-1): 0.6 
Lagged New Plantings (NPt-1): 0.8 
Elasticity of Supply Response of Florida 
Growers 





Elasticity of Supply Response of Arizona-
Texas Orange Growers 
RRt-1:0.68 
NPt-1:0.43 
Demand Elasticity of Substitution between 
fresh oranges and orange juice 
1.5 
Own Price elasticity of Demand  for Oranges -0.76 
Elasticity of Demand for US Exports of 
Fresh Oranges 
-1.5 
Elasticity of Export Supply of Orange Juice 
to the US 
1.5 
Elasticity of Substitution between Capital 
and Labor at the Retail and Wholesale Levels 
0.2 
Elasticity of Substitution between Capital 






5.3 Data Projections 
As discussed in the conceptual framework, the model relies on differential 
equations to solve for deviations from a baseline in response to shocks to exogenous 
variables. The empirical analysis projects the impacts of pest spread under different 
mitigation policies from 2014/15 to 2043/44. Therefore, projections of all the supply, use, 
price, and cost data for that period are required to set the baseline for solving the model. 
Since the model variables are interrelated, a tool that allows for modeling the 
interaction of several endogenous time series variables is useful for data projection 
(Becketti 2013). Use of Vector Autoregression (VAR) or Vector Error Correction Models 
(VECM) is considered.  Stationarity tests of the data variables determine the selection of 
the model. According to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests, hypothesis of the 
existence of unit roots is rejected at the conventional levels of significance (between 1% 
to 10%) for all variables.  
Stationarity of the data variables implies the selection of VAR model. The main 
purpose of VAR is to determine the interrelationships among variables rather than to 
estimate structural parameters.  Each variable is represented as a function of p lags of all 
the variables included in the model as shown in the following equation: 
          t     0 1 t-1 1 t-2 p t-p tx A A x A x A x e  (5.8) 
where tx  is an (n.1) vector of the n variables of the model, 0A  represents an (n×1) 
vector of intercept terms, iA  refers to (n×n) matrices of coefficients, and te denotes an 
(n×1) vector of error terms. The explanatory variables are lagged variables which implies 
that they are predetermined. This supports the assumption that the error terms are not 
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correlated with the independent variables. Also, the error terms are assumed to follow the 
assumptions of no autocorrelation and constant variance. The above allows the estimation 
of each of the equations included in the VAR model using OLS. While the VAR model is 
likely to be overparameterized, imposing zero restrictions may result in losing important 
information about the interrelationships among variables (Enders 2010). 
Each of the fresh and processed orange markets is modeled separately. The 
endogenous variables considered in the model are orange prices, consumption, and new 
plantings.  Yield is included as an exogenous variable since its behavior affects the other 
variables. A higher yield results in higher production which implies higher consumption 
and lower prices. Although lower yield is associated with lower prices for growers, the 
impact on grower returns, which is determined by the product of price and yield, depends 
on the interaction between yield and price. Expected grower returns affect the farmer’s 
decision of new plantings.  National level data of consumption and retail prices are used. 
Meanwhile, state level data of grower price and acreage are employed. Given that 
California is the main player in the fresh orange market, California’s data are included in 
the supply side of the fresh orange market. On the other hand, Florida’s data are included 
in the supply side of the orange for processing market.  
The first step is to project California’s yield. The Dickey Fuller’s test, Philips-
Perron test, and GLS-DF tests reject the existence of a unit root. So, the time series is 
stationary.  The autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation correlograms indicated a 
possibility of applying an ARMA (0, 0, 1) model to yield data. The moving average 
coefficient and the overall model are statistically significant at the 1% level. That process 
predicts an annual average yield of 10.5 tons per acre. However, Lobell et. al. (2006) 
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projects a decrease in yield in California’s oranges due to climate change.  Fitting a Prais-
Winsten regression to the yield data with time as an independent variable resulted in 
projection of yield data that decreased by 0.019 tons/acre so that yield is predicted to 
decrease from 10.5 in 2013/14 to 9.7 in 2050/51.  Accordingly, a Vector Autoregression 
Model is estimated using yield projections as an exogenous variable. Pre-diagnostic lag 
order selection statistics are used to test for the appropriate lag for the model. Four of the 
tests (AIC, HQIX, SBIC, LR) recommend a five-lag model. Meanwhile the FPE test 
recommends a four-lag model. The five-lag model fails to meet the stability condition. 
Therefore, the five-lag model is discarded.  
A four-lag model scenario is estimated (Table 5-6). The endogenous variables are 
California’s fresh orange real equivalent on-tree price, California’s new planting, national 
level real retail price of fresh oranges, and national consumption of fresh oranges. Post-
diagnostic tests indicate that the stability condition is satisfied. Also, the Lagrange 
Multiplier test of the hypothesis of no-autocorrelation is not rejected at all lag orders and 
all conventional levels of significance (p-values are not less than 0.477).  The null 
hypothesis of normality of disturbances is not rejected by the Jarque-Bera test at any of 
the conventional levels of significance (1-10%). The post estimation test of the 
significance of the lags is statistically significant at the 1% level in most cases except for 
the third lag in the real fresh equivalent on-tree price of California oranges equation and 
the fourth lag of consumption which are only significant at the 15% level. Meanwhile, all 
lags are statistically significant at the 1% level when the VAR is considered as a whole. 
All pairwise Granger Causality Tests are significant at the 1% level except for the test 
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that consumption causes new plantings. However, the joint tests for each variable are 
significant at the 1% level. 
 








Real Retail Price 









Fresh Oranges  
Lag1 1.235*** 1.703** -0.300 0.008 
Lag2 -0.376 -0.914 0.313 0.010** 
Lag3 -0.292 -1.768*** 0.806*** 0.011 
Lag4 -1.047*** -2.025*** 0.431* 0.007 
Real Retail Price 
of Fresh Oranges 
Lag1 -0.195 0.142 -0.291* 0.002 
Lag2 0.407** 0.783 ** -0.187 -0.002** 
Lag3 0.098 0.425 -0.151 -0.005 
Lag4 0.095 -0.499 ** 0.009 -0.002 
US Consumption 
of Fresh Oranges 
Lag1 0.648*** 0.989*** -0.300** 0.000 
Lag2 0.235 0.685* 0.313** -0.001 
Lag3 0.235 -0.143 0.806* -0.002 
Lag4 -0.471** -1.717** 0.431* -0.004 
New Planting 
of Oranges in 
California 
Lag1 14.927** -44.190** -44.190 -0.051 
Lag2 36.044** -8.922** -8.922 0.188 
Lag3 -7.809 30.423 30.423*** -0.127 
Lag4 -33.740* 16.182*** 16.182** 0.314* 
California Yield -54.66 -88.2 91.3 0.27 
***: siginifcant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, and *: significant at 10%. 
 
Vector Autoregression model of oranges for processing is developed in a similar 
way to that of fresh oranges. The endogenous variables considered are Florida’s real 
equivalent on-tree prices of oranges for processing, consumption of orange products, 
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imports of orange products and Florida new plantings. It is worthy to note that the real 
retail price of orange products is excluded since the estimated model does not satisfy the 
condition of stability.  
On the other hand, Florida’s orange yield is included in the model as an 
exogenous variable. The existence of a unit root in that variable is rejected at the 10% 
and 1% levels of significance by the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Philips-Perron tests 
respectively. Meanwhile, the Dickey Fuller- GLS test shows that the optimal lag is 1 
indicating the existence of a unit root. ARIMA models (0,2,1) and (0,1,1) are examined. 
Both specifications are significant at the 1% level. The projections resulting from the 
ARIMA (0,2,1) were selected since they imply decreasing projected Florida yield. 
Florida’s future yield is expected to decrease due to orange diseases. 
A four-lag order VAR model is estimated. The stability conditions are satisfied. 
Also, the Lagrange Multiplier test of the hypothesis of no-autocorrelation is not rejected 
at all lag orders (p-values were not less than 18%).  The null hypothesis of normality of 
disturbances is not rejected by the Jarque-Bera test. The post estimation test of the 
significance of the lags was statistically significant at the 1% in most cases except for the 
first, second and fourth lags in the real grower price of orange for processing.  
Meanwhile, all lags are significant at the 1% level when the VAR is considered as a 
whole. All pairwise Granger Causality Tests were significant at between 1% to 10% level 
except for the consumption impacts on new plantings, and the impact of real grower price 
on net imports of oranges.  However, the joint tests for each variable are significant at the 
1% level. The results of the estimation are shown in Table 5-7. 
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US Consumption of 
Orange products 











Lag1 0.33** -0.5** 0.27 0.03* 
Lag2 -0.09 -0.3 -.09 0.05 
Lag3 0.007 -0.08 0.18 0.007** 




Lag1 0.15* 0.33*** -0.3* 0.03*** 
Lag2 0.09 0.59*** -0.01 -0.02*** 
Lag3 0.16 -0.5*** 0.18* 0.01 
Lag4 0.12 0.22** 0.15 0.04*** 
US Net Imports 
of Orange 
Products 
Lag1 0.01 0.33** 0.39 -.001 
Lag2 0.32 0.28 0.37 0.0001 
Lag3 0.19 -0.7*** -0.35 0.06 
Lag4 -0.11** 0.08** -0.38 0.033*** 
New Planting of 
Oranges in 
Florida 
Lag1 -1.09 10.5*** 5.2* 0.46** 
Lag2 0.2 -16.9*** -2.8 -0.08 
Lag3 1.3 10.9 -3.5 0.57** 
Lag4 -0.65 5.9** 0.35 -.31 
Florida yield -18.42 18.29 18.9 0.9 




The other variables in the model are projected based on their relationship with the 
variables projected in the VAR models mentioned above. Florida’s real equivalent on-
tree prices of fresh oranges are estimated based on Prais-Winsten Regression with 
California’s real equivalent on-tree price, Florida’s yield, and severe weather events as 
the explanatory variables. The same regression variables are tried for estimation of 
Arizona’s and Texas price, but only the coefficient of California’s price is significant. 
Meanwhile, California and Arizona-Texas real equivalent on-tree prices of orange for 
processing do not exhibit a relationship with Florida’s real prices. Therefore, it is 
assumed that such price represents 10% of the equivalent on-tree real price of fresh 
orange price in each region. Real transportation costs at the different levels, packinghouse 
costs, and all grower costs are assumed to remain constant at the average level of (2009-
2011) in the 30-year projection period.   
Total acreage of oranges is calculated based on new plantings and average annual 
removal rate of 2.6% for orange trees below the age of 14, and 5% for older orange trees. 
Allocation of oranges between fresh and processing is based on average historical levels.  
It is assumed that 80%, 5%, and 85% of the future production of oranges is allocated to 
fresh utilization in California, Florida, and Arizona-Texas respectively. Allocation of 
consumption of fresh oranges and orange products between the different regions assumes 
that the geographical distribution of population between the different states follows that 
of 2012. Exports of fresh oranges are calculated as the difference between production and 
consumption.  
Figure 5-3 shows a scatter diagram of the projected fresh orange retail price and 
consumption. They display a negative relationship as expected. Consumption levels are 
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projected to follow a flat to decreasing trend as shown in Figure 5-4. Given the projected 
increase in population, a decreasing or even flat total consumption implies a decreasing 
per capita fresh orange intake. This is consistent with the projections about decreasing 
fresh per capita orange consumption due to the consumers’ preference of easy-peel citrus 
like tangerines, and the increasing availability of other types of fresh fruits. The US retail 
price and California’s equivalent-on-tree price of fresh oranges are projected to witness 
an increase in the beginning of the forecast period, followed by a period of fluctuations 
until 2030 when they become almost flat (Figure 5-5). The equivalent on tree prices of 
Florida and Arizona-Texas follow similar trends (Figure 5-6).  
 
  























Fresh Orange Consumption (1000 MT)





Figure 5-4: Historical (1980/81-2010/11) and Projected (2011/12-2043/44) Total US 
Consumption of Fresh Oranges  
 
 
Figure 5-5:  Historical (1980/81-2010/11) and Projected (2011/12-2043/44) US Retail 
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Figure 5-6: Historical (1980/81-2010/11) and Projected (2011/12-2043/44) Equivalent 
On–Tree-Price of Fresh Oranges in the three US orange-producing Regions 
 
On the other hand, new planting in California increases in the beginning of the 
forecast period, then it follows a flat to decreasing trend. Figure (5-7) compares new 
plantings resulting from the projections of a VAR model with projections resulting from 
the new plantings regression equation estimated in the previous chapter (equation 4.2). 
Projections from both models follow similar trends although the VAR model is 
associated with higher levels of new plantings. Beginning 2032, projections from the new 
planting regression equation tends to demonstrate a more decreasing trend. Although the 
projections resulting from both methods result in high levels of new plantings compared 
to the period (2003/04 to 2011/12), projections that maintain the low levels of the 2000s 
(for example, univariate time series projections) are excluded since they would result in 
severe reductions in California’s total orange acreage. Forecasts resulting from the new 




Figure 5-7: Comparison of New Plantings Projections from the VAR Model and the New 
Planting Regression Equation 
 
Total bearing acreage of California’s oranges is shown in Figure (5-8). 
Meanwhile, total US production, consumption and exports of fresh oranges are shown in 
Figure (5-9). With the low levels of new plantings in the late 2000’s, bearing acreage of 
California is forecast to follow a decreasing trend through 2018. Then, the projected 
increase in new plantings is associated with increasing bearing acreage of California until 
the mid-2030’s when the acreage level becomes almost flat and close to the 1980’s level. 
Lower bearing acreage and yield of oranges in California and Florida are associated with 


























































































































































Comparing New Plantings projections from the VAR model and 
New Planting Equations




Figure 5-8: Historical (1980/81-2010/11) and Projected (2011/12-2043/44) Bearing 
Acreage of Oranges in California 
 
 
Figure 5-9: Historical (1980/81-2010/11) and Projected (2011/12-2043/44) Total US 
Production, Exports, and Consumption of Fresh Oranges 
  
On the other hand, Florida witnessed a decreasing trend of new planting of oranges 
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increase with higher orange prices. Consequently, Florida’s bearing acreage of oranges 
follows a decreasing trend until 2024 when it starts to increase to be close to the early 1990s 
level (Figure 5-10). Decreasing bearing acreage and yield in Florida results in lower 
oranges for processing production levels. Production of oranges for processing are 
predicted to follow the trend of Florida’s bearing acreage. Net imports of orange products 
are forecast to have an opposite trend to that of production (Figure 5-12). Projected 
Equivalent on-Tree Prices of oranges for processing in Florida are shown in Figure 5-11. 
 
 
Figure 5-10: Historical (1980/81-2010/11) and Projected (2011/12-2043/44)  Florida’s 





Figure 5-11: Historical (1980/81-2010/11) and Projected (2011/12-2043/44)  Florida’s 
Equivalent-on-Tree Price of Oranges for Processing  
 
 
Figure 5-12:  Historical (1980/81-2010/11) and Projected (2011/12-2043/44) US Orange 
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5.4 Model Validation 
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the validity of the model through 
comparing the response of the model variables to exogenous shocks with the actual 
behavior of such variables using historical data. This process involves calibration of the 
model through sensitivity analysis of the parameters and revenue shares. 
 One of the key shocks to the model is yield shock because plant pests are usually 
associated with yield reduction. The model response to fresh orange yield shocks is 
compared with historical responses to similar shocks. However, the focus will be on 
tracking the response of the model variables in the same year rather than the full dynamic 
response of the model because it is difficult to track the separate impact of a given shock 
over a period of historical data. The estimated elasticity of the response of new plantings 
of oranges to changes in relative returns was validated in section 5-2 through comparing 
the observed data with predicted values.  The new plantings response is the key variable 
in the dynamic behavior of the model. A main endogenous variable that affects new 
plantings behavior and links the different parts of the model is the packinghouse door 
price of California fresh oranges. Therefore, the validation process focuses on the impacts 
on this particular price. 
The focus on the period of validation is between the years 2000 to 2008. Different 
market conditions prevailed until 1994, since the California Citrus Marketing allowed 
California orange producers to restrict the quantity of oranges directed to the fresh market 
in order to maintain high prices. On the other hand, for the years following 2008/2009, 
the prices of fresh oranges were not reported in the USDA Citrus Summary Reports for 
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confidentiality reasons (USDA-ERS 2012). Only the average price of fresh oranges and 
oranges for processing is publicly available starting 2009/2010.  
Table 5-8 compares the packinghouse door price changes predicted by the model in 
response to fresh orange yield shock with the observed responses to such shocks. When 
the observed change in fresh orange production is different from the total change in 
orange yield, the difference is included in the model as a shock that diverts fresh orange 
production to processing assuming that the allocation of oranges between fresh and 
processing depends on weather and other exogenous events in California, as explained in 
section 4-3. The figures in the “Shock to Fresh Orange Yield” column in Table 5-8 refers 
to the total shock to fresh oranges resulting from total yield reduction and the diversion 
shock. For example, the comparison assumes that the price of California fresh oranges in 
2000, a year of lower orange yield, would have been equal to that of 2002, if the 
production level was the same. Thus, introducing an increase of 8.1% to California’s 
fresh orange yield in 2000 would have resulted in a 20.4% reduction in California’s fresh 
orange price. The model predicts that the price would have been reduced by 18.8%. The 
predicted prices are close to the observed prices for most of the years included in the 





Table 5-8: Comparison of Predicted Response of California Packinghouse Door Prices of 
Fresh Oranges to Observed Price Changes 
Year to which the 





















2000 2001 3.9% -9.9% -9.1% -0.43 
2000 2002 8.1% -20.4% -18.8% -0.43 
2001 2002 15.7% -38.0% -37.1% -0.42 
2003 2002 11.9% -24.3% -26.5% -0.45 
2005 2004 5.3% -9.0% -12.3% -0.43 
2005 2007 8.7% -15.4% -20.2% -0.43 
 
The changes in packinghouse door price in the model are determined by the 
elasticity of response of California’s wholesale derived demand of oranges to changes in 
California’s packinghouse door price. Such elasticity is a function of revenue shares, and 
elasticities of substitution at the wholesale and retail level, the share of the importing US 
regions in fresh orange imports and the different transportation costs, as well as share of 
world imports and world import demand elasticity of fresh oranges as shown in the 
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KL represent the wholesale elasticities of substitution between 
capital and oranges and between capital and labor respectively, ,
Rj
KO r and ,
Rj
KL r refer to 
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the fresh orange retail elasticities of substitution between capital and oranges and 
between capital and labor respectively, subscript r denotes domestic regions consuming 







k r , and ,
Rj
k r  refer to the revenue shares of oranges, and capital at the wholesale and 
retail levels respectively. Also, ,
T
O r  represents the share of domestic region r in total 
fresh orange imports, ,
T
O World is the share of imports from the rest of the world in total 
fresh orange imports, and   is the elasticity of foreign demand for fresh orange imports 
from the United States.  
Table 5-9 presents sensitivity analysis of the elasticity of supply response of 
wholesale derived demand of California’s oranges to packinghouse door price with 
respect to the model parameters. The sensitivity analysis is also performed to the 
predicted packinghouse door price of California fresh oranges in 2003 if the fresh orange 
yield was the same as that of 2002. A lower revenue share of oranges at the wholesale is 
associated with less elastic derived demand and a higher change in price. Also, increasing 
the elasticity of the Rest of the World demand of US fresh oranges increases the derived 
demand elasticity and is associated with a lower price change; yet, the impact varies with 
export share in the US orange production. In addition, higher level elasticity of 
substitution between capital and oranges is associated with higher derived demand 
elasticity. The resulting predicted price from increasing the elasticity of substitution from 
0.2 to 0.3 is closer to the actual price. Decreasing the elasticity of substitution from 0.2 to 
0.1 is a decrease in derived demand elasticity from 0.43 to 0.31 and the price decrease 
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rises from 26.5 % to 37.3%, despite the assumed increase in elasticity of import demand 
by the rest of the World which has some offsetting effect in the opposite direction.  
While increasing the elasticity of substitution between capital and oranges results 
in price changes that are closer to predicted prices for the years to 2003 and 2005, it is 
also associated with higher gaps between actual and predicted prices in other years. In 
addition, there is limited scope for wholesalers and retailers to reduce orange waste in the 
case of higher orange prices. In conclusion, the current model structure and parameter 





Table 5-9: Sensitivity Analysis of the Wholesale Derived Demand Elasticity of Fresh Oranges to Packinghouse Door Price with 
respect to the Model Parameters and Revenue Shares (Shock Applied to 2003 data in comparison to 2002 data) 
Change 


















































11.9% -24.3% -26.5% -0.45 
Lower Wholesale 
Revenue Share of 
Orange 





11.9% -24.3% -32.3% -0.37 
Higher Retail Revenue 
Share of Orange 





11.9% -24.3% -25.4% -0.47 
Lower Elasticity of 
Import Demand for 
Oranges by Rest of the 
World 





11.9% -24.3% -27.7% -0.43 
Higher Elasticity of 
Demand for Oranges by 
Rest of the World 





11.9% -24.3% -24.9% -0.48 
Higher Elasticities of 
Substitution between 
Capital and Labor, and 
Capital and Oranges 
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11.9% -24.3% -22.2% -0.54 
Lower Elasticity of 
Import Demand for 










11.9% -24.3% -37.3% -0.32 
Higher Elasticity of 
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This chapter presents the different sources of data used in the model. Because the 
study employs a simulation model, several parameters are estimated in the current study, 
drawn from the literature, or assumed based on judgment and model validation. 
Econometric estimation of the supply response parameters of orange growers in the 
different United States regions is conducted in the current chapter, besides econometric 
estimation of orange consumer demand elasticities. On the other hand, import demand 
elasticity for the United States exports of fresh oranges by the Rest of the World and 
elasticity of export supply by orange products in the Rest of the World to the United 
States are drawn from the literature. Meanwhile, the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labor, and capital and oranges are assumed based on judgment and model 
validation. The model projects the impacts of the alternative mitigation scenarios for 30 
years. Thus, the current chapter presents those projections which are based on time series 
analysis and econometric estimation. Based on the conceptual framework presented in 
chapter 4, and the data and parameters presented in this chapter, the alternative impacts of 
the pest management strategies of False Codling Moth affecting California’s oranges is 




CHAPTER 6. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO THE FALSE 
CODLING MOTH PEST INFESTATION 
Although False Codling Moth (FCM), Thaumatotibia (Cryptophlebia) leucotreta, 
(Lepidoptera: Tortricidae), is not currently present in the United States, it was recognized 
by the USDA Plant Pest Quarantine (PPQ) as a potential threat since 1960. Native to 
Africa, FCM has been intercepted 2622 times at 34 US ports in cargo and passenger 
luggage during the period 1984-2013 (PERAL/NCSU (2013). However, the first instance 
of domestic detection of  FCM  was of a single male in Ventura County, California, in 
2008; yet, no adult females were discovered (USDA 2010). Regulatory action is invoked 
under the following conditions: “(1) more than one moth is found in an area less than 6 
square miles within one estimated life cycle; (2) one mated female, or a larva, or a pupa 
are detected; and (3) a single moth is detected that is determined to be associated with a 
current eradication project” (USDA 2010). 
While False Codling Moth prefers navel oranges as the main host, it feeds on 
other varieties of citrus and crops causing fruit yield reduction. Due to similarity between 
the weather conditions of the Southern and Southwestern United States and the foreign 
regions where the pest is established, there is a risk that it becomes established in the 
United States (USDA 2010). According to the False Codling Moth risk map developed 
by NAPFFAST (2013), the risk areas for establishment of False Codling Moth in the 
United States include California, Florida, Arizona, and Texas. The risk areas for pest 
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establishment are identified based on relative density of potential pest hosts, conducive 
climate conditions, and pathway introduction points (Magarey et. al. 2011). However, the 
focus of the current research is only on California orange growing areas.  
False Codling Moth results in orange crop losses that range between 2.5 to 19.4% 
in unsprayed orange orchards in Citrusdal region in South Africa which has similar 
weather conditions to those of California’s major orange producing areas (PEARL/NCSU 
2013). The orange fruit affected by the pest is totally damaged such that it is no longer 
possible to sell the fruit in either the fresh or processed orange markets.  
Therefore, several mitigation options are considered for addressing the threat of 
the False Codling Moth to California oranges including quarantines, pesticide treatment, 
sterile insect technique, and mating disruption. PERAL/NCSU (2013) compares the 
expected pest spread and expected damages to orange yield in California under 
alternative pest management strategies that include combinations of the above mitigation 
options as well as a No Mitigation Scenario where no action is taken to control the pest. 
The comparison relies on output from the Exotic Pest Assessment Tool (EXPAT) 
developed by (Waage 2005) and modified by the Plant Epidemiology and Risk Analysis 
Laboratory of the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and North Carolina 
State University. Based on expected damages to California’s yield and expected costs to 
be incurred by orange growers in California provided by PERAL/NCSU (2013), the 
economic impacts of the different pest management scenarios are compared using the 




The following section presents the various mitigation options available for 
controlling the False Codling Moth affecting oranges. Then, section (6.2) presents the 
scenarios considered for the analysis of the impacts of False Codling Moth introduction 
to California oranges as well as a brief description of the EXPAT model. The first 
scenario is a No Mitigation Scenario where no action is taken to control the pest. Each of 
the other scenarios includes one or more of the mitigation options outlined in section 
(6.1). Section (6.3) presents the model results for the analysis of the economic impacts of 
the different scenarios. Section (6.4) presents the conclusions. 
 
6.1 Mitigation Options 
Four mitigation options are considered in PERAL/NCSU (2013). Each of the pest 
management scenarios outlined in section 6.2 (except the No Mitigation scenario) include 
one or more of the pest mitigation options discussed in this section. All mitigation costs 
are assumed to be incurred by growers in infested areas. 
 
6.1.1 Quarantine/Fruit Removal 
Quarantines involve various restrictions on fruit movement. Two quarantine 
options are considered. The first option is to use orchard sanitation where the host 
materials and larvae are removed before they emerge. This involves weekly stripping of 
fruits that requires four labor hours per week costing a total of $1826 per acre for the 




The second quarantine option is stripping 100% of the orchard crop such that all 
the fruits are removed from the trees and destroyed. This implies a 100% fruit loss in the 
infested orchards. Under this option, participating growers incur an annual cost of $1462 
per acre besides yield loss (PERAL/NCSU 2013).  
 
6.1.2 Sterile Insect Technique 
The Sterile Insect Technique (SIT) is a biological control method defined by the 
International Standard for Phytosanitary Measure No. 5 (FAO 2005) as “a method of pest 
control using area-wide inundative releases of sterile insects to reduce reproduction in a 
field population of the same species”. This method is considered by the International 
Standard for Phytosanitary Measures No. 3 (FAO 2005) as an introduction of beneficial 
organisms because it is an environment-friendly pest control method that avoids the 
introduction of exotic species to the environment. Also, sterile insects are not self-
replicating so they cannot be established in an environment (NAFA n.d.). The annual 
total cost of application of the program is $1156.2 per acre in infested areas 
(PERAL/NCSU 2013). 
 
6.1.3 Mating Disruption 
Under mating disruption, the orchard is saturated with synthetic pheromones -that 
are naturally released by female moths to attract males for mating- in order to inhibit the 
ability of males to find females (Murray and Alston 2010). Application of this program 





The effectiveness of pesticide application in reducing the infestation rate of False 
Codling Moth varied among studies within a range of 50-75%. With two pesticide 
applications per year, a pesticide program costs $380.88 per acre annually 
(PERAL/NCSU 2013). 
 
6.2 Pest Management Scenarios  
Four pest management scenarios covering 30 years are considered. The first 
scenario assumes that no mitigation action is taken to control the pest. Each of the other 
pest spread scenarios includes one or more of the mitigation options outlined in the 
previous subsection.  The potential damages to orange yield as well as the potential costs 
to be incurred by growers under each scenario are provided by PERAL/NCSU (2013) 
using the Exotic Pest Assessment Tool described below. Given that the False Codling 
Moth has multiple hosts other than oranges, the scenarios assume that all mitigation 
requirements are applied by growers of other plants that are hosts to the False Codling 
Moth. Yet, the costs considered in the current analysis only pertain to orange growers 
(PERAL/NCSU 2013). 
The Exotic Pest Assessment Tool (EXPAT) allows the comparison of the spread of 
an invasive pest in the United States under various pest management options. The spread 
of a plant pest or a disease “is determined by several biological factors including the size 
of the area of the original incursion; the intrinsic rate of natural increase; the dispersal 
distance; the host density of the area of interest; and satellite outbreaks from the original 
site” (PERAL/NCSU 2013). The likelihood of a random satellite outbreak is assumed to 
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be directly related to the area of the initial outbreak and population density in that area. 
The parameter values required for simulation of plant pest or disease spread are obtained 
from literature relating to the spread and physical impacts of the plant pest/disease under 
study. Each parameter is represented in the model as a probability distribution rather than 
a point estimate to consider the uncertainty associated with available empirical data 
(PERAL/NCSU 2013).  
 The estimated potential yield loss due to the pest in the region under study is 
calculated as the mathematical product of the area of spread of the pest (obtained from 
the EXPAT Model) and the potential damage due to the pest obtained from the literature 
(PERAL/NCSU 2013). The output provided by the EXPAT model is in the form of 
percentage reduction in orange yield in each year of the thirty-year projection period. The 
percentage reductions in orange yield are introduced to the partial equilibrium economic 
model developed in this dissertation as exogenous supply shocks.  
The following presents the alternative pest management scenarios of False Codling 
Moth.  As mentioned earlier, the minimum yield loss associated with False Codling Moth 
is 2.5% and the maximum is 19.4%. Applying a uniform distribution with a minimum of 
2.5% and a maximum of 20%, the average estimated potential yield loss is 11.25%. Table 
6-1 illustrates the minimum, average, and maximum pest infestation spread under each of 
the four scenarios where the pest infestation spread refers to the percentage of 
California’s bearing acreage infested by False Codling Moth. Table 6-2 shows the 
minimum, average, and maximum estimated potential yield loss in each year due to the 
False Codling Moth for each of the pest management scenarios. In the following, the pest 
management scenarios assuming the minimum estimated potential yield loss are labelled 
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minimum outbreak scenarios, the pest management scenarios assuming the average 
potential yield loss are labelled average outbreak scenarios, and the scenarios assuming 
maximum estimated potential yield loss are labelled maximum outbreak scenarios. 
 
6.2.1 Scenario 1: No Mitigation 
This scenario assumes that no mitigation is attempted to control the pest spread. 
The crop damage due to the pest spread is assumed to be similar to that of unsprayed 
orchards in Citrusdal, South Africa, which has similar weather conditions to most of 
California’s citrus producing areas. No control costs are incurred.  
The EXPAT model results show that under this scenario, the False Codling Moth is 
predicted to infest 100% of the area over an average of 10.09 years, with a minimum of 9 
years, and a maximum of 12 years (Table 6-1). Starting year 12, an average loss of 
11.25% of California’s orange crop is expected annually assuming a uniform probability 
distribution, at a minimum of 2.5% and a maximum of 19.4% (Table 6-2).  
 
6.2.2 Scenario 2: Grower Mitigation with Pesticide 
Under this scenario, growers apply the pesticide mitigation option. The pesticide 
application is assumed to reduce the pest growth rate by a range of 50% to 70%. Orange 
growers in infested areas incur an annual cost of $380.88 per acre. 
The pest spread model results show that the pest infestation rate is reduced 
compared to the No Mitigation Scenario. The average infestation rate increases gradually 
over the 30 year-period to reach an infestation rate of 9.3% as an average for the model 
iterations with a minimum of 1.7% and a maximum of  27% in year 30 (Table 6-1). Crop 
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losses increase gradually to reach an average of 1.03% in year 30 with a minimum of 
0.06% and a maximum of 4.36% (Table 6-2). 
 
6.2.3 Scenario 3: Area Wide Management Program 
This scenario involves both orchard sanitation and pesticide sprays. Orchard 
sanitation requires growers to remove infested fruits from the orchard on a weekly basis. 
Growers in infested areas can sell the non-infested fruits. This program requires an 
annual mitigation cost of $2310.5 per acre to be incurred by growers in infested areas 
(PERAL/NCSU 2013). Crop losses under this scenario range between a maximum of 
1.4% at the highest infestation level and a minimum of 0% at the minimum infestation 
(Table 6-2). Actually, at the minimum infestation level, this scenario has a similar impact 
to the eradication scenario as the pest is eradicated after five years (Table 6-1). 
 
6.2.4 Scenario 4: Eradication 
This scenario is a federally-coordinated eradication program that combines 
several of the above mentioned mitigation options. It includes pesticide spraying, fruit 
stripping, sterile insect technique and mating disruption. That combination of mitigation 
options is expected to be effective in pest eradication. Besides, the mitigation costs of 
$3508.51 per acre, the growers in infested areas lose all their yield due to the fruit 
stripping requirement. Yet, they save the costs of applying the growth regulator ($148.4 
per acre), as well as harvesting costs (PERAL/NCSU 2013).  
The longest the pest survives before eradication is 7 years which occurs at the 
maximum infestation level of 1.3%. At the average infestation level of 0.43%, the pest 
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survives for four years (Table 6-1). The crop losses are the same as the infestation levels 
since the program requires stripping of the entire crop of the infested orchard (Table 6-2). 
 
Table 6-1: Comparison of the False Codling Moth Infestation Spread as Percentage of 
Total Acreage under the Different Pest Management Scenarios  
Y
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1 0.07 0.44 1.23 0.07 0.43 1.23 0.07 0.43 1.23 0.07 0.43 1.23 
2 0.09 0.49 1.28 0.02 0.18 0.63 0.01 0.07 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.01 
3 0.19 1.04 2.61 0.02 0.17 0.62 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 0.42 2.16 5.39 0.03 0.19 0.64 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 0.87 4.43 11.30 0.03 0.23 0.75 0.00 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 1.66 8.55 21.71 0.05 0.30 0.98 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7 4.16 17.72 43.99 0.05 0.40 1.29 0.00 0.09 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 9.03 35.63 88.48 0.08 0.52 1.75 0.00 0.13 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9 16.92 68.61 100 0.12 0.66 1.99 0.00 0.16 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10 34.21 95.20 100 0.11 0.83 2.60 0.00 0.20 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 
11 69.25 99.98 100 0.13 1.02 2.94 0.00 0.25 1.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12 100 100 100 0.18 1.24 4.05 0.00 0.30 1.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
13 100 100 100 0.23 1.48 4.17 0.00 0.35 1.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 
14 100 100 100 0.30 1.75 5.45 0.00 0.40 1.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 
15 100 100 100 0.35 2.04 5.78 0.00 0.47 2.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 
16 100 100 100 0.28 2.36 6.77 0.00 0.53 2.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17 100 100 100 0.44 2.70 8.75 0.00 0.60 2.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 
18 100 100 100 0.54 3.06 8.38 0.00 0.67 2.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 
19 100 100 100 0.53 3.44 11.68 0.00 0.75 3.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20 100 100 100 0.68 3.83 11.04 0.00 0.83 3.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 
21 100 100 100 0.66 4.27 13.68 0.00 0.92 4.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
22 100 100 100 0.90 4.73 15.07 0.00 1.01 4.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 
23 100 100 100 0.95 5.22 16.30 0.00 1.11 4.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24 100 100 100 1.05 5.72 16.75 0.00 1.21 4.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 
25 100 100 100 0.97 6.25 19.05 0.00 1.31 5.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 
26 100 100 100 0.72 6.80 22.12 0.00 1.42 5.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 
27 100 100 100 1.00 7.42 23.55 0.00 1.54 7.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
28 100 100 100 0.93 8.02 24.54 0.00 1.65 6.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 
29 100 100 100 1.51 8.66 28.99 0.00 1.77 7.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 
30 100 100 100 1.68 9.31 26.59 0.00 1.89 8.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source: PERAL/NCSU (2013) 
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Table 6-2: Comparison of the Estimated Potential Yield Loss for California Oranges 
































1 0.00 0.05 0.24 0.00 0.05 0.24 0.00 0.05 0.24 0.07 0.43 1.23 
2 0.00 0.05 0.23 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 
3 0.01 0.12 0.46 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 0.01 0.24 1.03 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 0.02 0.50 2.11 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 0.07 0.96 3.92 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7 0.15 1.99 7.64 0.00 0.04 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 0.32 4.00 16.97 0.00 0.06 0.25 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9 0.71 7.70 20.00 0.00 0.07 0.35 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10 1.26 10.72 20.00 0.00 0.09 0.42 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 
11 2.48 11.25 20.00 0.00 0.11 0.53 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12 2.50 11.25 20.00 0.01 0.14 0.65 0.00 0.03 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 
13 2.50 11.25 20.00 0.01 0.17 0.72 0.00 0.04 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
14 2.50 11.25 20.00 0.01 0.20 1.00 0.00 0.05 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
15 2.50 11.25 20.00 0.01 0.23 1.03 0.00 0.05 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 
16 2.50 11.25 20.00 0.02 0.26 1.12 0.00 0.06 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17 2.50 11.25 20.00 0.01 0.30 1.48 0.00 0.07 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 
18 2.50 11.25 20.00 0.02 0.34 1.56 0.00 0.08 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 
19 2.50 11.25 20.00 0.02 0.39 1.81 0.00 0.08 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20 2.50 11.25 20.00 0.03 0.43 1.99 0.00 0.09 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 
21 2.50 11.25 20.00 0.03 0.48 2.01 0.00 0.10 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 
22 2.50 11.25 20.00 0.03 0.53 2.16 0.00 0.11 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 
23 2.50 11.25 20.00 0.03 0.59 2.65 0.00 0.12 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24 2.50 11.25 20.00 0.04 0.64 2.97 0.00 0.14 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 
25 2.50 11.25 20.00 0.04 0.70 2.99 0.00 0.15 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 
26 2.50 11.25 20.00 0.05 0.77 3.78 0.00 0.16 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
27 2.50 11.25 20.00 0.04 0.84 3.57 0.00 0.17 1.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 
28 2.50 11.25 20.00 0.06 0.90 4.19 0.00 0.19 1.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
29 2.50 11.25 20.00 0.06 0.97 4.32 0.00 0.20 1.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 
30 2.50 11.25 20.00 0.06 1.05 4.35 0.00 0.21 1.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 




6.3 Model Application 
The economic impacts of the above scenarios are analyzed using the model 
outlined in chapter (4), with the parameters and data described in chapter (5). Shocks to 
the model in terms of percentage reduction in yield and changes in control costs are 
obtained from PEARL/NCSU (2013) as explained in the previous sections. All mitigation 
costs are assumed to be incurred by growers in infested areas. The reduction in yield in 
year t is introduced to the model as a shock to the current year’s supply, and a shock to 
the expected returns of orange growers. Thus, the pest infestation and mitigation 
scenarios affect California orange growers’ new planting decision in two ways. First, 
growers update expected returns based on changes in the previous year’s average yield 
and price. Second, given that additional costs under the different mitigation scenarios are 
only incurred by growers in infested areas, growers calculate expected cost, ( )E Cost ,  as 
follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )   
Inf NoInf
E Cost P Inf Cost P NoInf Cost    (6-1) 
where ( )P Inf is the probability of pest infestation based on the previous year’s pest 
spread, InfCost  is the cost in case of pest infestation under the mitigation scenario in 
question, ( )P NoInf is the probability of no pest infestation, and NoInfCost is the cost when 
there is no pest infestation. 
In subsection (6.4.1), the impacts of the different scenarios on orange production, 
consumption, and production are presented. The impacts presented in this subsection 
assume average outbreak level (percentage reduction in orange crop denoted average in 
Table 6-2). Section (6.4.2) compares the welfare impacts of the different scenarios under 
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the average pest outbreak level assumption. Then, the welfare impacts under the 
minimum, average, and maximum pest outbreak levels (with potential yield losses 
denoted minimum, average, and maximum respectively in Table 6-2) for the four pest 
management scenarios are compared. 
 
6.3.1 Impacts on Orange Production, Consumption, and Prices 
This subsection starts with presentation of the impacts of pest infestation under the 
No Mitigation Scenario in order to illustrate the relationship between the different 
variables in the model. Then, the impacts under the different scenarios are compared. All 
the analysis in this subsection assume average outbreak level. 
 
6.3.1.1 No Mitigation Scenario 
In the No Mitigation Scenario, no action is taken to control the pest spread. The 
pest infestation rate increases gradually such that all California’s orange growing acreage 
is subject to pest infestation within 11 years of the initial infestation (Table 6-1). An 
average crop loss of 11.25% of infested areas is projected (Table 6-2). In the following, 
the impacts of the No Mitigation Scenario on California’s prices, grower returns to cost 
ratio, acreage, and production are first discussed in subsection (6.3.1.1.1). Then, the 






The decrease in average orange yield in California due to pest infestation induces 
an increase in average orange price received by growers. Therefore, new plantings 
increase which results in an increase of orange bearing acreage over time. The increase in 
bearing acreage partially offsets the impact of the orange yield reduction on orange 
output, such that the orange output decrease is lower than the yield shock. As orange 
bearing acreage witnesses more increases and as more of the new plantings reach 
maturity, the yield shock impact on orange output is more than offset and orange output 
becomes higher than the base level starting the year 2039. Starting the same year, the 
increase in orange output to levels higher than the base level induces a decrease in orange 
grower price to levels below the base level (Figure 6-1). 
 
 

























































































Change in California's Orange Output, ACreage, Yield, And Grower 
Price- No Mitigation Scenario






Expected grower returns to costs ratio is the main factor affecting changes in new 
plantings in this model. Changes in expected grower returns to cost ratio is a function of 
the changes in grower prices, yield, and cost of the previous year. Yet, there are no 
changes in costs associated with this scenario except for harvest cost savings since 
harvest cost depends on yield. Therefore, the yield reduction has two opposite impacts on 
grower returns: a downward pressure on the quantity sold but an upward impact on price. 
Consequently, as seen in figure 6-2, the increase in grower returns to costs ratio is lower 
than the increase in grower price in all years. Also, grower returns to costs ratio starts to 
decrease before the grower price falls (grower price falls starting 2039 because of the 
output increase resulting from higher new plantings as explained above). Starting 2037, 
the increase in grower price is not high enough to offset the impact of lower yield on 
average grower returns to cost ratio, and grower returns to cost ratio falls. Grower relative 
returns to costs per acre become 11.7% lower than the base level in 2043 (A yield 
decrease of 11.25%, plus a price decrease of 4.7%, so the total decrease in returns of 16% 
is partially offset by a decrease in harvest and transportation costs such that the net 
change in relative returns to costs is -11.7%). 
New plantings follow the changes in grower returns to cost ratio with some lag. 
The impact of changes in grower returns to cost ratio on new plantings in a given year is 
extended for several years and new plantings increase at a higher rate than relative returns 
of the previous year due to the time taken for adjustment following an investment 
decision ( 𝑁?̂?t =0.6 𝑅?̂?t-1 + 0.8 𝑁?̂?t-1, where 𝑁?̂?t refers to changes in new plantings in 
year t, and  𝑅?̂?t- refers to changes in returns to cost ratio in year t-1 such that only 20% of 
an investment decision is implemented in year t and the rest is implemented in the 
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following years). The percentage increase of new plantings compared to base level 
reaches a maximum of around 44% during the period (2028-2030), then the rate of 
increase in new plantings declines with the decrease in grower returns. New plantings 
start to follow a decreasing trend in 2041 which is f years after the decline in grower 




Figure 6-2: Changes in California’s New Plantings, Grower Returns, and Orange Price- 
No Mitigation Scenario 
 
6.3.1.1.2 Transmission of the Changes in California’s Prices and Interaction with the 
Other Regions: 
Given that 80% of California’s production is utilized as fresh and that California 
contributes to more than 75% of the US fresh orange production but less than 8% of the 
US orange for processing production (USDA-ERS 2012), the impacts of changes in 
























































































Changes in CA New Plantings, Grower Returns,  and Orange Price-
No Mitigation Scenario 
CA Orange Grower Price
CA Yield Shock





price linking the different regions) differs between the fresh and processed market. The 
changes in wholesale prices of oranges in California and all the other regions follow the 
trend of the changes in California’s grower price, although the percentage changes of 
wholesale prices are around 50% lower than that of California’s growers. Figure (6-3) 
shows the price of grower, wholesaler, and retailer prices of California’s. Meanwhile, 
Figure (6-4) shows that the wholesale prices of Arizona and Texas follow the changes in 
the wholesale price of California, where the latter is determined by the grower price of 
California as shown in Figure (6-3).  
On the other hand, Florida dominates the orange products market and California 
imports more than 55% of its orange products consumption. Therefore, the wholesale 
prices of orange-based products in the United States mainly follow the changes in 
Florida’s market. As illustrated in Figure (6-5), the percentage changes in the wholesale 
price of orange products of California are low compared to the percentage changes in its 
grower price. Figure (6-6) shows that the changes in California’s wholesale price of 
orange products follows the trend of the grower price (Packinghouse Door Price) of 
Florida, rather than grower prices of California. For example, when California’s 
packinghouse door price of orange products increases by 40%, its wholesale level price 
increases by less than 1%. In contrast, the wholesale price of Florida’s fresh oranges 








Figure 6-3: Changes in Fresh Orange Prices at the Wholesale, Retail, and Packinghouse 




Figure 6-4: Changes in California’s Packinghouse Door and Wholesale Prices of Fresh 























































































Changes in Florida's Wholesale Price and Packinghouse Door Price 
Compared to California's Wholesale Price of Fresh Oranges-No 
Mitigation Scenario
California Wholesale price of
fresh oranges at retailer's door
FL, AZ-TX Packinghouse door
price of fresh oranges
FL Wholesale price of fresh
























































































Changes in Fresh Orange Prices at the Wholesale, Retail, and 
Packinghouse Door Levels in California-No Mitigation Scenario
California Retail price of fresh
oranges
California Wholesale price of
fresh oranges at retailer's door
California Packinghouse door




Figure 6-5: Changes in Orange Products Prices at the Wholesale, Retail, and 
Packinghouse Door Levels in California-No Mitigation Scenario 
 
  
Figure 6-6: Changes in Orange Products Prices at the Wholesale Level in California 























































































Changes in Florida's Wholesale Price and Packinghouse Door Price 
Compared to California's Wholesale Price of Fresh Oranges-No 
Mitigation Scenario
California Packinghouse door
price of orange products
California Wholesale price of 
orange products at retailer's 
door























































































Changes in Orange Product Prices: Packinghouse Door Level in 
Florida, Wholesale Level in Califonria and Florida, and Retail 
Price:  No Mitigation Scenario
California Wholesale Price of
Orange Products at Retailer's
Door
Retail price of orange products
FL Packinghouse Door Price
of Orange Products
FL Wholesale Price of Orange




With the increase in price of fresh oranges relative to the price of orange for 
processing, Florida orange growers divert some of their production from the orange for 
processing market to the fresh market. Thus, the production of oranges for processing in 
Florida slightly decreases until the year 2032. Yet all the changes are minimal, as the 
maximum increase in fresh orange production is 2.3%, and the maximum decrease in 
orange for processing production is -0.13%.  
The decreases in the production of oranges for processing induce a minor increase 
in its grower price (a maximum of 0.4%). The increase in the prices of oranges for 
processing combined with the increase in fresh orange prices explained above results in 
an increase in Florida’s grower returns. Grower returns in Florida depend to a greater 
extent on the price of orange for processing since it represents 95% of their production. 
Thus, even in the years when fresh orange grower price reaches an increase of 22%, the 
increase in grower returns is only 1.5%. As a result, the changes in Florida’s grower’s 
returns are much lower than those of California’s growers.  
The grower returns of Florida, which are illustrated in Figure 6-7, are largely 
determined by its packinghouse door price of oranges for processing. Consequently, 
grower returns continue to increase until the year 2034 when it starts to slightly decline 
until it becomes 2.2% lower than the base level in 2043. The reason for that decline in 
grower returns is the decrease in the orange for processing price starting 2031 (the impact 
of the decrease in orange for processing price on grower returns between 2031 and 2034 
is offset by the increase in fresh orange grower price), as well as the decline in the rate of 
the decrease in fresh orange grower price. That decrease in orange for processing price is 
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due to the increase in Florida’s orange production following the new plantings increase 
resulting from higher returns starting 2031.  
Changes in new plantings follow the changes in new returns, but with some lag. 
Therefore, new plantings of Florida witness an increase by a maximum of 3.82% in 2031, 
then they start to decline in 2038 to become 4.6% lower than the base level in 2043. The 
increase in new plantings results in an increase in Florida’s orange production. Although 
the rate of increase of Florida’s production allocated to the fresh market starts to decline 
following the rate of change of price, it remains higher than the average increase in the 
total orange output of Florida until the year 2040 when fresh orange prices decrease 
(Figure 6-8). Overall, Florida’s total orange output increase does not exceed 1.5%. 
 
  
Figure 6-7: Changes in Florida's Average Grower Returns, and Packinghouse Door Prices 
























































































Changes in Florida's Average Grower Returns, and Packinghouse 
Door Prices of Fresh Oranges and Oranges for Processing:                             
No Mitigation Scenario
FL Average Grower Return
FL Packinghouse door price of
fresh oranges





Figure 6-8: Change in Florida’s Orange New Plantings, Farm Production, and Grower 
Returns -No Mitigation Scenario 
 
6.3.1.1.2.2 Arizona-Texas Region 
The Arizona-Texas region, which directs most of its production to the fresh market, 
witnesses higher increases in new plantings than those of Florida, but lower than 
California (Figure 6-9). New plantings adjust to the changes in returns in Arizona-Texas 
with a shorter lag than California and Florida due to the higher adjustment coefficient of 
the estimated new plantings coefficient in Arizona-Texas. The adjustment coefficient for 
Arizona-Texas is 0.65 compared to 0.73 in Florida, and 0.8 in California. Also, in 
Florida, the estimated new plantings equation included four lagged variables of previous 
years’ relative returns, while the estimated equations for California and Arizona-Texas 
regions included one lagged variable of previous year’s returns only (Tables 5-2, 5-3 and 
5-4 in the previous chapter). New plantings increase of Arizona-Texas region reaches a 


























































































Changes in Florida's Average Grower Returns, and Packinghouse 
Door Prices of Fresh Oranges and Oranges for Processing:                                                    
No Mitigation Scenario
FL New Plantings
FL Average Grower Return
FL Fresh Orange Production




California and higher orange output in Arizona-Texas region, new plantings increases at 
a decrease rate until 2034. Starting 2035, new plantings of Arizona-Texas follow a 
decreasing trend to reach a 15% decline from the base level in 2043. Orange output in 
that region remains higher than the base level with a maximum increase of 9.1% in 2035, 
then the rate of output increase declines with lower new plantings.  
 
 
Figure 6-9: Change in Arizona-Texas Orange New Plantings, Farm Production, and 
Grower Returns- No Mitigation Scenario 
 
6.3.1.2 Impacts of the Different Mitigation Scenarios 
Under the Pesticide Treatment Scenario, the yield shock increases gradually from 
0.05% in the first year to 1.05% in year 30, and growers in infested areas (infested areas 
increase gradually to 9% of total California orange acreage in 2043) incur an annual cost 
of $380 per acre. The yield shock is very low such that it results in a minimal increase in 


























































































Changes in Arizona-Texas New Plantings, Orange Farm 
Production, and Returns- No Mitigation Scenario
AZT New Plantings





is lower than orange grower price due to higher expected costs and lower expected yield. 
Thus, new plantings increase by a minimal rate to reach a maximum increase of 2% in 
2043. Thus, a minor increase in orange acreage in California occurs which marginally 
offsets the yield shock impact on orange output. In 2043, the yield shock is 1.05% and 
the orange output decrease is 0.85% (Figure 6-10). 
 
 
Figure 6-10: Impacts on California's New Plantings, Grower Price, Returns, and 
Production- Pesticide Treatment Scenario 
 
On the other hand, while the Area-Wide Pest Management scenario is associated 
with higher treatment costs for the infested acres compared to the Pesticide Treatment 
Scenario, the grower expected costs are no more than 40% higher (except for the first 
year) because the probability of pest infestation is lower under the Area-Wide Pest 
Management Scenario. Under the Area-Wide Pest Management scenario, the pest spreads 























































































Pesticide Only Scenario- Impacts on California's New Plantings, 









California’s orange crop. Meanwhile, under the Pesticide Treatment Scenario, the pest 
spreads to 9.3% of California’s orange acreage resulting in the loss of 1.05% of 
California’s orange crop in the same year. With a lower yield shock than the previous 
scenario, the price change resulting from the yield  reduction is too small to offset the 
increase in expected costs and yield loss; consequently, there is a slight decrease in new 
plantings (not exceeding 0.85%) during the whole forecast period( figure 6-11). As a 
result, there is a minor decrease in California’s orange output which exceeds the 
reduction resulting from the yield shock (0.4% decrease in orange output in 2043 while 
the yield reduction is 0.21% in the same year). It is worthy to note that this scenario starts 
with a yield shock of -0.05% in the first year which decreases gradually, and then 
increases again in 2027. That is why the rate of increase in grower price is higher in the 
first two years. 
 
 
Figure 6-11: Impacts on California's New Plantings, Grower Price, Returns, and 
























































































Area Wide Pest Management Scenario- Impacts on California's 
New Plantings, Grower Price, Returns, and Production
CA New Plantings






The eradication scenario involves stripping of the entire crop from the infested 
acre as well as a combination of mating disruption and sterile insect technique applied in 
infested areas only. At an average infestation rate, this scenario results in eradication of 
the False Codling Moth in seven years and there is a yield loss of -0.43% in the first year. 
Starting the second year, the yield loss under this scenario is negligible. Therefore, all the 
changes to output, prices, and production are minimal (Figure 6-12). There is a slight 
decrease in new plantings (0.2%) in the second year due to the initial yield shock and 
higher expected costs due to the eradication treatment requirement. Then, in the second 
year, a slight increase in new plantings occurs (0.25%) due to the higher price resulting 
from the initial yield loss. This results in a minimal increase in output which is associated 
with a minimal price decrease. A minor decrease in output follows which induces a small 
price increase. Yet, all of the changes in output and price are negligible and do not exceed 
0.13% except for the first year. 
 
 
Figure 6-12: Impacts on California's New Plantings, Grower Price, Returns, and 























































































Eradication Scenario- Impacts on California's New Plantings, 
Grower Price, Returns, and Production
CA New Plantings
CA Grower Price Change





Comparing the acreage used for orange production in California under the 
different scenarios, the No Mitigation Scenario increases the total acreage of orange by 
12% in year 30 to increase from 189,000 to 211, 000 acres. However, output is only 
1.68% higher than the base acreage level before the pest infestation. Meanwhile, the 
Pesticide Treatment scenario results in a small decrease to Califonria’s output that 
reaches 1% at the end of the forecast period, and an icrease in acreage not exceeding 
0.1%. The Area-Wide Pest Management and Eradication scenarios are associated with 
minimial changes to acreage and production in California.  
As for the impacts of the alternative scenarios on the total United States 
production, consumption, and trade of fresh oranges and orange products, there are very 
minor changes under the Pesticide Treatment, Area-Wide Pest Management, and 
Eradication Scenarios. On the other hand, the No Mitigation Scenario is associated with 
decreasing US output of fresh oranges to reach a decline of 9% from the base output. 
Then, it remains lower than the base production levels until the year 2038, when it 
follows an increasing trend such that it exceeds base production by 1.6% in 2043. Fresh 
orange consumption exhibits similar trend, but the maximum decrease witnessed is 2.5%. 
Also, exports follow the trend of production and consumption but the rate of decrease is 
higher than production and consumption. Also, production of orange products decreases 
by no more than 1% from the base level. Consumption follows a similar trend, while 




6.3.2 Welfare Impacts 
This subsection starts with comparing the annual welfare impacts for the different 
US regions and stakeholders under the No Mitigation Scenario with an assumption of 
average pest outbreak level. Then, the total welfare impacts for the different stakeholders 
and regions for the whole study period under the alternative mitigation scenarios and the 
No Mitigation Scenario are compared. Finally, the welfare impacts of the alternative 
scenarios under the assumptions of minimum, average, and maximum pest outbreak 
levels are compared. 
Changes in consumer welfare are defined as changes in consumer surplus. 
Changes in wholesalers’ and retailers’ welfare are measured by changes in returns to 
capital and management. Orange growers’ welfare is measured as changes in grower’s 
net profits including investment costs. Due to the possibility that the asset value of an 
infested orange orchard may be reduced, the analysis assumes that orange growers do not 
sell the orange orchards such that they do not incur losses relating to the decline in the 
value of their assets. Welfare losses for wholesalers, retailers, and growers refer to 
reduction from the baseline welfare level, and should not be interpreted as negative 
returns/profits. 
 
6.3.2.1 Welfare Impacts under the No Mitigation Scenario 
Changes in average California orange growers’ welfare is affected by changes in 
grower returns per acre, and production costs (Figure 6-13).  California growers achieve 
welfare gains until 2035 due to the high grower returns resulting from higher prices. 
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However, California growers start to incur welfare losses two years before average 
grower returns start to decrease. This is attributed to the higher costs of investment they 
incur due to new plantings which continue to increase after the changes in grower returns 
because of the lags in implementation of prior investment decisions. Welfare changes of 
Florida and Arizona-Texas growers follow a similar trend to that of California but with a 
smaller magnitude of welfare changes. 
Changes to the welfare of California fresh orange wholesalers follow an opposite 
trend to those of Arizona-Texas and Florida fresh orange wholesalers and California 
growers. California wholesalers of fresh oranges incur increasing welfare losses as input 
prices increase at much higher rates than output prices, in addition to lower derived 
demand by retailers and foreign importers because of higher prices (Figure 6-14). 
Welfare losses of California fresh orange wholesalers decrease with higher California 
orange output and lower input price. Meanwhile, Florida and Arizona-Texas fresh orange 
wholesalers benefit from the increase in wholesale price of California since the level 
change in output price is higher than the level change in input price, in addition to higher 
demand for their output with the decrease in California’s supply.  
The change in welfare of California’s orange products wholesalers follows an 
opposite direction to that of Florida  until 2024 (Figure 6-15). In the beginning of the 
forecast period, Florida wholesalers achieve minor gains due to the increase of output 
prices relative to input prices. However, such gains are partially offset by lower volume 
of sales due to less availability of Florida oranges for processing which have been 
diverted to the fresh market. As Florida’s total output increases with new plantings, 
Florida’ orange for processing availability increases and the wholesale price decreases. 
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This reduces the negative impacts of lower California production of orange for 
processing on California’s orange products wholesalers since they are net importers, 
besides being processors of California’s oranges. 
 
 
Figure 6-13: Annual Changes in Growers’ Profits in the Different US Orange-Producing 
Regions- No Mitigation Scenario 
 
Meanwhile, the trend of changes of welfare impacts for fresh orange consumers 
and retailers are similar in all regions (Figure 6-16). The difference between the level of 
impacts on the different regions is proportional to their consumption levels. The results 
show that, welfare losses to fresh orange retailers are much higher than those incurred by 
consumers. This is attributed to the fact that the reduction in the retail price of fresh 
oranges is much lower than that of the wholesale price. This implies that fresh orange 
retailers absorb a large part of the price change which can be explained by the high 
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elasticity of demand for oranges by consumers than the derived demand elasticity for 
oranges by retailers. 
 
 
Figure 6-14: Changes in the Returns to Capital and Management for Fresh Orange 
Wholesalers in the US Orange-Producing Regions- No Mitigation Scenario 
 
 
Figure 6-15: Change in Orange Products Wholesalers' Returns to Capital and 
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Figure 6-16: Changes to Total Welfare of Consumers and Retailers of Fresh Oranges in 
all US Regions-No Mitigation Scenario 
 
 
6.3.2.2 Comparison of the Welfare Impacts of the No Mitigation Scenario and the 
Alternative Mitigation Scenarios 
The welfare impacts of the No Mitigation Scenario and the alternative mitigation 
scenarios at the average pest outbreak level are presented in the first subsection. Then, in 
the second subsection, the impacts of the alternative mitigation scenarios at the minimum 
average and maximum pest outbreak levels are compared.   
 
6.3.2.2.1 Comparison of the No Mitigation Scenario and the Alternative Mitigation 
Strategies at an Average Infestation Rate 
The welfare impacts of the alternative scenarios in the different US regions at all 
market levels without discounting and at a discount rate of 5% under the assumption of 
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United States of all scenarios under 0%, 3%, 5%, 7%, and 10% discount rates are 
compared in Table 6-4.  
Under the No Mitigation Scenario, no action is taken to control the pest and 100% 
of California’s orange acreage is expected to be infested within 10-12 years resulting in 
an average loss of 11.25% of California’s orange production per year. This scenario 
results in the highest aggregate welfare losses for the United States with a total of                   
-$1,240 million in 30 years. The highest welfare losses are incurred by fresh orange 
retailers, as a total of all regions, followed by consumers of fresh oranges, California’s 
fresh orange wholesalers, then California’s orange products (juice) wholesalers. The 
welfare losses by fresh orange retailers are triple the welfare losses by consumers since 
retailers absorb a large part of the price increase as illustrated in the previous section. 
This is attributed to the high margin that retailers maintain between wholesale and retail 
price, as well as the high elasticity of demand for fresh oranges by consumers compared 
to the derived demand elasticity for fresh oranges by retailers from wholesalers. 
Consumers’ welfare losses are attributed to the higher orange prices and lower 
consumption.  
California orange wholesalers also incur welfare losses because the level increase 
in their input price, California’s grower price, is much higher than the increase in their 
output price. Also, there is a reduction in the quantity they sell in most of the years due to 
lower orange production by California. Meanwhile, Florida and Arizona-Texas 
wholesalers benefit from the increase in the wholesale price of fresh oranges in California 
since the grower prices in those regions increases at a lower rate than that of California. 
In addition, the grower prices in Florida and Arizona-Texas decrease before the decline in 
143 
 
California’s grower price (that decline in price is witnessed due to higher output). 
Although the increase in California’s acreage is much higher than that of the other two 
regions, acreage impact on output is offset by the yield shock in most of the years such 
that California’s orange output remain lower than the base level until the year 2041. By 
contrast, the increase of acreage in Arizona-Texas and Florida, though lower, is 
associated with a positive increase in fresh orange output.  
The decline in Florida and Arizona-Texas regions grower prices starting the mid 
2030’s offsets the gains they achieve in the beginning of the period, and the net impact on 
growers in those two regions for the 30 years is a welfare loss of -$17 million and              
-$3 million respectively. On the other hand, when a 5% discount rate is applied, the net 
gains for those two regions is a gain of $51 million for Florida, and $10 million for 
Arizona-Texas. However, all the welfare losses and gains for Florida growers are 
minimal compared to their production revenues. 
The growers in California achieve the highest gains under the No Mitigation 
Scenario in the 30-year period. The aggregate gains they achieve represent a total of 
$1063 million at zero discount rate and $766 million at a 5% discount rate. Most of the 
gains achieved by California’s growers are concentrated in the first 20 years of the 
projection period. Their gains in those 20 years are 1.65 times the total gains achieved in 
the 30-year period.  
Meanwhile, the eradication scenario results in the lowest welfare losses for the 
United States among all scenarios at all discount rates ($-4.02 million at 0% discount rate 
falling to $-3.36 million at 10% discount rate). In addition, the Eradication scenario is 
associated with the lowest welfare losses and gains for all groups of stakeholders. 
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Consumers’, retailers’, and wholesalers’ welfare losses are $-0.36 million, $-0.61 million, 
and $-2.34 million respectively which are minimal welfare losses compared to the other 
scenarios. Also, the overall welfare loss to California orange growers is only $-0.93 
million.  
The Pesticide Treatment Scenario and Area-wide Pest Management Scenario 
result in higher welfare losses than the Eradiation scenario, but lower than the No 
Mitigation Scenario. As an aggregate impact on the United States, the Pesticide 
Treatment Scenario and the Area-Wide Pest Management Scenario result in similar levels 
of welfare losses that amount to -$75 million and -$77 million respectively at a zero-
discount rate. However, the distribution of welfare gains and losses among the different 
agents differs between both scenarios. The Area-Wide Pest Management Scenario is 
associated with welfare losses to fresh orange consumers and retailers in all regions and 
California fresh orange wholesalers that are about one-third of those incurred under the 
Pesticide Treatment scenario. Meanwhile, the aggregate impact on fresh orange growers 
in California is a gain of $75 million under the Pesticide Treatment Scenario, and a 
welfare loss of $-23 million under the Area-Wide Pest Management Scenario.  
Decomposing the welfare impacts on California orange growers to distinguish 
between growers in infested and non-infested areas, we find that under the Pesticide 
Treatment scenario, orange growers in infested areas achieve total welfare losses of $-
116 million while growers in non-infested areas achieve total gains of $192 million 
during the thirty-year forecast period. Meanwhile, under the Area-Wide Pest management 
scenario, there are welfare gains for growers in non-infested areas of $70 million and 
welfare losses of -$93 million for growers in infested areas compared to base grower 
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profits during the thirty-year forecast period. The Eradication Scenario is associated with 
welfare losses of -$5.6 million for orange growers in infested areas, and welfare gains of 
$4.7 million for growers in non-infested areas. Under the No Mitigation Scenario, all of 
California’s orange acreage is infested with the pest starting year 12. Growers in infested 
areas achieve total gains of $859 million dollars in the 30-year projection period, and 
growers in non-infested areas achieve total gains of $204 million.  
In the following, the per grower welfare gains and losses under the four pest 
management scenarios are compared. An average orchard size of 60 acres is assumed, 
based on O’Connell (2009).  The No Mitigation scenario is associated with average gains 
of $7800 per grower in non-infested areas and average gains of $29,190 per grower in 
infested areas. Grower gains are calculated based on the assumption that the average crop 
loss rate of 11.25% uniformly applies to all growers. However, the orange crop damages 
due to the pest infestation range between 2.5% and 19.4%. Thus, if the crop losses do not 
uniformly apply to growers, California growers whose orchard is affected by the 
maximum crop damage of 19.4% under this scenario achieve average annual welfare 
losses of -$14,058 which are still lower than the average losses under Pesticide Treatment 
scenario as seen below.  
Under the Pesticide Treatment Scenario, growers in infested areas, which 
represent 9% of total California’s orange acreage in 2043, incur losses due to pesticide 
spraying costs in addition to losing 11.25% of their yield, but there are savings in harvest 
costs. For example, in 2043, 272 orange growers in infested areas are forecast to incur an 
average reduction in profit of -$40,880.2 each. Meanwhile, each of the 2645 growers in 
non-infested areas is forecast to achieve an average increase of $6291.4 in profit. 
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Under the Area-Wide Pest Management Scenario, growers in infested areas reach 
0.21% of total orange acreage in California in 2043. Assuming an orchard size of 60 
acres, 55 orange growers incur a profit reduction of -$160,113 each in 2043 in infested 
areas, and 2848 growers in non-infested areas achieve a profit increase of $2450.8 each in 
non-infested areas in the same year. The welfare losses to California orange growers are 
concentrated at the end of the forecast period when the infestation rate ranges between 
1% and 1.85%. Thus, 80% of the welfare losses incurred by growers are during the 
period (2036-2043). Consequently, the discounted welfare losses of California orange 
growers in infested areas are -$33.1 million and -$14 million at 5% and 10% discount 
rates respectively. 
Under the eradication scenario, the infestation of the False Codling Moth is 
concentrated in the first year (0.43% of the total orange acreage), after which the 
infestation rate decreases to 0.000485% in the second year, and then it decreases 
gradually to reach total eradication in the seventh year. Therefore, the main impact of the 
eradication program is witnessed in the first year. Assuming an average orange orchard 
size of 60 acres, 12 orange growers incur a welfare loss of -$459,696 each in the first 
year of the forecast period. Those welfare losses comprise revenue losses due to stripping 
of the entire orchard yield which is a requirement of the program, in addition to the costs 
of applying the mitigation programs of Sterile Insect Technique and Mating Disruption 
besides the costs of fruit stripping. The calculation of profit losses of growers takes into 
account the saving of harvest and growth regulator costs. In the same year, gains of 
growers in non-infested areas are negligible ($3.7 per grower). Following that year, gains 
and losses of all growers (there is no need to classify growers between infested and non-
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infested areas anymore since the pest is eradicated) alternate within a minimal range due 
to the minor changes in new plantings following the initial price increase in the first year 
as explained in the previous subsection. 
 
6.3.2.2.2 Comparison of the Impacts of the Alternative Pest Management Scenarios 
under the Three Pest Outbreak Levels  
The welfare impacts of the four alternative mitigation scenarios under the 
minimum, average, and maximum pest outbreak levels (with estimated potential yield 
losses denoted minimum, average, and maximum respectively in Table 6-2) are 
compared in Tables 6-4 and 6-5.  The ranking of the No Mitigation Scenario with respect 
to the aggregate welfare impacts on the United States and the welfare impacts on the 
different economic agents does not change under the three pest outbreak levels. It is 
associated with the highest welfare aggregate losses for the United States and the highest 
welfare gains for California orange growers. It also results in the highest welfare losses 
for fresh orange consumers, retailers, and California wholesalers.  
Under the average and maximum pest outbreak levels, the eradication scenario is 
associated with the lowest welfare losses. While there are small differences between the 
values of the aggregate welfare losses that the United States incurs under the Pesticide 
Treatment and Area-Wide Pest Management scenarios at the average outbreak 
assumption (-$75 million and -$77 million respectively), the difference in the values of 
aggregate welfare losses increases under the maximum outbreak scenario such that the 
former is associated with welfare losses -$311.69 and the latter is associated with losses 
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of -$327.29 million .The distribution of gains among the different agents for both 
scenarios does not change with the different outbreak assumptions.  
For the minimum pest outbreak assumption, the Area-Wide Pest Management 
scenario has a similar impact on pest spread as that of the eradication scenario under an 
average outbreak assumption such that the pest is eradicated after the fifth year. 
However, this scenario is associated with lower welfare losses to orange growers in the 
infested area than the Eradication scenario because the treatment costs are lower, and the 
growers can still sell the non-infested crop. Therefore, it is associated with a smaller 
overall welfare loss to the United States than that resulting from the Eradication Scenario. 
The Pesticide Treatment Scenario results in an overall welfare loss of $-9.81 million 
under the minimum outbreak assumption. 
  
6.3.2.2.3 Sensitivity of the Results to Different Discount Rates 
  Under the Pesticide Treatment and Area-Wide Pest Management scenarios, a 
higher discount rate results in lower overall welfare losses to the United States because 
the infestation rate increases gradually over the forecast period. As explained in the Area-
Wide Pest Management case, most of the welfare losses to growers in infested areas 
occur during the last eight years of the forecast period. Also, consumer welfare losses are 
higher near the end of the forecast period when the price increase is higher under both 
scenarios. That is why consumer welfare losses at a 5% discount rate are about one-third 
their levels at a 0% discount rate under both scenarios. Meanwhile, under the eradication 
scenario, the total consumer welfare losses actually increase with discount rates since 
they are concentrated at the beginning of the forecast period. Overall, under the 
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eradication scenario, the total welfare impacts are less sensitive to changes to discount 
rate since most of the pest impact is concentrated in the beginning of the forecast period.  
In the No Mitigation Scenario, the pest spreads to 100% of California’s acreage in 
year 11 with a yield reduction of 11.25% in all orange growing areas. Consumer welfare 
and fresh orange retailers’ and wholesalers’ welfare losses are reduced by about 50% 
using a 5% discount rate. However, orange growers’ gains are only reduced by 25%. This 
is because as an overall impact growers achieve higher gains in the beginning of the 
forecast period. In fact, California growers achieve gains in the first 20 years of the 
forecast period that are 1.65 times the total gain they achieve in the thirty-year period. 
They start to achieve welfare losses with lower price increase and higher investment costs 
starting the year 2035 as explained above.  
 
6.4 Conclusions  
This chapter compares the economic impacts of four alternate pest management 
programs to address the threat of False Codling Moth to California oranges. The 
projected pest spread and crop damages resulting from the alternative pest management 
alternatives are provided by PEARL/NCSU (2013).  The first alternative is a No 
Mitigation Scenario where no action is taken to control the pest. All California’s orange 
producing areas are infested with the pest in 11 years at the average pest outbreak 
assumption, and the pest is associated with an 11.25% loss of orange crop. 
 The other three scenarios include alternative pest control programs where the 
orange growers in infested areas incur all the costs. The Pesticide Treatment Scenario 
involves pesticide spraying at an additional cost of $380.9 per acre in infested areas. The 
150 
 
pest spreads to 9.3% of California’s orange acreage in 30 year under this scenario. 
Meanwhile, the Area-Wide Pest Management Scenario requires orange growers in 
infested areas to apply pesticides and strip the infested fruits but they can still sell 80% of 
the orchard yield. This program reduces the pest spread to 1.89% of total California’s 
acreage in 30 years at an average infestation rate and can lead to total eradication of the 
pest at a minimum pest outbreak assumption. On the other hand, the eradication scenario 
requires orange growers in infested areas to totally destroy their orange crop and apply 
several pest control techniques that cost them $3540 per acre. The maximum spread of 
the pest is in 0.43% of California’s orange acreage in the first year of infestation, after 
which the pest almost disappears until it is fully eradicated in the seventh year.  
The No Mitigation Scenario is associated with the highest aggregate welfare losses 
for the United States under discount rates ranging between 0% and 10%. The Eradication 
scenario is associated with the lowest total aggregate welfare loss for the United States at 
all discount rates. At the minimum pest outbreak assumption, the Area-Wide Pest 
Management scenario has similar welfare impacts to the Eradication scenario since they 
have similar pest spread impacts. However, at the average and maximum pest outbreak 
assumptions, the Area-Wide Pest Management and Pesticide treatment scenarios result in 
similar values of aggregate welfare losses to the United States, though the Area-Wide 
Pest Management Scenario results in slightly higher overall welfare losses than those 
resulting from the Pesticide Treatment Scenario under a maximum outbreak assumption 
(-$311.69 million versus -$327.29 million). Yet, in terms of the distribution of the 
welfare impacts among the different agents, the two scenarios differ as explained below. 
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Considering the separate welfare impacts of the alternative scenarios on the 
different groups of stakeholders, the Eradication Scenario is associated with the lowest 
welfare losses for fresh orange consumers, retailers, and wholesalers who incur the 
highest welfare losses under the other scenarios especially the No Mitigation Scenario. 
On the other hand, the No Mitigation and Pesticide Treatment scenarios result in the 
highest gains for California orange growers. Meanwhile, the Area-Wide Pest 
Management Scenario leads to negative welfare gains for California orange growers 
except under the minimum pest outbreak assumption.  
Decomposing the impacts on California orange growers at the average infestation 
rate, the Pesticide Treatment Scenario, Area-Wide Pest Management, and Eradication 
scenarios result in welfare losses of  -$116 million, -$93 million, and -$6 million for 
growers in infested areas respectively, and gains of $190 million, $60 million, and $5 
million for growers in non-infested areas respectively. Yet, the per grower welfare losses 
vary among the three scenarios due to their different impacts on pest spread and the 
varying program costs. Assuming an orchard size of 60 acres, 12 growers in infested 
areas incur  -$459,696 under the Eradication Scenario in 2014 (the year of highest pest 
spread), 272 growers incur welfare losses of -$40,880 under the Pesticide Treatment 
Scenario in 2043, and 55 growers incur welfare losses of -$160,113 under the Area-Wide 
Pest Management Scenario in 2043. 
Also, the findings show that the welfare impacts of orange growers and fresh 
orange wholesalers exhibit a negative relationship. However, a large percentage of 
California growers are members of cooperatives that perform the packing operations for 
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them and most of the revenues/losses accrue to growers. Therefore, some of the welfare 
gains/losses of growers are partially offset by impacts on wholesalers. 
Although, in the No Mitigation Scenario, there are high welfare losses to 
consumers due to higher prices of fresh oranges, the change in the retail price level is 
about 30% of the change in the wholesale price at retailers’ door. This is attributed to the 
high margin between the two prices which allows retailers to absorb a large part of the 
price change. This is besides the higher elasticity of demand of consumers for fresh 
oranges relative to the derived demand elasticity of retailers for fresh oranges.  
The welfare impacts on Florida growers due to changes in California’s market are 
small relative to the size of orange production in Florida even in the No Mitigation 
Scenario when there are large changes to price of fresh oranges in the US market. The 
reason is the small contribution (around 5%) of fresh oranges to Florida’s orange 
production which is mainly allocated to the processing market. On the other hand, the 
welfare impacts on Arizona-Texas markets are larger relative to the size of its orange 
industry since most of its production is directed to the fresh orange channel.  
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Table 6-3: Comparison of Welfare Impacts of the Alternative Scenarios on the US Regions (Value $Million) 
Scenario Element 
Total with zero discount rate Total with 5% discount rate 



















Consumer Welfare Fresh -59.86 -29.44 -66.84 -351.26 -507.4 -29.93 -14.66 -33.34 -175.78 -253.71 
Consumer Welfare Juice 4.77 0.48 4.44 40.78 50.47 0.71 -0.42 0.73 4.54 5.56 
Retail Fresh -179.05 -95.73 -187.47 -1090.69 -1552.94 -88.69 -47.63 -92.89 -539.95 -769.16 
Retail Juice 5.70 3.77 4.94 20.96 35.37 0.09 0.69 -0.01 1.05 1.82 
Wholesale Fresh -519.90 135.92 84.57   -299.41 -255.61 62.40 32.78  -160.43 
Wholesale Juice -184.94 169.74 5.87   -9.34 -89.32 47.08 1.97  -40.26 
Growers  Infested Areas 859.2     556.5     
Growers non-Infested Areas 204.1     140.8     
Total Grower 1,063.3 -16.84 -3.33   1,043.13 704.54 51.60 10.07  766.21 











Consumer Welfare Fresh -3.72 -1.79 -4.23 -22.14 -31.88 -1.31 -0.64 -1.49 -7.81 -11.25 
Consumer Welfare Juice -0.21 -0.18 -0.20 -1.42 -2.01 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.47 -0.66 
Retail Fresh -11.14 -5.81 -11.74 -67.8 -96.5 -3.93 -2.06 -4.14 -23.91 -34.04 
Retail Juice -0.25 -0.01 -0.21 -0.65 -1.12 -0.10 -0.01 -0.09 -0.27 -0.47 
Wholesale Fresh -37.68 8.08 3.94  -25.66 -13.71 2.93 1.31 0.00 -9.47 
Wholesale Juice -12.92 3.13 0.20  -9.59 -4.26 0.86   -3.4 
Growers Infested Areas -116.43         -40.09         
Growers non-Infested Areas 192.01     
  
 66.31     
  
  
Total Growers 74.38 14.17 2.91  91.46 26.22 4.95 1.09  32.26 






Table 6-4: Continued 
Scenario Element 
Total with zero discount rate Total with 5% discount rate 




















Consumer Welfare Fresh -1.28 -0.62 -1.46 -7.64 -11.01 -0.45 -0.22 -0.51 -2.69 -3.87 
Consumer Welfare Juice -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.55 -0.78 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.18 -0.26 
Retail Fresh -3.85 -2.00 -4.05 -23.4 -33.3 -1.35 -0.71 -1.42 -8.23 -11.71 
Retail Juice -0.10 -0.01 -0.09 -1.42 -1.62 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.59 -0.68 
Wholesale Fresh -14.27 2.94 0.63   -10.70 -5.01 1.02 0.16  -3.83 
Wholesale Juice -4.80 1.08 -0.02   -3.74 -1.66 0.33 -0.01  -1.34 
Growers- Infested Areas -93.47         -33.06         
Growers- non-Infested Areas 70.05         24.56         
Total Growers -23.42 5.14 2.04   -16.24 -8.50 1.84 0.75 0.00 -5.91 
















Consumer Welfare Fresh -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.28 -0.41 -0.08 -0.05 -0.09 -0.50 -0.72 
Consumer Welfare Juice 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Retail Fresh -0.15 -0.10 -0.17 -0.9 -1.32 -0.26 -0.15 -0.28 -1.57 -2.26 
Retail Juice -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.16 -0.21 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.19 -0.26 
Wholesale Fresh -1.65 0.11 -0.62  -2.16 -1.76 0.18 -0.19  -1.77 
Wholesale Juice -0.33 0.29 -0.02  -0.06 -0.40 0.16 -0.03  -0.27 
Growers- Infested Areas -5.6         -5.34         
Growers -non-Infested Areas 4.67     
  
  6.22     
  
  
Total Growers -0.93 0.12 0.87 0 0.06 0.88 0.44 0.36 0.00 1.68 







Table 6-4: Welfare Impacts under the Alternative Mitigation Scenarios, and Pest Outbreak Assumptions- No Discounting  




































Total 95.6 50.47 5.08 -7.81 -2.01 -0.15 -4.13 -0.78 0 0 0.06 0.02 
Retail  
Fresh 
Total -2815.1 -1552.94 -324.63 -405.69 -96.5 -6.9 -189.57 -33.3 -0.37 2.49 -1.32 -0.45 
Retail 
 Juice 
Total 47.3 35.37 8.5 -7.59 -1.12 -0.15 -4.17 -1.62 0 -1.36 -0.21 -0.01 
Wholesale 
Fresh 
Total -608 -299.4 -61.8 -108.49 -25.66 -1.5 -51.71 -10.7 -0.02 -5.34 -2.16 0.1 
CA -1060.4 -519.9 -109.9 -158.28 -37.68 -2.64 -74.88 -14.27 -0.15 -5.11 -1.65 -0.24 
AZ-TX 173.03 84.57 18.4 15.73 3.94 0.56 7.27 0.63 0.1 -0.37 -0.62 0.04 
FL 279.4 135.9 29.9 34.05 8.08 0.58 15.9 2.94 0.03 0.14 0.11 0.3 
Wholesale 
Juice 
Total -22.3 -9.34 -7.08 -39.37 -9.59 -0.9 -13.67 -3.74 -0.21 -0.65 -0.06 0 
Grower 
Profit 
Total 1265.2 1043.13 295.6 391.47 91.46 2.06 -1.32 -16.24 0.63 0.43 0.06 0.32 
CA 1329.04 1063.33 289.5 324.88 74.38 1.23 -34.39 -23.42 0.71 -1.26 -0.93 0.65 
AZ-TX -2.4 -3.33 1.29 15.25 2.9 -0.14 7.34 2.04 -0.12 -0.15 0.87 -0.39 
FL -124.5 -16.84 4.82 51.35 14.17 0.97 25.73 5.14 0.04 1.84 0.12 0.07 






































0% -3022.72 -1204.16 -192.03 -311.69 -75.3 -9.82 -327.29 -77.37 -0.09 -3.5 -4.02 -0.161 
3% -1721.96 -658.95 -94.81 -161.75 -41.55 -4.84 -174.48 -40.79 0.05 -2.89 -3.84 -0.159 
5% -1354.71 -438.78 -64.21 -107.53 -27.16 3.21 -118.09 -27.59 0.074 -2.34 -3.67 -0.158 
7% -1075.91 -321.31 -43.49 -73.18 -18.88 -2.18 -81.82 -19.23 0.071 -1.81 -3.53 -0.155 










CHAPTER 7.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
7.1 Conclusions 
This dissertation provides decision support to the United States regulators in the 
identification of the trade-offs in economic welfare among the different stakeholders to 
the United States orange industry under the alternative pest management strategies of 
False Codling Moth affecting California’s oranges. This is achieved through the 
integration of an economic model developed in this research with the output from a pest 
spread model developed by the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Service and North Carolina State University (PEARL/NCSU 
2013).  
False Codling Moth, a pest that prefers oranges as its main host, is not presently in 
the United States. Yet, it has the potential to be established in California. If introduced to 
California and no action is taken for its control, False Codling Moth can spread in all of 
California’s orange growing areas within 10 to 12 years, causing an average loss of 
11.25% of California’s orange production per year. California’s orange production 
represents 25% of the US total orange production. However, California dominates the 
United States fresh orange market with a market share of more than 75%. By contrast, 
Florida is the main US producer of oranges directed to processing. California and Florida 
constitute 97% of the US orange production, and Texas and Arizona produce the rest. 
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Several mitigation options are currently considered for the control/eradication of 
False Codling Moth where California orange growers in infested areas are assumed to 
pay the mitigation costs. The Pesticide Treatment Scenario involves pesticide spraying at 
an additional cost of $380.9 per acre in infested areas. The pest spreads to 9.3% of 
California’s orange acreage in 30 years under this scenario. Meanwhile, the Area-Wide 
Pest Management Scenario requires orange growers in infested areas to apply pesticides 
and strip the infested fruits but they can still sell the non-infested fruits. The mitigation 
practices under this scenario imply an additional cost of $2310.5 per acre for growers in 
infested areas. This program reduces the pest spread to 1.89% of total California’s 
acreage in 30 years at an average infestation rate and can lead to total eradication of the 
pest at a minimum infestation rate. On the other hand, the eradication scenario requires 
orange growers in infested areas to totally destroy their orange crop and biological 
control techniques that cost them $3508.5 per acre. The maximum spread of the pest is 
0.43% of California’s orange acreage in the first year of infestation, after which the pest 
almost disappears until it is fully eradicated in the seventh year.  
Therefore, the main objective of the current research has been to identify the trade-
offs in economic welfare among the different agents in the United States orange market 
under the alternative pest management strategies of False Codling Moth in California. 
This objective is achieved through developing a model that projects the economic 
impacts of phytosanitary measures for 30 years on the different stakeholders (consumers, 
retailers, wholesalers, and orange growers) along the US supply chain of fresh oranges 
and orange products in a dynamic partial-equilibrium framework.  
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Comparison of the impacts of the alternative pest management scenarios shows 
that the No Mitigation Scenario results in the highest aggregate welfare losses to the 
United States(-$1240 million), while the eradication scenario is associated with the 
lowest aggregate welfare losses(-$4 million). Alternatively, both the Pesticide Treatment 
and Area-Wide Pest Management Scenarios result in similar aggregate welfare losses           
(-$75 million and -$77 million respectively).  
California orange growers’ ranking of the alternative pest management scenarios 
in terms of welfare impacts is opposite to that of the United States as a whole as well as 
most of the other economic agents. The No Mitigation Scenario is associated with the 
highest welfare gains for California orange growers in infested and non-infested areas, 
and the highest welfare losses for fresh orange consumers, retailers, California 
wholesalers, and the United States as a whole.  This scenario has a similar impact to 
volume control policies. Prior to 1994, California orange growers participated in volume 
control policies when the California-Arizona Citrus Marketing Order permitted them to 
restrict the quantity of oranges sold in the fresh market. The organization of California 
growers through a cooperative system allowed them to apply a mechanism for 
compensation of growers who incur losses due to volume control (Jacobs 1994). Such 
cooperatives still exist but they currently operate in a market where volume control is 
outlawed. Their role is to perform the wholesale operations of packing and marketing of 
fresh oranges on behalf of growers and all the profits/losses accrue to growers (Boland 
2008). 
Given that many of California orange growers are also fresh orange wholesalers, 
the gains they achieve under the No Mitigation policy are partially offset by the losses 
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incurred at the wholesale level. Another consideration concerning the No Mitigation 
scenario is the existence of risks for individual California orange growers relating to the 
distribution of crop losses among them. All orange growers achieve gains under that 
scenario at the different pest outbreak assumptions (minimum, average, and maximum), 
if the crop losses are proportionately distributed among growers. If the crop losses are 
disproportionately distributed among orange growers, an individual grower who suffers 
the maximum crop loss rate of 19.4% under the scenario of an aggregate crop loss of 
11.25% incurs an annual average loss of $14 thousand. That annual loss is still lower than 
that of individual growers under the scenarios involving mitigation, but the probability of 
pest infestation is higher.  
The scenarios involving mitigation have minimal impacts on orange prices and 
require orange growers in infested areas to pay for the mitigation costs. Therefore, such 
scenarios are associated with welfare losses/lower welfare gains for California orange 
growers and lower welfare losses for the other economic agents and the United States as 
a whole. Among the four alternative pest management scenarios, the Eradication 
Scenario ranks highest for all economic agents except California orange growers in non-
infested areas. Also, compared to the other scenarios involving mitigation, the 
Eradication scenario results in the lowest total welfare losses for California orange 
growers in infested areas. However, the losses are concentrated among a small number of 
growers. Assuming an average orange orchard size of 60 acres in California, 12 orange 
growers incur welfare losses of -$460 thousand in the first year of the projection period 
after which the pest is totally eradicated. Meanwhile, California orange growers as a 
group incur total welfare losses of -$23 million under the Area-Wide Pest Management 
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as opposed to total welfare gains of $76 million under the Pesticide Management 
Scenario. Although total welfare losses for California orange growers in infested areas 
under the Pesticide Treatment Scenario are higher than those under the Area-Wide Pest 
Management Scenario, losses for individual growers under the Pesticide Treatment 
Scenario are lower.  
The above raises the question of whether gainers from the Eradication Scenario 
could compensate California orange growers for the welfare losses associated with that 
scenario including the welfare gains forgone due to not adopting the No Mitigation 
Scenario. Retailers and consumers of fresh oranges in all US regions and California 
wholesalers of fresh oranges and orange products incur total welfare losses of                             
-$2680 million under the no Mitigation Scenario, and -$5 million under the Eradication 
scenario. Thus, the Eradication Scenario avoids them total welfare losses of $2675 
million. In contrast, California orange growers achieve gains of $1063 million under the 
No Mitigation Scenario, and losses of -$0.93 million under the Eradication Scenario. 
Thus, accounting for the gains forgone, the Eradication scenario results in welfare losses 
of -$1063.93 million for California growers. If fresh orange retailers and consumers in all 
regions and California wholesalers of fresh oranges and orange products transfer 
$1063.93 million to California orange growers, they could avoid losses of $2675 million. 
 
7.2 Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research 
 There are several limitations to the analysis in the current study that would benefit 
from further research. First, the model employed in the current research assumes that the 
allocation of oranges between the fresh and processed markets in California is determined 
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by exogenous factors like weather. This assumption is based on the fact that the 
delivered-in price of oranges for processing is too low compared to the packinghouse 
door price of fresh oranges, since most of the oranges directed to processing are fruits 
that do not meet the standard of packinghouses. In addition, after the termination of the 
Arizona-California Citrus Marketing Order in 1994, about 80% of California’s 
production is allocated to the fresh market. The years when a lower share of California’s 
orange production is utilized as fresh are the years of severe weather events or lower 
rainfall. This led to the assumption that California orange growers strive to route their 
production to the fresh market channel, and the quantity of orange output that is routed 
out of the fresh market channel is determined by factors out of the grower’s control. 
However, further research about how California orange producers make their decision 
about the allocation of their production between the fresh and processed market will 
provide more insights to the analysis.  
Another limitation to the model developed in the current study is the non-
availability of data about inter-state trade in the United States. The model only accounts 
for net trade flows of each region without disaggregation of trade flows by origin and 
destination. Disaggregation of trade flows by origin and destination is particularly 
important when analyzing the impacts of measures that involve restrictions on movement 
of fruits from infested areas to specific regions. The current model treats restrictions on 
movement as a prohibitive tariff equivalent of the quantity of trade reduction resulting 
from the measure. However, restrictions on movement of fruits are not among the 
scenarios considered for the mitigation of False Codling Moth, the pest of focus in the 
current research.  
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Finally, while oranges represent the main host for False Codling Moth, there are 
other crops which can host the pest. The pest spread model assumes that producers of the 
other crops adopt the same control policies proposed for oranges. Thus, accounting for 
other hosts to the crop in both the pest spread and economic model is a useful extension 
of the current research.
1 
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All the model equations are transformed into logarithmic differential form. The 
logarithmic differential form has the advantage of being driven by elasticities which are 
easier to estimate or obtain from the literature.  In addition, it allows the flexibility of 
either using historically observed data or projected data (Paarlberg et. al. 2008). The 
following shows the logarithmic transformation of the equations explained in chapter 4.  
 
Consumer Demand 
Total logarithmic differentiation of equation (4.1) gives the percentage change in 
consumer demand for the aggregate of fresh oranges and orange products as follows: 
 
where oC represents percentage change in consumer demand,  refers to income 
elasticity of demand for oranges, E  is percentage change in consumer expenditure,   is 
own price elasticity of demand for oranges, and RCoP  is the change in average retail price 
of oranges,  is the cross price elasticity of demand for oranges with respect to other 




Meanwhile, the percentage change in fresh orange consumer demand is 
represented as follows: 
 
where σc  refers to elasticity of substation between fresh oranges and orange 
products, and subscripts o, of, and op  denote all oranges, fresh oranges, and orange 
products respectively. 
Orange products demand is represented as: 
 
 
Wholesale and Retail Level 
Total differentiation of factor market clearing conditions in equations (4.14) to 
(4.19) gives: 
 
Total differentiation of the zero-profit conditions, application of the envelope 
theorem, and normalization of quantity on the unit isoquant, the retail price is represented 
as a linear combination of the percentage changes in wages, retail returns to capital and 
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management, and wholesale price of oranges at retailer’s door weighted by their revenue 
shares: 
 
Similarly, the wholesale price of oranges is represented as a linear combination of 
percentage changes in wages, percentage changes in returns to capital and management 
of wholesalers, and percentage changes in the packinghouse door price of oranges as 
follows: 
 
With the assumption of constant returns to scale, and as shown in Paarlberg et. al. 
(2008), Woodland(1982), and Chamber (1988), the change in the ratio of per unit demand 
of oranges to per unit demand of capital is expressed as a function of the elasticity of 
substitution between oranges and capital, and the change in the ratio of the price of 
oranges and returns to capital as follows: 
 
The ratio between the percentage change in per unit demand for labor to the per 
unit demand for capital to produce a unit of oranges for retail sale is represented in a 
similar way: 
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